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Chapter 1  General Introduction 
 
The optimal boundary of banking organizations has been the subject of an active debate on 
defining the financial market structure of a national economy. The answers provided by banking 
economists point in two different directions: The theory of scope economies suggests that 
commercial banks should expand their activities into other financial services like securities and 
insurance activities, while the theory of specialization suggests banks better concentrate on their 
core business of loans and deposits. Since both sides are valid in their own rights, the preferred 
trade-off between the gains from scope economies on the one hand and from specialization on 
the other, and the risks related to them, defines the landscape of the banking industry with its 
broader or narrower scope of permitted operations. 
 
While a broader banking boundary, known as the Universal Banking System or the European 
Continental Banking System, is preferred in most European countries, the banking sector in the 
world’s biggest economy, the US, has maintained a narrow, or separating, banking system, since 
the Banking Act of 1933. 
1.1. Overview on banks’ securities activities: Regulatory evolution 
1.1.1. The Glass-Steagall Act and its background 
 
Banking conglomerates conducting securities activities were once common in the US until they 
were forbidden in 1933. The establishment of securities affiliates and the lifting of some of the 
federal restrictions on underwriting activities by the McFadden Act in 1927 enabled commercial 
banks to become prominent actors in the securities business by the end of the 1920s. In 1929, for 
example, 459 US banks were underwriting securities directly through their bond departments and 
an additional 132 were sponsoring securities issues through an affiliate (Flannery 1985, p. 68). 
By 1930, commercial banks were underwriting 54.4 percent of all new securities issues 
(Kennedy 1973, p. 212). 
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The Great Depression from 1929 to 1933 triggered a nation-wide wave of bank bankruptcy and a 
stock market crash. Between 1929 and 1933, nearly 10,000 banks went bankrupt; 4,000 banks 
closed their doors in 1933 alone (Friedmann and Schwartz, 1963). The Banking Act was passed 
at that critical moment to reconstruct a sound financial system. Section 16, Sections 20, 21, and 
32 of the Banking Act (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act), erected a wall between 
commercial banks and securities firms, restricting commercial banks to mainly deposit taking 
and loan making.  
 
The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in the context of a series of congressional investigations in 
the aftermath of the banking crisis. Commercial banks’ underwriting and trading of securities 
through their bond departments or affiliated securities firms were heard in court, and testimonies 
were produced on a wide variety of abuses in the securities activities of commercial banks, 
including insider trading and outright fraud. Of particular concern was the possibility that banks’ 
securities affiliates were involved in speculative and fraudulent activities at the expense of 
depositors and that they threatened financial safety and soundness (Kelly, 1985). Because of 
their access to the parent banks’ resources, the securities affiliates of commercial banks were 
charged with not being sufficiently cautious in their investment decisions,. It was also alleged 
that securities affiliates induced the banks to make a variety of ill-advised lending and 
investment decisions that they otherwise would not have undertaken, including the lending of 
money to affiliates or their customers on preferential terms and purchasing securities from the 
affiliates to relieve them of excess holding1.  
 
The key contents of the Glass-Steagall Act include: Section 16, which bars national banks from 
investing in shares of stock, limits them to buying and selling securities as an agent, and 
prohibits them from underwriting and dealing in securities; Section 20, which prohibits Federal 
Reserve member banks from being affiliated with any organization that is engaged principally in 
underwriting or dealing of securities; Section 21 which makes it unlawful for securities firms to 
accept deposits, and Section 32, which prohibits contacts between officers, directors, or 
                                                 
1 Among others, Shughurt II (1988), Kroszner (1994, 1998), Greenspan (1987), White (1984) also provide 
description on the historical evidence of imprudent speculation of commercial banks in 1930’s. 
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employees of a Federal Reserve member bank and any organization primarily engaged in 
underwriting or dealing of securities. 
 
The enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act erected barriers between banks and securities firms. 
Large banks which engaged in underwriting as well as accepting deposits at that time, such as J.P. 
Morgan & Co., were split. Other banks which had securities departments or affiliates, like Chase 
Bank and Citibank, divested them. From 1933 until 1999, although there were limited exceptions 
such as Section 20 subsidiaries2, Glass-Steagall essentially stood as a wall between commercial 
banking and securities activities.  
 
Some banks sought to circumvent bank regulations by forming holding companies. The holding 
company might acquire non-bank subsidiaries such as investment banks and insurance firms and 
use bank resources to engage in these activities. To close that loophole, Congress passed the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 which provided that non-bank companies owned by bank 
holding companies must be engaged in activities “closely related to banking”. Such activities 
were to be decided and defined by the Federal Reserve System.  
1.1.2. The erosion of the Glass-Steagall Act and passage of the Financial Service 
Modernization Act 
 
By the 1980s, commercial banks faced increasing competitive pressures from less regulated 
players in the financial market. The increased substitutability between various types of financial 
instruments has become an important global trend in financial services industries. Many financial 
instruments are now available to households and corporations that provide similar kinds of 
services. In many countries bank deposits compete with other liabilities of financial 
intermediaries, such as money market funds, in the provision of savings and liquidity services, 
and often also payment services. Many insurance products also have features similar to savings 
                                                 
2 Starting 1987, the Federal Reserve authorized bank holding companies to establish securities subsidiaries to 
engage in limited underwriting and dealing of securities. To comply with the Glass-Steagall Act, the revenues from 
the above bank-ineligible securities activities could not exceed 5 percent of the securities subsidiary’s total gross 
revenues, on an eight quarter moving average basis. Since the ineligible securities activities were authorized by the 
Fed under Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, these securities affiliates are commonly referred to as Section 20 
subsidiaries. 
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products. The demarcation lines between different types of financial intermediaries and financial 
services are therefore increasingly blurred. The consumer demands for financial services have 
changed as well. Consumers, households, and corporations are increasingly becoming more 
sophisticated and ask for a full package of financial services, preferably from a single provider.  
 
These changes make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between different financial products 
and different types of financial institutions. A strict division between commercial banking 
products and other financial products, even if possible, would be rather ineffective in real 
practice and rather costly in terms of social resources. Based on this context, regulatory 
authorities gradually set out to relax the Glass-Steagall Act by reinterpreting its provisions. 
Under Section 20 of the Act, banks were prohibited from affiliating with other financial 
institutions that were “engaged principally in the issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale, or 
distribution of financial assets”. Over the years however, the term “engaged principally” became 
subject to reinterpretation. Through a series of court rulings and Federal Reserve Broad 
interpretations, the type of securities and the proportion of assets that bank affiliates could devote 
to these securities were broadened3.  
 
Beginning in 1987, the Board of Federal Reserve (Fed) authorized bank holding companies to 
establish securities subsidiaries to engage in limited underwriting and dealing of municipal 
revenue bonds, mortgage-related securities, consumer-receivable-related securities, and 
commercial papers. To comply with the Glass-Steagall Act, the revenues from the above bank-
ineligible securities activities could not exceed 5 percent of the securities subsidiary’s total gross 
revenues, on an eight quarter moving average basis. By satisfying this limit, the securities 
subsidiary would be considered by the Fed as not engaging primarily in underwriting and dealing 
of ineligible securities. Since the ineligible securities activities were authorized by the Fed under 
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, these securities affiliates are commonly referred to as 
Section 20 subsidiaries. To isolate the ineligible securities activities from the banking system, 
                                                 
3  Reviews on some major parts of these deregulation measures are available on the Federal Reserve Board 
Documents [Docket No. R-0841], 1996, Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank 
Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities. 
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and to prevent the extension of the bank safety net from covering non-banking activities, the Fed 
required all bank-ineligible securities activities to be conducted in a subsidiary of the holding 
company that was independent of the commercial bank. Furthermore, the Fed established a 
number of firewalls restricting transactions, information flows, and shared management between 
the banks and the securities subsidiaries.4 
 
In 1989 the ineligible revenue limit was raised from 5 percent to 10 percent, and the Fed also 
authorized underwriting and dealing in all types of corporate debt and equity securities. By 1996, 
bank affiliates were allowed to underwrite up to 25 percent of revenues in corporate bond and 
equities. Virtually all large bank holding companies had Section 20 Securities Affiliates (Kwan, 
1997). And, following the relaxation of three Section 20 firewalls to allow officers’ and 
directors’ interlock, cross-marketing, and inter-affiliate transactions in October 1996, the Fed 
eliminated most of the remaining Section 20 firewalls and replaced them with a set of operating 
standards in August 1997. 
 
Along with the deregulation of ineligible revenues, a number of banks made significant inroads 
into the securities market. The top three banking organizations' Section 20 subsidiaries held a 
combined 10 percent of the underwriting market for domestic debt and equity issues for the year 
1996 (Kwan,1997). 
 
The regulatory tide to ease the separation banking system peaked in 1999 by the passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act, also known as the Financial Service Modernization Act of 
1999). The key provisions of the Act concerning the commercial bank financial services follow 
below: 
Financial holding company affiliations permitted a full range of securities activities and more:  
The Act permits banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to affiliate within a new 
                                                 
4 See Walter (1996), Mester (1996, 17-18). Richardson, (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1994), White (1986), Benston 
(1990, 1996) and Puri (1994, 1996) for discussion of firewalls. 
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financial holding company (FHC) structure. Financial holding companies are authorized to 
engage in a broad array of financially related services including securities underwriting and 
dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and merchant banking activities.   
Moreover, FHCs may also engage in any other activity that the Fed determines to be financial in 
nature or incidental to financial activities after consultation with the Secretary of Treasury. FHCs 
could expand even beyond the financial industry into any non-financial activity that the Fed 
determines to be (i) complementary to a financial activity and (ii) does not pose a substantial risk 
to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the financial system.   On the contrary, 
bank holding companies that have not chosen to become FHCs may only engage in activities that 
the Fed has determined to be closely related to banking under Section 4 (c) (8) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act.   
The procedure to become a financial holding company is simple and largely free of bureaucracy. 
Bank holding companies and foreign banks that meet certain eligibility criteria can choose to 
become FHCs, provided that all their depository institution subsidiaries are well-capitalized and 
well managed, and that all their depository subsidiaries have a satisfactory CRA rating5.  The 
decision by a bank holding company to become a financial holding company will be effective on 
the 31st day after it has been received by the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank, unless the Board 
has notified the bank holding company prior to that date that its choice was ineffective6. 
 
Financial subsidiaries of national banks permitted a limited range of securities activities: The 
Financial Service Modernization Act permits well-capitalized and well-managed national banks 
to control or own a “financial subsidiary”, providing that the banks have a satisfactory or better 
Community Reinvestment Act rating  A financial subsidiary may engage in activities that have 
been determined under the act to be financial in nature or incidental to financial activities and in 
activities that the parent bank is permitted to conduct directly. However, a financial subsidiary 
                                                 
5 CRA refers to the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Federal Reserve banks conduct regular examinations on 
banks’ CRA compliance and assign them CRA performance ratings according to the examination results.  
6 For detailed information on the procedure to become a financial holding company, see Federal Regulation, Part-
225, Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, Board of Governor of Federal Reserve System 
(Regulation Y). Sources available online: http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=635f26c4af3e2fe4327fd25ef4cb5638&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title12/12cfr225_main_02.tpl 
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cannot engage in insurance underwriting, real estate development, merchant banking, or 
insurance company portfolio investing. A precondition is that the aggregate consolidated total 
assets of all financial subsidiaries of the national bank cannot exceed 45 percent of the parent 
banks’ total consolidated assets, or $50 billion, whichever is greater. A state member bank may 
own or control a subsidiary that engages in activities that national banks may conduct through a 
financial subsidiary, if the bank and its subsidiary comply with the conditions and limitations 
applicable to national banks. 
Regulation: The Act authorizes banking regulators to adopt prudent standards and restrictions on 
the relationships or transactions between depository institutions and their subsidiaries and 
affiliates. The Fed serves as the “umbrella” supervisor of all bank holding companies (BHCs), 
including FHCs. 
The US banks apparently welcomed the GLB Act, and actively elected to be FHCs to better 
exploit the full range of permissible financial services. The following figure illustrates the FHCs’ 
number and their share of banking assets, both exhibiting steady increases. In the left axis of the 
bar graph, there are only around 100 FHCs in the beginning of 2000, shortly after the GLB Act 
was enacted. Five years later, at the end of 2004, this number has already risen up to nearly 500, 
accounting for nearly one fourth of the total BHC number. This increase is quite significant, as 
the total number of all BHCs only increase 30 percent during the same period.  In the right axis 
of the line graph, we also find a steady increase of FHCs’ share of banking assets. To the end of 
2004, FHCs already possess 87 percent of the total banking assets in the US, indicating that 
FHCs have gradually dominated the US banking market.    
Figure 1: Increase in Financial Holding Companies 
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Data Source: Harshmann, F. Yeager and T. Yeager, 20057  
1.1.3. Banks in securities activities: why it matters? 
An important concern underlying the regulations of banks’ securities activities is that they might 
bring about unfavorable effects on bank soundness and safety. For a long time securities 
activities were viewed as more risky than commercial banking activities, and, therefore, as a 
source of instability for the banking sector. Given the banks’ core position in the credit market 
and the payment system, it is widely feared that bank failures will carry significant social costs.8 
 
The central role of the banking industry in the financial system is the starting point of the 
common view9 that financial difficulties are assumed to be systematic only when the banking 
system has been hit. When this occurs outside the banking system, turbulence can be managed as 
long as banks are in a position to support the liquidity needs of other intermediaries, mitigating 
the risk of an overall market collapse. However, when the commercial banks are now allowed to 
set their feet into the investment banking field, shocks from the securities markets could directly 
affect the commercial banks themselves, and the fall-outs of the shocks might cause a decline in 
                                                 
7 The data include all top-tier domestic banking organizations that file the Federal Reserve’s FR Y-9C—the 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies. By including only top-tier organizations, we avoid 
double counting parent companies and their subsidiaries. Mandatory Y-9C reporters include all domestic BHCs and 
FHCs with total consolidated assets of at least $150 million. Smaller organizations are omitted from this sample. 
8 Ingo Walter, 1988, Deregulating Wall Street: commercial banks penetration of the corporate securities market 
9 Padoa-Schioppa, 2002, Securities and Banking: bridge and wall 
 9
the liquidity supply of the whole financial system and jeopardize its stability. In one word, the 
act authorizing banks’ securities activities does not only change the nature of banking institutions; 
it changes the financial environment in general, due to the central role the commercial banks play 
in the financial system. Its consequences, therefore, are worthy of detailed studies. 
 
Three extensively discussed topics in the area of bank soundness and safety are bank profitability, 
risk and efficiency. On the positive side, some argue that securities activities will enhance bank 
profitability, through economies of scope as well as through informational advantages, resulting 
from the cross-producing of different financial services. Others argue that securities activities 
generate important diversification effects and liquidity effects for banks, which mitigate banks’ 
risks. It is also claimed that to tear down the wall between banks and securities firms increases 
competition in the financial market, promoting bank efficiency.  However, on the negative side, 
critics argue that securities activities increase banks’ risks by connecting banks with securities 
market turbulence, by creating more space for moral hazard, by adding possibilities of risk 
contagion and by increasing the complexity of supervision and safety nets. Empirical studies, 
however, provide very mixed results when evaluating these effects from both sides.  
 
This dissertation will provide empirical studies on US bank holding companies to clarify the 
effects of banks’ securities activities with more contemporary data, in the context of the new 
regulation on banks’ expansion into securities activities. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
permits US banks’ securities activities primarily in the form of a financial holding company, 
which is based on a well-capitalized and well-managed banking holding company. Even before 
1999, the Fed’s deregulation on banks’ securities activities also focused on banks holding 
companies10 . Therefore, using bank holding companies as sample banks in the dissertation 
allows us to examine banks’ securities activities by way of “real” data, e.g. data from banks, 
which, in accordance with the financial regulation, “really” conduct securities activities. 
Compared with most of the previous studies which had to use synthetic universal banks to 
simulate banks’ securities activities or use industrial aggregate data, the presented dissertation 
                                                 
10 See Federal Reserve Bulletins in 1987, 1989, 1996 for deregulations of securities in bank holding companies. 
Also see page 4-5 for brief description of these deregulations. 
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has an apparent advantage by using “real” data11. The data distortion problem of simulation is 
avoided, and the bias of industrial aggregate data does not exist any more.   
 
Surely people might question just how informative and representative this research might be, if 
we only include bank holding companies in our data set. However, statistical survey on bank 
holding companies leads us to believe that they actually dominate the US banking market. 
Federal Reserve data shows that around 85-90 percent of US banking assets are kept by bank 
holding companies12.   Therefore, the examination of the profitability, risks and efficiency of 
bank holding companies holds important policy implications as to the regulation and supervision 
of the US banking sector. 
1.2. Structure of the dissertation: 
The main part of this dissertation consists of five chapters. We begin with a review of the 
theoretical arguments and the existing empirical evidence on the banks’ securities activities, both 
historical and current, in Chapter 2. Theoretically, the banks’ securities activities could have 
various effects on bank profitability, risk and efficiency. However, the effects are so profound 
and somewhat contradictory to each other, that they bring about confusion when theoretically 
deciding on the advantages or disadvantages of the banks’ securities activities. Empirical 
evidence is, therefore, of particular importance. When revisiting and rethinking the historical 
experience prior to the Glass-Steagall Act, no evidence is found to support the culpability of 
banks’ securities activities in the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933. More recent evidence, 
however, provides very mixed results of the banks’ securities activities after the 1980’s, which 
leads to three further empirical studies that we present in the dissertation.  
 
To provide a detailed examination of the exact effect of each individual securities activity, we 
divide the banks’ securities activities into three types, namely: securities trading, underwriting, 
and fiduciary activities. Chapter 3 provides a preliminary description of the various 
characteristics of the three different types of securities activities. Securities trading is an in-
                                                 
11 Chapter 2 provides detailed discussions of the data problem existing in previous studies, which use aggregate 
industry data or simulated universal banking data. 
12 See Board of Federal Reserve Annual Report 1995-2004.  
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balance sheet activity, with trading securities assets being listed in a bank’s balance sheet. 
Securities underwriting involves purchasing and selling commitments of the underlying 
securities, which are characterized as off-balance sheet items. Fiduciary activity relates to 
managing assets in the trust of clients, which essentially makes it an intermediary activity. 
 
Chapter 4 builds up a panel data model to study the effects of securities activities on bank 
profitability. Banks in the US during the period between 1993 and 2004 are examined. We find 
that securities trading activity enhances bank profitability significantly, in both linear and 
quadratic functions. Underwriting and fiduciary activities reduce bank profitability in the linear 
regression, but increase bank profitability in the quadratic function. This indicates that bank 
profitability begins to rise when the underwriting and fiduciary activities reach certain thresholds. 
The empirical results suggest that the securities activities enhance bank profitability, but only for 
a few top banks whose securities activities are above the threshold.  
 
The risk effects of a bank’s expansion into securities activities are examined in Chapter 5. The 
banks’ total risk is decomposed into market risk and interest risk through a two-factor model. 
Empirical results find that fiduciary activities significantly increase a bank’s total risk, largely 
due to the increment of its market risk. Securities trading activities do not touch a bank’s total 
risk, but they significantly increase a bank’s exposure to market risk while lower its interest rate 
risk. Underwriting lowers the total risk of banks and leaves the two specific risks untouched, 
indicating that the underwriting risk could be properly hedged. The results are interesting in that 
they find these securities activities to affect various kinds of banks’ risks in different ways. This 
indicates that an appropriate combination of these activities could serve as a useful instrument in 
bank operations, helping bank managers to adjust banks’ risk exposure accordingly. 
 
Chapter 6 explores in what way a bank’s expansion into securities activities may have an impact on 
bank efficiency. Empirical results find that all three types of investment banking activities increase 
bank efficiency scores significantly, and that the fiduciary activity brings about the largest efficiency 
improvement. The increased efficiency is attributed to enhanced competition, a higher level of 
employee working effort, and favorable information resources. 
 12
 
Chapter 2   Banks in securities business: advantages and disadvantages 
 
2.1. Theoretical arguments on banks conducting securities activities 
Theoretical debates on whether banks should be permitted to expand into securities activities are 
largely based on the potential effects of this expansion on bank soundness and safety. The three 
most intensively discussed topics are: profitability, risk and efficiency. 
 
In each of these three fields there exist some points that are strongly debated, both theoretically 
and empirically. One by one, we present arguments in these three fields by first beginning with 
some classic theoretical arguments and then proceeding with documenting doubts and cons for 
them. 
2.1.1. Profitability 
Economic theory generally supports that securities activities enhance bank profitability, through 
economies of scope and better informational advantages. 
 
Economies of scope 
 
Conceptually economies of scope are said to exist when the cost of one organization producing a 
given mix of products is less than the cost of several specialized firms producing the same 
bundle of products. Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1981) suggest that economies of scope in 
production arise when there are inputs that are shared or used jointly. 
 
Banks enjoy economies of scope when they offer a variety of related financial services (Saunders 
and Walter, 1994). Firstly, they can spread the fixed costs of managing a client relationship over 
a wider set of products (Steinherr and Huveneers, 1990). Secondly, they can use their branch 
networks and all their other existing delivery channels to distribute additional products at low 
marginal costs (Llewellyn 1996). Thirdly, they can deal with shifts in the demand for the 
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products they offer (some of the products offered by financial institutions are, to a certain extent, 
close substitutes) more easily because they can respond by shifting resources within their 
organizations. Finally, there are spillovers in reputation of financial service provider, since the 
public typically treats services as equally credible, as far as they are provided under the same 
brandname (Rajan 1996). Therefore, “broader” banks can use the reputation gained in offering 
one service to recommend their other services, enjoying scope economies in terms of reputation.  
 
However, some researchers criticize that scope economies might exist only theoretically, because 
banks actually cannot or do not choose their optimal institutional structure due to capital 
constraints or regulatory restrictions. Besides, the results of the empirical studies of scope 
economies have so far been mixed.  The bulk of studies for US banks concludes that economies 
of scope in banking, if at all present, are exhausted at very low levels of output (Berger et al. 
1987; Berger et al. 1993).These studies may have limited relevance, however, as US banks were 
allowed to only offer very limited investment banking services, and these activities had to be 
located in a separate subsidiary of the bank holding company. 
 
Empirical studies on European banks, which may be more relevant since European countries 
generally allow more integrated banking, have been regretfully inconclusive. Lang and Welzel 
(1995) report scope economies in small cooperative banks, but find absence of scope economies 
in German universal banks. Vander Vennet (2002), on the contrary, finds universal banks have 
strong economies of scope, especially for the bank size category above 20 billion Euro.13 
 
Informational advantages: 
 
The theory of asymmetric information tells us that firms generally have internal information 
about their own creditworthiness and about relevant features of their investment projects. This 
information is usually not readily available to outsiders or might not be credibly conveyed to 
outsiders. Financial intermediaries, especially banks, heavily rely on the availability and 
                                                 
13 see Clark (1988), Mudur (1992) and Forestieri (1993) for a survey of the empirical research on economies of scope. 
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credibility of the information, which help them to correctly screen bad projects out and pick good 
projects up, thus enhancing their profitability. 
 
It is argued14 that conducting securities activities helps banks reduce informational asymmetries 
in several ways. Firstly, informational advantages stem from a more sustainable bank-firm 
relationship. In establishing a relationship with a firm, a bank incurs costs in gathering 
information about the firm and its investment opportunity before making lending decisions. The 
longer the expected duration of the bank-firm relationship, the more willing the bank will be to 
invest in gathering firm-specific information, which in turn can increase the financing to valuable 
investment projects. Firms would switch between different financing patterns over their business 
life cycle, as small firms typically turn to banks for financing due to their poor acknowledgement 
by the market, while bigger firms tend to go to the open market, based on their readily available 
information (reduced information asymmetric). Therefore, banks’ expansion into securities 
activities helps to prolong the relationship between firms and banks: when a firm switches from 
bank financing to raising money on the capital markets, it can continue to be a customer of the 
same bank if the bank provides both lending and securities underwriting services. 
 
Secondly, a “broader” bank has more information than a specialized bank as it can offer a 
broader set of financial products than a specialized bank. This allows the bank to learn more 
about its borrowers and with lower information and monitoring costs. Information derived, for 
example, from managing a basic bank account can be used in the supply of other financial 
services.  
 
However, critics argue that the degree to which these informational advantages can be realized 
depends on the degree of informational asymmetries: only in economies where information is 
generally poor, close bank-firm relationships could in principle be very useful (Rajan and 
Zingales 1999).  
                                                 
14 For a more detailed explanation on this point, see Claessen and Klingebiel, 2001 
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2.1.2. Bank risks: 
Given the unique role of banks in the monetary system, bank risk is the most vigorously 
discussed topic when arguing the consequences of the securities activities. It is also the most 
complicated topic, with interactions between some effects mitigating bank risk and other effects 
increasing bank risk. 
 
Risk-mitigating effects ---- diversification effects 
 
A bank engaged in securities activities may be more stable than a specialized financial institution 
because of diversification benefits. These benefits can arise from several sources. 
 
First, due to low or even negative correlation between returns from commercial banking and 
securities activities, the total profits of a bank providing securities services will be more stable 
than that of a “narrow” bank with a single product. This is supported by empirical evidence from 
various authors (Kwan and Ladermann 1999, Eisenbeis and Wall 1984).  
 
Secondly, when firms bypass banks and raise money directly from public markets or from 
wherever they obtain other types of financial products from capital markets, particularly from 
equity markets, it will affect a bank less because the decline in lending business can be offset by 
an increase in underwriting and securities trading business. This in turn may reduce the banks’ 
incentives to engage in riskier lending to maintain profits when faced with a client switch. This 
effect is difficult to show at the individual bank level, but there is some support at the sectoral 
level that financial systems with fewer restrictions are more stable (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 
2001a).  
 
Risk-mitigating effects ---- Liquidity effects 
Banks have long been viewed as the liquidity provider of the financial system, offering liquid 
deposits and finance illiquid loans. The mismatch of banks’ illiquid assets and liquid liability 
makes banks particularly vulnerable to the liquidity shock, resulting either from bank runs or a 
sudden liquidity contraction. The proponents of banks’ securities activities suggest broadening 
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the set of banks’ permissible investments to include various funds, bonds and equities helps 
balance the mismatched assets and liability.  
 
Bonds and equities are more liquid than bank loans in several ways: firstly, there is an open 
market for funds and equities so that they are easy to sell instantly, which helps the bank meet 
any spontaneous liquidity demands, which might be unforeseeable in some cases. Secondly, 
bonds and equities are typically designed with small face values per unit, allowing the bank to 
sell or buy any small amount it wishes, without severely damaging their values. This is contrary 
to loans, which usually can not be decomposed to be sold in parts whose sizes exactly match the 
banks’ liquidity need. Lastly, the continuous trading in the open market offers a continuous 
yield-risk curve for bonds and equities, so that the bank can choose to buy or sell any specific 
combination of liquidity, yield and risk, as long as it matches the need of the bank`s’ liquidity 
management and profitability or risk management. 
 
However, critics point out that the liquidity effect of including securities in banks’ portfolio is 
limited, especially when the bank faces a relatively big liquidity demand. For example, when a 
bank tries to sell a big block of securities, it incurs the risk of having to sell that block at a lower 
price.  Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987), for example, find that selling large blocks of 
common stocks affects the stock price by permanently lowering the stock price. 
 
Risk-enhancing effects ---- inherent risks of securities markets  
 
Many argue that the securities activities are inherently more risky than commercial banking 
activities. A combination of securities and commercial banking activities therefore can increase 
the risk of bank failure (Saunders 1994). The restrictions on banks’ permitted activities thus aim 
at limiting banks’ opportunities to undertake too much risk. 
 
Securities activities can be divided into agency-type activities and principal type activities. In the 
agency-type, the bank acts as an agent, conducting two-way transactions on behalf of customers, 
include acting as a securities broker or as a “placement” agent in underwritings. In the principal-
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type activities, the bank acts as a principal; that is, it conducts transactions for its own account. 
These mainly refer to securities trading15.  
 
Agency-type activities are mainly fee-based, but that does not necessarily mean that they are less 
risky. Fee-based activities are sometimes more variable than loan activities, as the clients are not 
bound by relatively long term loan contracts. The switching costs are therefore lower and the 
incomes are volatile.  Besides, the agency-type activities, unlike the principal-type activities and 
bank loan business, require less capital, which hence promotes banks’ financial leverage and 
further amplifies the income volatility.  With the principal-type activities the risk lies in the fact 
that the bank attempts to profit from acquiring securities in the expectation of reselling them at a 
higher price. This makes the profitability of the principal-type activities very dependent on the 
banks’ assessment of the value of the securities and on that of the market. Furthermore, even if 
the bank has accurately and correctly valued the securities, big price swings might still happen 
due to runs by securities investors, driving the bank out of its balance position in a very short 
time. Analogous to bank runs, securities investors can run (i.e. rush to sell) in favour of higher 
liquidity and lower risk. Herding behavior may take place if investors copy the actions of others, 
who are presumed to be better informed. While herding is more often associated with less 
informed retail investors, evidence suggests that it might even take place among professional 
investors. Thus, when rushes to exit particular securities or collective investments cause large 
swings in market prices, a risk of failure for securities businesses is implied. 
 
Risk-enhancing effects ---- risk contagion 
Since securities activities, as well as the aforementioned, are inherently riskier; a further question 
is how these risks might strike a commercial bank through various tangible and intangible 
contagious effects. Contagion refers to the situation where a bank is affected by financial 
problems, such as insolvency or illiquidity, arising in another financial service provider which is 
capitally or managerially linked to it. One contagious channel is the potential transfer of capital 
from a bank, as might occur when it attempts to rescue an associated securities firm from 
financial difficulties. Such transfers may be evident, as in the case of loans, investments and 
                                                 
15 For a more detailed explanation, see Santos, 1998 
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guarantees, or may be obscured, most often through devises such as the off-market pricing of 
internal transactions. Another contagious channel is the potential for negative events involving 
an associated securities firm to trigger a liquidity crisis or a substantially diminished flow of 
business for a bank.  
 
However, empirical evidence does not confirm this risky effect as a general proposition. An 
empirical analysis of bank failure in the 1920s in the US, for example, found that banks 
undertaking securities activities were no more likely to fail than banks with no connection to the 
securities business (White, 1986).  More generally, there is no strong evidence that the 
combination of financial activities increases risk, they might as well reduce risks. 16 
 
Risk-enhancing effects ---- moral hazard 
Moral hazard exists extensively in various fields of banking economics. As to banks’ securities 
businesses, however, moral hazard is mainly concerned with the possibility of risk shifting and 
asset substitution, namely the substitution of highly risky securities assets with banks’ other safer 
assets, and shifting the risks from bank shareholders to bank debtors. 
 
As in any other debt-financed firm, banks’ managers acting in the shareholders’ interest have an 
incentive to take excessive risks, because the debt holders bear the downside risk while the 
shareholders benefit from the upside potential. This problem of “risk shifting” is particularly 
acute in the banking sector where a large proportion of the liabilities are in the form of debt 
(deposits). (Allen and Gale, 2000, p. 271-273) Allowing banks to participate in securities 
markets therefore gives banks opportunities to realize their risk shifting incentive and results 
actually in the substitution of high-risk assets.  
 
Risk-enhancing effects ---- complexity for financial supervision and safety net 
 
Supervision of commercial banks and securities entities aims at different objectives. Supervision 
of commercial banks is aimed at systemic stability by protecting the net worth of the entity (and 
                                                 
16 For example, Wall and Eisebeis 1984. 
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thus the rights of creditors, particularly depositors) as the bank will primarily be intermediating 
third party money. In securities firms, the regulators’ objective is aimed at consumer protection. 
Regulations are geared to safeguard the investment made by investors through these firms: as 
long as investors can recover the assets they have invested in, insolvency of a securities firm 
does not need to present a systemic risk. Therefore, from a systemic stability point of view, 
supervisors would care more about the risks that arise from commercial banking as they relate to 
the safety net. The combination of securities and commercial banking activities can make 
supervision and monitoring more difficult as the two activities can not easily be monitored 
separately and therefore supervised according to their respective regulatory aims. 
 
The risks, as argued by Claessens and Klingebiel (2001), may be amplified through the 
ambiguous business boundary between commercial banking activities and the banks’ securities 
activities. Some of these two types of activities are closely linked or even partially substitutable 
to each other. This makes it possible for similar activities to be treated differently or for some 
activities to remain unsupervised, which creates incentives for regulatory arbitrage and can 
thwart the intent for regulation. Moreover, the consolidated position of a bank with securities 
affiliates may not be transparent due to complex internal exposures which may have adverse 
effect on the health of the banking entity. Consequently, the effectiveness of prudential 
requirements and supervisory indicators applicable to individual institutions may be diminished. 
 
2.1.3. Efficiency: 
 
Efficiency is important in that it is an indicator for bank soundness and that it is closely related to 
bank risk. Various studies demonstrate that institutions would display low efficiency prior to 
failure. Cebenoyan, et al. (1993) use annual accounting data in 1988 for 511 S&Ls in the US 
They firstly compute inefficiency scores for these S&Ls through a stochastic frontier approach, 
then employ the inefficiency scores as explanatory variables for the binary consequence of 
whether a S&L failed or not. A highly significant, positive coefficient of inefficiency scores 
implies that inefficient S&Ls are more likely to fail.  Barr, et al. (1994) quantify a banks’ 
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managerial efficiency, using a data-envelopment analysis model that combines multiple inputs 
and outputs to compute a scalar measure of efficiency. They find that failure-prediction models 
for detecting a banks’ troubled status which incorporate this explanatory variable have proven to 
be robust and accurate.  In short, banks and S&Ls with a low efficiency failed at greater rates 
than institutions with higher efficiency levels and this relationship was evident a number of years 
ahead of eventual failure. As a result, efficiency measures have been shown to improve the 
predictive accuracy of failure prediction models and thus may represent a useful addition to 
current modeling efforts by regulatory agencies. 
 
Although there is no doubt about the importance of bank efficiency, theoretical arguments are 
not convergent on how the securities activities might affect bank efficiency. On one side, 
deregulating the wall between banking and securities activities promotes competition in financial 
services, which would force inefficient banks out of the market and enhance the average bank 
efficiency; on the other side, however, conducting securities activities means banks have to adopt 
the complicated organizational structure of a holding company, which might be economically 
and managerially inefficient. 
 
Competition enhance efficiency 
Tearing down the wall between banking and securities activities increases competition in 
financial services. One effect of separating banking systems was to divide the financial market 
into the narrow functional banking fields of commercial banking and investment banking and 
therefore limit the competition between commercial and investment banks (Shughart II, 1998). 
However, this market segmentation effect has been diminished under the current regulatory 
framework. Banks nowadays have to operate in an increasingly challenging environment, 
resulting from commercial banks entering a new competition environment of the securities 
market and investment banks in turn entering into commercial banking markets. Whether and 
how banks may survive in this new financial era depends in part on how efficiently they operate. 
 
It is typically argued that competition enhances efficiency. Leibenstein (1966) points out that 
competition affects the intensity with which firms and people work. He claims that people and 
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organizations normally work neither as hard nor as effectively as they could, and that they 
discretely choose their optimal working effort according to their own utility maximization. As a 
result, a given set of inputs produces various outputs, depending on how efficiently they work.  
Where the competitive pressure is light, people will trade the disutility of greater effort; therefore 
produce fewer outputs than maximally feasible outputs. In this way, the economic resources are 
inputted in an inefficient way and the average cost for per unit output is higher than the feasible 
minimal level. Under tighter competition with more newcomers to the banking and securities 
industries, however, the quantity of financial service outputs increases and the price falls to a 
lower level which makes it difficult for the inefficient banks to make profits. Banks whose costs 
are above the new price level now face stronger pressure: either they reorganize themselves to 
produce more efficiently or they are forced out of the market.  As a result, after a certain period 
only more efficient banks stay in the market and the average efficiency is promoted. 
 
More complicated organizational structure decreases efficiency 
 
Each organization has its internal inertia. Bureaucracy, misunderstandings, ambiguous entrust 
and buck-passing behavior between various internal divisions, all these increase the 
organizational inertia and decrease organizational effectiveness. In principle the organizational 
effectiveness has a negative relationship with the size of the organization. When an organization 
grows bigger and contains more complicated internal structure, the bureaucratic behavior inside 
and the inertia become more serious. 
 
The present organizational structure for banks to conduct securities activities is typically a 
financial holding company, as proposed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. However, it is 
criticized that the holding company structure is uneconomic, as it has to establish a holding 
company which can not produce any profit (Santos 1997, Claessens and Klingebiel 2002). 
Besides, the complicated holding company structure makes it more difficult to conduct a proper 
corporate governance and increases the opportunities for agent rent-seeking. By using a sample 
of 412 multi-bank bank holding companies (MBHCs) from 1990 to 1994, Klein and Saidenberg 
(1997), for example, suggest that some organizational inefficiencies are inherent in the holding 
 22
company structure. They argue that banks should be allowed to realize the benefits of 
diversification without limiting them to a particular organizational form. 
 
2.2. The effects of bank securities activities revisited: historical evidence 
 
Profound but contradictory theoretical arguments fail to reach conclusions. In the following 
section, we interpret empirical evidence to clarify the real effects of banks’ securities activities.  
Since the division between banks and securities firms was legitimated in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression, it is helpful to revisit and rethink the historical experience of banks’ securities 
activities at that time. 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The prohibition of banks’ securities activities was introduced in the context of the Great 
Depression 1929—1933. The Depression, triggered by a sudden stock market crash in October 
1929, caused enormous hardships for tens of millions of people and the failure of a large fraction 
of the nation's banks, businesses, and farms. By 1933, 11,000 banks had failed, or 40 percent of 
the total bank number in 1929; about $2 billion in deposits had been lost since 1929; money 
supply had contracted 31 percent since 1929. Instability in the banking system disrupted savings 
and investments, with investments dropping from $16.2 billion to a third of one billion dollars 
since 1929.17  
Commercial banks were not only among the biggest victims of the Great Depression; they were 
also blamed to be partly responsible for it, having themselves engaged in speculations in the 
stock market or through their affiliated securities firms.   
The involvement of commercial banks in the securities business predates the 1920s. However, 
national commercial banks were essentially forbidden to engage in equities underwriting until 
the McFadden Act of 1927, when “the Controller of the Currency was given the power to allow 
                                                 
17 Data from: Timeline of the Great Depression. Sources available online: 
http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/THE_GREAT_DEPRESSION.htm 
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banks to underwrite securities at his discretion” (Geist, pp. 178). This boosted the involvement of 
commercial banks in the underwriting business and helped the stock market to explode. 
Cocurrent with the commercial banks’ large expansion into the securities activities sector, the 
stock market in the US exhibited rampant speculations. The use of credit and leverage to buy 
stocks was common place. Investors were able to buy stocks on up to a 90 percent margin with 
the banks and brokerage houses charging high interest rates on margin or call loans. The bull 
market rose more than 200 percent between 1925 and 1928. Such rampant speculations forced 
the stock market to new highs and was a factor in facilitating its ultimate collapse (Bauer and 
Kelly, 2001). 
Since the active expansion of commercial banks in the stock market was almost synchronized 
with the rampant stock market speculations, many people believe that the former phenomenon is 
a major cause of the latter. Notorious cases of a few commercial banks’ outright fraud in stock 
trading 18  also contributed to the public feeling that commercial banks and their securities 
subsidiaries were speculative and fraudulent in the stock market.  Critics argue that these frauds 
and speculations did not only hurt bank clients’ interest and stock market’s soundness, but also 
impaired banks themselves: When the stock market crashed, commercial banks were also pulled 
down, due to their large credit involvement with their securities subsidiaries. And, furthermore, 
the fall-outs of commercial banks’ collapse triggered the economic crash. 
Decades after the Depression, however, rethinking and revisiting that catastrophe provides 
different historical evidence. The following points were researched, which help to clarify the real 
role that banks’ securities activities played in the economic crash. 
2.2.2. Relatively low risk of banks with securities activities 
Accumulated evidence shows that the banks’ securities activities actually were inculpable in the 
banking crisis. Furthermore, the securities activities might have mitigated the banks’ risk 
exposure.  
                                                 
18 Shughart II ( 1988) and Walter (1994)  cite some juristic charges on commercial banks’ fraud and speculations in 
stock market.  
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Negative correlation between the banks’ securities affiliates and the bank failure constitutes the 
strongest evidence against the culpability of bank securities activities. It was the smaller, rural 
institutions that accounted for the majority of bank failures throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, 
and virtually none of these were likely to have been much involved in underwriting activities. 
Eighty-eight percent of the banks that suspended operations between 1921 and 1929, for example, 
had capital of less than $100,000 (Kelly 1985, p. 44). This is the pattern that continued into the 
1930s. The institutions that failed over the next four years were similarly smaller, on average, 
than those banks able to weather the storm.  
 
Table 2-2. Average size of failed bank versus all banks: deposit per bank ($1,000), 1929--1933 
year failed banks all banks 
1929 349.99 1,977.77 
1930 620.07 2,165.08 
1931 737.13 2,183.29 
1932 486.69 1,903.38 
1933 899.18 2,257.90 
Source: See Shughart II 1988, data from Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 438) and US 
Department of Commerce (1975, pp.  1021—22). 
 
Furthermore, by examining the securities subsidiaries of failed banks, White (1986, p.40) notes 
that while 26.3 percent of all national banks failed between 1930 and 1933, “only 6.5 percent of 
the 62 banks which had affiliates in 1929 and 7.6 percent of the 145 banks which conducted 
large operations through their bond departments closed their doors.” More importantly, using 
data for 1931, the year when the largest number of banks with securities affiliates failed, White 
(p.41) finds that the presence of an affiliate appears to have reduced the probability of bank 
failure. 
 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 354) observe that “if there was any deterioration at all in the ex 
ante quality of loans and investments of banks, it must have been minor, to judge from the 
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slowness with which it manifested itself.” Simply put, banks would have failed at a much higher 
rate as the economy moved into depression if the composition of the asset and loan portfolios 
they had built up during the 1920s had been a major contributor to impaired safety and 
soundness. 
 
Case to case studies also rejected the culpability of securities activities in explaining the wave of 
bank failures. Despite the fact that congressional hearings on the subject generated much rhetoric 
on the harm to the safety and soundness of commercial banks allegedly caused by their 
investment banking activities, securities affiliates were identified as a proximate cause of failure 
only in the case of the Bank of the United States (Flannery 1985, p. 75). Moreover, although the 
collapse of the Bank of the United States in December 1930 was spectacular and contributed 
greatly to a weakening of public confidence in the banking system, it was due less to the 
operations of the banks’ securities affiliate per se than to inept management and outright fraud 
(Kennedy 1973, pp. 1—5). 
 
2.2.2. Weak evidence on conflicts of interest:  
The traditional conflict of interest argument is that banks’ securities affiliates could -- and did -- 
systematically fool the (naive) public investor. It was alleged that opportunistic commercial 
banks systematically duped naive investors into buying low-quality securities, which helped to 
undermine the confidence in the public markets (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994) . A typical argument 
is that since a commercial bank has loans outstanding to firms, it could favor the interests of its 
own equity holders in the following manner: if a bank had private bad news about a firm it had 
lent to, it could use its underwriting arm to certify and distribute securities on behalf of the firm 
to an unsuspecting public and have the firm to use the proceeds to repay the outstanding bank 
loan. However, empirical research on the conflicts of interest associated with commercial banks’ 
securities activities has not uncovered strong evidence supporting the claim that banks did 
exploit these conflicts (Puri 1993,1994, 1996; Kroszner and Rajan, 1994,1997) . 
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The conflicts of interest are generally difficult to determine because they emerge precisely in 
situations where information is poor ex ante, and it is difficult ex post to distinguish between 
malfeasance and bad luck. However, an intuition is that if conflicts of interest exist extensively, 
the securities placed by the commercial banks should systematically have a quality that is below 
average. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) use this idea to examine the conflicts of interest for the 
period before Glass-Steagall: comparing the ex post default performance of ex ante similar 
securities underwritten by commercial banks (either through trust departments or through 
affiliates) with those underwritten by investment banks, they find no evidence that commercial 
banks systematically fooled the public by offering low-quality securities. Instead, their findings 
indicate that commercial banks underwrote higher-quality securities, which performed better 
than comparable securities brought to the market by investment banks.  
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2.3. Contemporary survey on banks’ securities activities 
 
Compared with the historical survey, contemporary surveys on banks’ securities activities benefit 
a lot from enriched empirical methodologies but suffer severely from poor data availability. 66 
years of regulatory prohibition on banks’ securities activities leave this long period absent of data, 
leading to great difficulties in conducting empirical studies.  
 
To circumvent the weak data availability, researchers conceived various methods as alternatives: 
early literature of the 1970’s and 1980’s typically uses industry aggregate data, to compare the 
risk and profitability between securities industry and banking industry. Others try to compose 
synthetic universal banks conducting securities activities, by simulating mergers between banks 
and securities firms.  Some literature compares US banks with their European counterparts, who 
have been permitted to conduct securities activities for a long time.  Later, when the Federal 
Reserve Board gradually deregulated the commercial banks’ securities activities beginning from 
late 1980’s, some papers examine the consequences of securities activities within a very short 
period by looking into the very limited samples of bank holding companies with Section 20 
Subsidiaries19. Alternatively, a few others checked the effects of banks’ securities activities by 
conducting event studies on Federal Reserve’s deregulation actions. 
 
All these methods have their own drawbacks. Some have been questioned for using industry-
level data, which introduces an aggregation bias20. The studies of hypothetical mergers between 
banks and securities firms have also been questioned for not taking into account the effects of 
policy changes that usually follow a merger. The outcome of a merger between two firms is not 
the same as the combination of their balance sheets, as firms change their policies after the 
merger in order to take advantage of, for example, the scope economies associated with the new 
                                                 
19 By re-explaining the section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Fed allows the banks’ securities affiliates to expand 
into activities on those so-called “non-illegible” securities as equity and corporate bonds. These affiliates are called 
“Section 20 Subsidiaries”.   
20 See Boyd, Hanweck and Pithyachariyakul (1980) for a discussion of the aggregation bias in these studies. 
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mix of activities that they undertake. Studies on Section 20 Subsidiaries are criticized for 
restricting their samples to a very limited number of BHCs with subsidiaries while neglecting all 
other BHCs which count for the majority of banks.  Besides, studies within a very short time 
window are also affected by market turbulances which particularly occur in these short period. 
Despite of this criticism, however, the abovementioned methods appear to serve as good 
alternatives during the 66 years without systematic data on banks’ securities activities.  
 
Nowaday, 16 years after the Federal Reserve first loosened the Glass-Steagall Act in 1989, and 6 
years after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act completely abolished the prohibition on banks’ 
securities activities, more than 600 financial holding companies chose to conduct securities 
activities, which creates space for our surveys in this dissertation, with more comprehensible 
data for a longer time window.  
  
Following we present reviews and comments on contemporary surveys in the fields of bank 
profitability, risk and efficiency. 
2.3.1. Bank profitability: 
 
The empirical studies on the profitability consequences of US banks’ securities activities present 
very mixed results. Some report significantly higher profits of banks’ securities activities (Litan 
1985, 1987; Wall et al. 1984, 1993; Estrella 2001; Boyd et al. 1988, 1993), while others argue 
that securities activities lower banks’ profitability (Santos and Walter 1994; Kwan 1998).  
 
To facilitate our review and comments on the literature, we classify the previous studies into two 
main strands according to the different methodology they are using: The first uses an aggregate 
industry comparison between securities and banking industry, while the second uses simulated 
mergers among banks and securities firms to form “synthetic universal banks”. Both 
methodologies have their advantages and disadvantages. Indeed, regardless of what methodology 
they use, there is no consensus among these empirical findings. 
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Among the first strand of literature on aggregate industry comparisons, Wall and Eisenbeis 
(1984), Litan (1985, 1987), and Wall et al. (1993) strongly support the profitability of securities 
activities. They examine the aggregate accounting measures of profitability, including ROA and 
ROE, over periods from the 1960’s to the 1980’s, and report that the securities industry tends to 
have higher profits than the banking industry.  
 
On the contrary, Saunders and Walter (1994, p. 191)21 compare the compounded 5-year return, 
compounded annual return and mean daily returns for five groups of financial service providers, 
namely: money center banks, regional banks, life insurance, fire and casualty insurance, and 
securities firms. They find securities firms exhibit the poorest profitability over these five years, 
with a negative compounded 5-year return and an extremely small mean daily return. They 
report that the regional banks and money center banks are ranked as the second and the third 
highest profitable group over the five sample years between 1984 and 1988. Even after they 
exclude 1987 as the stock market crash year, the securities firms have only a slightly higher 
average daily return over the period between 1984 and 1988 (excluding 1987), which still ranks 
the lowest among all the five groups. A further comparison of compound annual return for each 
year also suggests that securities firms have the lowest return in four of all the five sample years 
except for the year 1985. Since they also find regional banks and money center banks steadily 
keep having above-average returns, their study indicates that commercial banks’ expanding into 
securities activities might not bring about higher profitability. 
 
Reichert and Wall (2000) find that the relative profitability of securities activities critically 
depends on which time period is examined and which profitability measure is employed. They 
employ accounting data of banks and securities firms included by the IRS Major Group 60 over 
the 25 years window between 1974 and 1997. Their descriptive analysis of ROA suggests that 
the securities broker/dealer firms averagely exhibit a higher ROA than banks for the subperiods 
between 1974 and 1980 and again between 1981 and 1989. From 1990 to 1997, however, the 
average ROA of securities firms is lower than that of the banks. On the contrary, when ROE is 
employed as profitability measures, securities broker/dealers on average have a higher ROE than 
                                                 
21 Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter, Universal banking in the United States, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
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banks in all the above three subperiods. This significant difference between ROA and ROE 
comparison maybe results from the securities brokers/dealers typically having a much higher 
financial leverage than banks. 
 
Very similar to these studies is the paper from Estrella (2001). He uses equity return instead of 
accounting ROA to adopt industries comparisons. Seven groups of finanical institutions in the 
US are selected, covering the time period from January 1989 to December 1998: three groups are 
from the banking industry (10 largest, 10 medium and 10 smallest bank holding companies), the 
other four groups are composed of 10 biggest companies from each of the four non-banking 
financial service industries, namely: securities firms, life insurances, property and casualty 
insurances, and commercial firms. He finds that securities firms exhibit the highest median 
return (21.4 percent) among all these 7groups.  
 
It is very hard to judge which profitability measure is better, using accounting data of ROA and 
ROE as Wall (1984, 1993), Litan (1985, 1987) and Santos and Walter (1994), or using market 
return as Estrella (2001).  The drawback of using accounting data is that they might not perfectly 
unveil the real economic return. Firms often try to smooth accounting data through time, 
producing reported returns that are deliberately low in the good years and high in the bad years. 
If firms across different industries have unequal ability to smooth their accounting earnings, then 
accounting-based risk measures may not provide accurate inter-industry comparisons of risk. 
Using accounting data has some appeal, however. First, market data is typically available only 
for the largest firms in an industry, so it clearly is more limited than accounting data. In addition, 
regulators rely heavily on accounting figures in their evaluation of a banks’ financial condition. 
 
All the above mentioned literature employ industrial aggregated data to compare profitability 
between commercial banks and securities firms. However, the industry comparison methodology 
is criticized22 as introducing aggregation bias by using industry-level data. The banking sector 
provides many more sample banks than the securities industry does. Besides, the banking 
industry is in many ways different from securities industry, in minimal capital requirement and 
                                                 
22 See Kwan and Ladermann (1999) for discussion of the aggregation bias in these literatures. 
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in average asset sizes. These differences make a direct comparison between bank profitability 
and securities firm profitability very difficult, as the two industries are so heterogeneous. 
Nevertheless, the ROA and ROE comparisons are still popularly adopted by various studies 
(Wall and Eisenbeis 1984; Litan 1985, 1987; Wall, et al. 1993), given their simplicity and 
intuitiveness.  
 
The second strand of literature adopts simulated mergers between banks and securities firms, 
which include both commercial banking and securities activities in “synthetic universal banks”. 
Boyd, et al (1988, 1993) find the synthetic universal banks to have higher returns. They simulate 
mergers by randomly matching the 146 BHCs and 11 securities firms, resulting in on-average 
higher returns than the returns from BHCs alone, which also indicates a potential profitability 
enhancement of banks’ expansion into securities activities.   
 
However, Saunders and Walters (1994, p. 195--205) get differing results by conducting similar 
studies. Data from nine money center banks, 24 regional banks, 11 securities firms, 13 life 
insurance companies and eight fire & casualty insurance firms are examined by Saunders and 
Walters for the period up to 1988. They indicate that the combination between commercial banks 
(both money center banks and regional banks) and securities firms produces the lowest return, 
compared with the combination between commercial banks and other financial service providers, 
no matter whether we look at the 2-industry combination or the 3- or 4-industry combination. 
Their findings also suggest that a combination of commercial banks (namely, between money 
center banks and regional banks) and a combination of commercial banks and insurance firms 
result in higher profitability, implying that commercial banks might better expand into the 
insurance field or expand geographically, rather than expanding into the securities industry. 
 
The idea of synthetic universal banks is appealing in that it uses firm-level data instead of 
industrial aggregate data, and therefore avoids an aggregation bias. But an obvious drawback is 
that “synthetic” universal banks can not incorporate the scope economies of cross-selling 
securities and banking products, as the “real” universal banks do. Besides, banks typically are 
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much larger in size than securities firms, which introduces a bank-dominated bias through 
simulated mergers. 
 
Since US banks were principally not allowed to do securities business in over six decades, most 
previous studies use “synthetic” data due to data absence. However, some researchers still tried 
to use very limited but “real” data. Kwast (1989) for example realizes that some commercial 
banks have already been trading limited types of government securities in house or through 
separated securities subsidiaries. He therefore examines the return relationship between 
commercial banks’ trading account securities and non-trading assets from 1976 through 1985, 
and finds that banks’ trading account securities on average have a higher ROA than banks’ non-
trading assets.  But his results only partly provide answers to the profitability effects of securities 
activities, as banks’ trading activities have been restricted to very limited sorts of government 
securities at his time. The large parts of equity securities are neglected in his study. 
 
Kwan (1997) also manages to get “real” data of US banks’ securities activities, although he 
works with only a small number of sample banks during a short time window.  He studieds the 
implications of securities activities on bank safety and soundness by comparing the ex-post 
returns between banking firms' Section 20 subsidiaries and their commercial bank affiliates. His 
sample covers 26 bank holding companies (BHCs) with Section 20 subsidiaries from 1990 to 
1997. Kwan found that the profitability effects depend on different types of securities activities 
as well as on different market players. By comparing the mean of returns (both ROA and ROE) 
for banks and their securities affiliates, he comes to the result that the securities activities in 
overall have brought higher profits than the (commercial) banking activities. He then classifies 
the securities activities into two types, namely securities trading and securities underwriting, and 
examines their effects respectively. The securities trading has been found to have a higher ROA 
than banking, regardless of whether the Section 20 subsidiary has been a primary or a non-
primary dealer. However, securities underwriting performed by nonprimary dealer Section 20 
subsidiaries has been found to have a lower ROA than banking, while underwriting by primary 
dealers has a level of return similar to that of banking activities. Compared with previous 
literature, Kwan’s study on Section 20 subsidiaries focuses on those banks that truly conduct 
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securities activities, but he apparently suffers from the limited sample banks and the short time 
period. 
2.3.2. Bank risks: 
 
The research on the potential risk to banks from conducting securities activities results in mixed 
findings. The generally adopted risk measures to account for the banks’ securities activities are 
volatility of and/or correlation between accounting returns, volatility of and/or correlation 
between market returns, and bankruptcy probability. The higher the volatility of bank returns or 
the more positive the correlation between commercial banking and securities activities, the 
higher the risks would be. A high bankruptcy probability also indicates high risks.  The empirical 
methods to examine banks’ securities activities are: groups (or industries) comparisons and 
correlations, event studies, simulated mergers and Section 20 subsidiaries studies. 
 
Groups (or industries) comparisons and correlations are the most popularly adopted method, due 
to its simplicity and intuitiveness. Heggestad (1975) correlates the annual profitability (return on 
assets) of commercial banks with the profitability of investment companies over the period of 
1953-1967. He finds a correlation coefficient of -.12, which indicates that combining the 
activities would reduce the variance of total returns.  Wall and Eisenbeis (1984), using 
accounting data at the industry level, find that there was a negative correlation between bank 
earnings and securities broker/dealer earnings over the period of 1970-80. Stover (1982) uses the 
similar methodology but finds a relatively large, positive correlation between the earnings of 
commercial and investment banks, suggesting that the variance of commercial banks’ return 
would be higher were the two activities combined. Litan (1987, 1985) conducts a similar study 
for the period of 1962-1982 on the basis of Internal Revenue Service profit data. He claims that 
the correlation between bank profits and securities broker/dealer profits is time-dependent: a 
correlation coefficient of -.11 for the whole period and a correlation coefficient of .06 for the 
subperiod of 1973-1982 are found. Kwast (1989) also finds, on the basis of firm-level data on 
banks’ trading accounts for the period of 1976-85, that the correlation between the return on 
securities activities and the return on banking activities is time- and bank-size dependent. 
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Brewer, Fortier and Pavel (1988) use the variation of daily stock returns to measure risk. They 
examine that variation over the years 1980, 1982 and 1986 for a sample of banks and non-
banking firms, finding that securities brokers and dealers exhibit a much greater variation ( 3.07) 
than bank holding companies (0.47). The correlation between the returns, however, was 
relatively low (0.30).  By setting various thresholds of securities activities, they also calculate the 
variation of daily stock returns for a hypothetical combination of a bank holding company and a 
securities broker-dealer. With securities activities at five percent of the total business operation 
of the hypothetic universal bank, the standard deviation of daily returns is .51; with securities at 
10 percent, the standard deviation is .65; with securities at 25 percent, the standard deviation 
is .94. This result implies that combining commercial banking and securities activities increases 
bank risk. 
 
Deyoung and Roland (1999) examine the fee-based securities activities like securities 
underwriting, by using data from 472 US commercial banks between 1988 and 1995. In their 
model they argue that banks’ profit is determined by two independent components: banks’ sale 
revenue which is determined largely by forces exogenous to the bank, and the banks’ combined 
degree of operating and financial leverage which transmit the revenue into profit. The volatility 
of a banks’ profitability is thus decomposed into the banks’ revenue volatility and the banks’ 
degree of total leverage. Their regressions find that both components of earnings volatility 
significantly increase with the share of revenues generated by fee-based activities. Their intuition 
is that either the banks’ revenues become less stable as information costs are low and 
competitive rivalry is high for fee-based activities or that the fee-based activities increase banks’ 
degree of total leverage, which amplifies the volatility of banks’ earning stream. 
 
As for an event study method, Bhargava and Fraser (1998) examine the risk effects of the 
Federal Reserve’s four deregulatory actions on banks’ securities activities from 1987 to 1996. 
The sample includes the 50 largest BHCs by assets as of the end of the year preceding the event. 
They employ the variation of sample banks’ stock return over a 121 days time window as the 
total risk measure, which is then further decomposed to get the banks’ systematic risk and firm 
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specific risk. The effects of the events are then studied by using dummy variables to indicate 
whether the stock return data is in the events windows or not. Their findings suggest that three 
deregulatory events among these four significantly increase the banks’ total risk and firm 
specific risk.  
 
Some researchers have examined the bankruptcy probability effects of banking firms’ expansion 
into the securities business by studying hypothetical mergers between BHCs and securities firms. 
Boyd and Graham (1988) use both accounting and stock market data for a sample of 146 bank 
holding companies and 11 securities firms over the period of 1971-84. By randomly combining a 
bank holding company with a securities firm, they build “synthetic universal banks”. Calculating 
the z-score of bankruptcy probability, ,they find that the probability is greater for the 
combination of securities and banks than for banking alone. Therefore, they conclude that 
mergers between BHCs and securities firms generally increase BHCs’ risk of failure (measured 
by an indicator of the probability of bankruptcy). Their empirical study is later extended to a 
longer period (1971—1987) by Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993), resulting in similar findings.  
However, this synthetic combination is critized for the fact that the bank holding companies are 
typically much larger than securities firms, the banks thus dominating the risk effect of the 
synthetic universal banks. 
 
Similar to Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, Estrella (2001) also adopts the methodology of synthetic 
financial conglomerates, by using equity return instead of accounting ROA. He selects the 10 
largest, 10 medium and 10 smallest bank holding companies in the US from 1989 to 1998, and 
matches them with the 10 largest firms from each of the other four financial service industries, 
namely securities firms, life insurance companies, property and casualty insurance companies, 
and commercial firms. By examining the equity return volatility and default risk z-score as risk 
measures, he claims that securities firms are inept partners for bank holding companies. 
Although the correlation between equity returns of securities firms and bank holding companies 
is the third lowest among all seven groups (only 0.69 and 0.41, for the biggest and smallest banks 
respectively), the volatility of the securities firms’ equity return is too high (31 percent, which is 
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the highest among the seven groups), which more than offsets the low correlation, and hence 
brings banks into a riskier position. 
 
Santomero and Chung (1992) also use the hypothetical merger approach to examine the 
probability of bankruptcy, using market data over the period of 1985-89. Their approach, 
however, differs from other studies, as they use the option-pricing theory to estimate the implied 
volatility of the rate of return on assets and the market value of assets, instead of the volatility of 
accounting return and book value of assets. Santomero and Chung find that mergers between 
BHCs and regional securities firms usually lead to a reduction in the BHCs’ risk. Mergers 
between BHCs and large securities firms, however, generally lead to an increase in the new 
organizations’ risk of failure. 
 
Default risk of the z-score is also adopted by Stiroh and Rumble (2005) with more recent data 
from 1800 bank holding companies. Using quarterly data from 1997 to 2002, they regress banks’ 
z-scores on their trading revenue, their fiduciary income and their other non-interest income. 
Fiduciary income is found to significantly reduce the default risk, while the coefficients of 
trading revenue and other non-interest income are both insignificant.  
 
Kwan (1998) is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to examine bank securities activities 
by checking Section 20 Subsidiaries. Using data from 23 US bank holding companies with 
Section 20 Subsidiaries from the second quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 1997, he 
divides bank securities activities into trading activities and underwriting activities. Trading 
activities conducted by primary dealer securities subsidiaries tend to reduce the banking 
organization's overall risk. Non-primary dealers’ trading activities were found to increase the 
firm's total risk due to their aggressive trading behavior. By contrast, securities underwriting is 
found to be riskier. 
 
Geyfman (2005) also examines the risk effects of securities activities by looking at BHCs’ 
Section 20 subsidiaries. His sample covers all of the 52 publicly traded US BHCs over the period 
of 1985-1999, among which are 32 BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries and 20 BHCs without. 
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Each BHC is examined using three risk measures: total risk which is estimated using the 
variance of market-based returns, the systematic risk and the unsystematic risk which is 
composed of the total risk through a single factor capital asset pricing model. The author finds 
evidence of a significantly lower total risk and an unsystematic risk for BHCs that expanded into 
securities activities, suggesting that these activities provided diversification benefits. Evidence, 
however, also suggests that these BHCs were exposed to a higher systematic risk.   
 
The method for examining BHCs’ Section 20 subsidiaries has its obvious drawbacks, though. 
Firstly, there is only a small number of BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries (23 in Kwan’s paper 
and 32 in Geyfman’s), which may not be viewed as representative and informative enough.  
Secondly, the characteristics of BHCs that participate in securities underwriting differ markedly 
from that of those BHCs that do not. BHCs that participate in securities activities are much larger 
(in terms of both total assets and total equity) than BHCs without Section 20 subsidiaries. Hence, 
it is hard to compare the risk between these two different groups of BHCs. 
2.3.3. Bank efficiency 
 
The literature on efficiency in banking is vast; most of it has focused on issues of X-inefficiency. 
Bank efficiency is important in that it is closely linked with the banks’ competitiveness and 
managerial quality, therefore becoming an early predictor for bank failure. 23 
 
There already exists a bulk of literature on the efficiency of the financial industry. Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), for example, document 130 studies of financial institution efficiency, using 
data from 21 countries, from multiple time periods, and from various types of institutions 
including commercial banks, bank branches, savings and loans, credit unions, and other non-
bank institutions like insurance firms. These studies report various levels of bank efficiency, 
stemming from different financial institutional and market structures in each individual country. 
But in general, many studies have found large inefficiencies, in the order of 20 percent or more 
                                                 
23 Berger and Humphrey, 1992a; Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register, 1993; Hermalin and Wallace, 1994; Barr, 
Seiford, and Siems, 1994, for example, report that Banks and S&Ls with low efficiency failed at greater rates than 
institutions with higher efficiency levels, which was evident a few years before the failure eventual happened.  
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of the total banking industry costs, meaning that the average bank could produce a cost savings 
of more than 20 percent if it eliminated X-inefficiency.  
 
However, the idea of linking bank efficiency with commercial banks’ securities activities is 
relatively new. Using the concept of OBS (off balance sheet activities), Siems and Clark (1997) 
belong to the first contemporary explorers in this field. They construct a sample of 9831 banks 
with 1995 FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council) condition and income 
data, and estimate bank profit efficiency measures with two product mixes: a conventional 
product mix without OBS and a broader one with OBS. By comparing bank efficiencies resulting 
from these two measures, they find that traditional bank efficiency measures, which omitted 
OBS in the estimation of bank efficiency, seriously understate bank output. Following them, 
Rogers (1998), Clark and Siems (2002) test US commercial banks during different sample 
periods, confirming that including OBS items result in a more accurate specification of bank 
output and lead to higher efficiency scores. 
 
The paper by Rime and Stiroh (2003) is based on a similar idea and looks at the Swiss universal 
banks over the period of 1996-1999. The conceptual change here is that they examine the banks’ 
securities trading business and brokerage activity instead of the broad term of OBS. To do so, 
three definitions on the production structure of Switzerland’s universal banks are defined: the 
“naive” definition includes only traditional measures of bank outputs --- various loans; the 
“intermediate” definition encompasses a fourth output --- securities and participations in addition 
to the output vector; and the “universal” definition goes one step further to include trading 
activities, and brokerage and portfolio management. A comparison of the efficiencies scores 
resulting from these three output definitions leads to the conclusion that failure to account for 
trading, brokerage and portfolio management activities significantly underestimates the profit 
efficiency.  
 
Using a somewhat different methodology, Van Vennet (2002) also draws the conclusion that 
financial conglomerates and universal banks with securities activities have a higher efficiency 
than the “specialized” commercial banks. With a sample of 2375 EU banks from 17 countries for 
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the years 1995 and 1996, he finds profit efficiency to be about 68 percent and 70 percent for 
financial conglomerates and universal banks respectively, both being higher than the profit 
efficiency of around 50 percent for US “specialized” banks reported by Berger and Mester 
(1997). Both studies from Van Vennet and from Rime and Stiroh, however, focus on the 
European banks that have a long tradition to conduct securities activities. Empirical research on 
the just deregulated US banks remains a blank. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter is devoted to some discussions on banks’ securities activities, both theoretically and 
empirically. Theoretical arguments provide profound but contradictory views on banks’ 
expansion into securities. Empirically, historical evidence prior to 1933 fails to find enough 
support to impeach the culpability of banks’ securities activities. Contemporary examinations of 
banks’ securities activities, however, present mixed results on the profitability and risks of US 
sample banks, and focus almost exclusively on the efficiency of European banks only. Therefore, 
further work is necessary in this field. 
  
One important reason for the mixed results of the profitability and risk effects might stem from 
the complexity of the banks’ securities activities. Securities activities are conceptually very 
complex, covering various sub-items which differ from each other in their characteristics of both 
profitability and risk. If we ignore their differences and just simply mix all these sub-types 
together, their effects would exhibit very controversial results, depending on which one (or ones) 
of these sub-type activities dominates. A clear classification helps to examine the exact effect of 
each individual securities activity in detail, and provides better policy implications. Kwan (1997) 
is the only one who divides bank’s securities activities into trading and underwriting activities, 
but his dichotomy classification of trading and underwriting might have neglected other 
important bank securities activities like banks’ mutual fund management.  
 
In this dissertation we categorize the banks’ securities activities into three types, according to 
their individual profitability and risk characteristics.  These three types will then be regressed to 
see their individual effects on banks’ profitability and risks. Empirically we find results from 
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these three types pointing into different directions, which helps to explain why previous literature 
presents very mixed findings. Particularly, bank risk is also decomposed into two different risk 
measures: market risk and interest rate risk, in order to find out the effects of securities activities 
on these two risks.  The consequences of US bank efficiency are also examined, which 
supplements the literature on European banks’ securities activities, and pushes the literature on 
efficiency of US banks’ OBS activities further into the particular direction of securities activities. 
The dissertation does not focus on conflict of interests, not because it is unimportant, but only 
because earlier literature has already pointed out that opportunities for conflicts of interests have 
been greatly reduced by the stricter supervisory arrangement and by monitoring from rating 
agencies.  
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Chapter 3 Banks’ Securities Trading, Underwriting and Fiduciary Activities 
 
The securities activities conducted by US bank holding companies cover securities trading, 
underwriting and fiduciary activities. We classify these three types of activities according to their 
different risk and profitability characteristics. Securities trading is an in-balance sheet activity. A 
bank’s position of trading securities is an intrinsic part of the bank’s in-balance sheet asset. Once 
the bank calls in a certain number of trading securities, the price fluctuation of the securities 
directly affects the market value of the bank’s assets. The losses or profits of the securities 
trading thus directly constitute the losses or profits of the bank. This way, a bank is directly 
exposed to the risk of the securities trading.  Securities underwriting belongs to a bank’s off-
balance sheet activities. The underwriting bank commits to buying the underwritten securities at 
a certain price. This commitment constitutes the off-balance liabilities of the bank. Although the 
bank doesn’t possess the underwritten securities, they have to face the price fluctuation of the 
underwritten securities during the underwriting periods.  
 
Securities trading and underwriting activities are regarded as the mainstream securities activities 
of banks, and have been studied in various research. Kwast (1989), for example, examines the 
securities trading activities of US banks; Kwan (1998), and Kwan and Ladermann (2001) 
observe the securities trading and underwriting activities.  Economic literature, however, 
improperly omitts dealing with fiduciary activities. This is probably due to the fact that fiduciary 
income counts for only a small proportion of US banks’ total incomes, and is also attributed to 
the understanding that fiduciary activities’ risks are all born by the fiduciary assets holder instead 
of the banks themselves. To the best of our knowledge, present research concentrates on the 
discussion of the juristic and regulatory framework of fiduciary activities. The impact of 
fiduciary activities on a bank’s profitability, risk and efficiency have never been observed in 
present economic research. 
 
For two reasons, we strongly recommend not to neglect fiduciary activities when examining 
banks’ securities activities: Firstly, fiduciary activities largely involve activities in the securities 
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market. The Federal Reserve Board (Fed) argues that buying and selling securities is “an 
essential part of the trust and fiduciary operations of banks”24. The Office of Controller of 
Currency (OCC) also defines fiduciary activities in terms mainly relating to securities activities25. 
Secondly, fiduciary activities differ from securities trading and underwriting in that they are 
intermediary activities. Fiduciary activities mainly involve managing the assets trusted by their 
clients. Neither are these assets in-balance sheet items nor do they involve any off-balance 
commitment.  
 
In the following sections we will provide preliminary descriptions of the three types of securities 
activities. Definitions, regulations as well as costs and benefits of these activities will be 
introduced. These contents provide useful hints to help understand their profitability, risk and 
efficiency characteristics that will be addressed in later chapters. 
3.1. Securities trading  
Securities trading refers to buying and selling securities, including stocks, bonds, notes and bills 
(Kwan).26 Under the framework of the Glass-Steagall Act, securities trading activities of banks 
have long been restricted to certain types of “safe” securities, primarily government securities, 
Federal Reserve funds and municipal bonds. Starting 1987, the Board of Federal Reserve has up 
to a certain extent allowed US bank holding companies to expand their trading into the formally 
“illegal” securities, namely investment grade corporate bonds and equities, given that revenues 
from these trading activities do not exceed certain thresholds.  The unlimited trading of a full 
range of securities, however, comes in force only after the enactment of the Financial Service 
Modernization Act of 1999.  
 
                                                 
24 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Testimony of Governor Laurence H. Meyer, The 
securities activities of banks, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial 
Services, US House of Representatives, August 2, 2001 
25 Section 3.3.1. provides a detailed discussion of the OCC’s definition. The original information is available in the 
OCC letter on March 26, 2005.  
26 This includes only the securities transaction with banks’ own assets. Trading on behalf of clients will be classified 
as fiduciary activities. 
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3.1.1. Definition of trading securities  
Securities trading is an in-balance sheet activity, in that trading securities held by a bank 
represent part of the bank’s asset. We gauge a bank’s securities trading activities by measuring 
the amount of trading securities.  
 
Trading securities refer to securities that are acquired for the purpose of selling in the near term 
or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements. This 
nature clearly distinguishes trading securities from investment securities, in that trading 
securities would be held only for short-term. According to the regulation of Federal Reserve 
banks, a bank should determine whether it intends to hold an asset for trading (that is, as 
available-for-sale securities, also know as trading securities) or for investment (that is, as held-
to-maturity securities, also know as investment securities), when a security or other asset is 
acquired. A bank holding company should not record a newly acquired asset in a suspense 
account and later determine whether it was acquired for trading or investment purposes. Given 
the nature of the trading account, transfers into or from the trading category should be rare.27  
 
Based on the nature of trading accounts, all trading securities are to be reported at their fair value 
(also known as market value). The difference between the historical costs and the present market 
value is treated as unrealized gains and losses recognized in the income sheet. The market value 
of securities should be determined by time references to the best available source of current 
market quotations or other data on relative current values. For example, securities traded on 
national, regional, or foreign exchanges or in organized over-the-counter markets should be 
valued at the most recently available quotation in the most active market. Securities for which no 
organized market exists should be valued on the basis of a yield curve estimate.  
3.1.2. Costs and benefits of securities trading activities: 
A bank could profit from securities trading activities if it correctly exploits the price fluctuation 
of the securities. This requires an accurate assessment of the value of the underlying securities 
                                                 
27 For more detailed interpretations on trading account securities, see the Board of Federal Reserve System: 
Instructions for Preparation of Reporting Form FR Y-9C, March 1996.  
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and of the movement of the market. The assessment must be based on abundant information as 
well as professional processing and profound understanding of the information. If the securities 
trading team makes a wrong assessment, the bank could suffer from a great amount of losses, 
depending on how large a position it holds on the securities and how volatile the securities are. 
 
Securities trading activities are closely connected with other banking activities such as liquidity 
management, underwriting and hedging, so that the effectiveness of securities trading is rather to 
be judged by the collaboration between trading and other banking activities, while keeping all 
operations of a bank in mind.  
 
Securities trading activities provide important instruments for managing a bank’s cash and credit 
position. Selling and buying securities relate to cash flow in different directions. Thus, a bank 
could balance the fund gap between its deposits and loans through buying or selling securities, 
especially when we look at the money market securities like treasury bills or notes. Transactions 
on these securities involve the lending (purchasing bills or notes) or borrowing (selling bills or 
notes) of immediately available funds, which helps to adjust the liquidity of a bank. 
 
Securities trading sometimes also collaborates with underwriting activities.  During the process 
of underwriting, a bank may temporarily hold a certain amount of securities, in case that these 
securities remain unsold until the underwriting closes. Usually these securities will be put into 
the account of trading securities. Sometimes the bank tries to sell out the securities later, which is 
defined by the Federal Reserve banks as “when-issued securities transactions”. In other cases the 
bank, as part of the underwriting commitment, will serve as a market maker of the underlying 
securities. Thus, the bank will keep an active net position in the underlying securities by offering 
or buying them.  
 
A bank’s derivative hedging activities also involve securities trading. There is a form of 
securities trading named program trading, also known as index arbitrage (Walter 1994). Program 
traders exploit the price discrepancies between indexes of stocks and future contracts by using 
sophisticated computer models to hedge positions. Program trading has arisen with the advent of 
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computer and telecommunication technologies, whereby trade in different markets can be 
monitored simultaneously and be manipulated accordingly.  
 
These multi-channel connections demonstrate the distinctive role that securities trading activities 
play in a bank’s operation, but also add difficulties when measuring the real performance of the 
securities trading team. Ambiguous performance measurement, according to the industry 
organization theory, sometimes results in more sluggishness and lowers efficiency. 
3.1.3 Regulation on the securities trading activities 
Securities are volatile and trading can be risky. The risk born by a bank depends on the size of 
the exposed position and the volatility of the underlying security. Since the enactment of the 
Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999, regulatory authorities no longer place quantitative 
and qualitative restrictions on banks’ trading activities. A bank can decide by itself which kinds 
of trading securities it tends to hold and how many securities assets it holds. Instead, the 
regulation’s focus shifts to two fields: information disclosure and capital requirement. 
 
Information disclosure is regarded as playing a vital role in a supervisor’s effort to encourage a 
sound risk management and foster financial market stability (BIS, 1998, 2005).  
 
Information disclosure helps banks to better evaluate their counterparties’ risk and to price the 
risk more accurately, so that information disclosure provides a basis for reasonable comparisons 
across firms involved in similar activities. It also reduces the likelihood that they become 
susceptible to market rumors and misunderstandings during periods of financial stress.28 
Under the present regulatory framework, banks are required to disclose both qualitative and 
quantitative information relevant to their trading activities. Quantitative information includes the 
high, average and low trading value-at-risk (VAR), for all trading securities aggregated as well 
as for various other securities categories (that is, fixed incomes, equities, and funds). Market 
                                                 
28 TRADING AND DERIVATIVES DISCLOSURES OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS, Joint report by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), November 1998.  
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value and trading revenue also belong to a vital quantitative information disclosure. The 
qualitative information involves the description of the employed risk measuring model, including 
methodology of the model design and the accuracy of the model. Federal Reserve banks 
encourage banks, especially large ones with assets above 10 billion ollars, to provide the 
information in quarterly or annual reports.29 According to surveys conducted by the BIS (Bank 
of International Settlement), more than 90 percent of the large banks have followed this 
encouragement to provide relevant trading information. 
Regulatory authorities also encourage banks to keep an adequate capital to cover risks from their 
trading positions. As proposed by the Basle Capital Adequacy Accord, the standard capital 
charge for trading securities is a 4 percent charge on the gross position against a specific risk and 
an 8 percent charge on the net position30 against the general market risk (BASLE).31 The capital 
requirement is calibrated not only based on the size of the exposed securities position, but also 
on the risk weight of the counterparty. Depending on the rating degree of the counterparties, the 
risk weight can vary between 20 percent and 350 percent.32  
3.2. Underwriting 
For a long period of time, US banks have been prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 from 
any affiliations with organizations engaged in underwriting activities.33  In the last two decades, 
however, US banking organizations have sought broader domestic securities underwriting 
                                                 
 
29 Board of Federal Reserve: Enhancements to Public Disclosure, SR 01-6 (SUP), March 23, 2001 
30 The net position is calculated by deducing the short position from the long position. The gross position, on the 
contrary, is the addition of the absolute value of both short position and long position. 
31 There is another methodology used by the Securities Exchange Commission in the US, which is only binding for 
public listed banks. The SEC rules require that a capital of 15 percent be held against the gross position of the 
portfolio. Hedging of long or short positions is permitted to the extent of 25 percent of the longer side of the 
portfolio, and is deducted from the capital charge on the gross position. The SEC approach does not attempt to 
separate risks into specific and general market risk. 
32 Source: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury, Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; 
Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Domestic Capital Modifications, Federal Register, October 20, 
2005 
33 The Glass-Steagall Act refers to Sections 16, 17, 20 and 21 of the Banking Act of 1933. This act resulted in the 
separation between commercial and investment banks. Section 20 of the Act relates to the underwriting activities of 
banks, requiring banks to eliminate any affiliations with organizations “engaged principally in the issue, flotation, 
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stock, bonds, 
debentures, notes, or other securities.” (12 USC. § 377). 
 47
powers. Starting in 1987, the Board of Federal Reserve has gradually authorized limited 
underwriting activities for previously prohibited securities such as corporate debt and equity 
securities, for example. 34  The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 brings the 
deregulation of domestic securities underwriting to the climax, when all limitations are fully 
removed.  
 
3.2.1 Definition of securities underwriting activities 
To understand the concept of underwriting, one must consider a firm wishing to raise capital by 
issuing securities. To facilitate the issuance, the firm hires a bank (or a group of banks) as 
underwriter. The underwriting bank assists with the documentation of the prospectus and with 
pricing and selling of the underlying securities. The issuer pays a fee to the underwriter for his 
services (Yasuda 200135, Saunders and Walter 1994, 1996).  
 
In detail, underwriting involves three major phases: origination, risk-bearing, and distribution. 
Origination relates to decisions on the type, quantity, pricing, timing, and other features of the 
new securities issue. Choice of the underwriting syndicate is also an important part of the 
origination. Risk-bearing refers to the agreement of the underwriting bank to purchase the issued 
securities at a fixed price, thus putting the investment bank at risk in terms of the eventual sale of 
the issue to the public. Distribution involves selling the securities to the public. 
 
According to different criteria, there are various types of underwriting. Taking the scope of 
issuance as criteria, securities underwriting can be either public offerings or private placements. 
Considering the familiarity of issuance to the investors, there can be underwriting for primary 
                                                 
34 Thus, underwriting covers both bonds and equity securities. However, hereinafter in the paper we discuss the 
underwriting activities of banks, without distinguishing whether they underwrite bonds or equities. This 
simplification is justified by Walter et Al. (1994, p. 163). They examine the respective underwriting of bonds and 
equities, and come to the conclusion that risk and profitability characteristics of underwriting depends not so much 
on the riskiness of the underlying security, but rather on the pricing, the spread, and the length of time the securities 
are held. 
35 Ayoko Yasuda, January 2001, Relationship Capital and Competition in the Corporate Securities Underwriting 
Market, Department of Economics, Stanford University, 
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new issues (so-called initial offerings) or secondary new issues (new issues of seasoned firms 
whose debt or equity is already traded). However, the most important distinctions are usually 
made between negotiated and competitive-bid underwriting and between firm commitment and 
best efforts underwriting.  
 
Regarding how the origination function is handled, we distinguish the negotiated and the 
competitive bid underwriting. In negotiated underwriting, the issuer firstly chooses a bank as 
leading manager of the underwriting. In discussions with the issuer, the leading manager designs 
the timing, quantity and pricing of the issued securities. He also organizes a group of 
underwriting banks to form a syndicate, in order to spread the risk and to provide a better 
distribution. The manager chooses members of the syndicate and decides on each member’s 
degree of participation. Usually, the leading manager is entitled to an additional fee due to his 
controlling the syndicate. In a competitive-bid underwriting, the issuer decides timing and 
quantities of the underwritten securities, thus enacting much of the origination function. Banks 
then bid for the issue, vying to become the leading underwriter. The winning bank forms a 
syndicate in order to spread the risk and to expand the distributional channels.  
 
If the issuer chooses underwriting through a competitive bid, the choice of the underwriting bank 
is based upon the quantitative conditions of the bids, for example, the agreed price of the issued 
securities and the lump sum payment. However, in a negotiated underwriting, the issuer chooses 
an underwriting bank before the details of the issue, including price, are determined. Thus, for a 
negotiated underwriting, factors other than price influence the choice of the leading underwriting 
bank. Empirical studies suggest that these factors are: the reputation of the underwriting bank, 
expertise in corporate finance, retail distribution capabilities, institutional distribution 
capabilities, expertise in their industry; general research capability, and capabilities in 
international corporate finance and international distribution (Hayes, Spence, and Marks 1985).36  
 
                                                 
36 See Hayes et al., Competition in Banking. 
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Equally important is the point that the distinction between firm commitment and best efforts 
underwriting is made according to the variation in how the risk-bearing aspect of underwriting is 
handled. 
 
Firm commitment underwriting is the most popular form of securities underwriting. The 
syndicate signs an agreement to purchase the issued securities at a certain price (known as the 
agreed price), and then attempts to distribute the securities to the public at a slightly higher price 
(also known as the publicly offered price). The spread between the agreed price and the offered 
price constitutes the underwriting premium of the syndicate. In the best efforts underwriting, on 
the contrary, the syndicate does not buy the securities. Instead, the syndicate just attempts to 
distribute as much securities as possible, and transmits funds to the issuer when the securities are 
sold. Thus, the unsold securities remain with the issuer, and the risk of an unsuccessful issue is 
born by the issuer.  
 
Except for small and regional issues, firm commitment underwriting is dominant in the 
underwriting market (Walter, 1994, pp. 98). Firm commitment underwriting generally undergoes 
the following process:  
 
First, the managing or leading underwriter inspects timing and volume of the issuance, and 
observes market sentiment or “appetite” for the issuance. When the demands of the market are 
perceived as promising, the investment bank will assist the issuer in preparing “red herring” 
prospectus documents. After the SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) permits the prospectus 
to be “effective”, the managing underwriter sets out to form an underwriting syndicate. An 
underwriting agreement between the underwriting syndicate and the issuer will be signed, 
stipulating the time, price and volume at which the syndicate commits to purchasing the 
securities. Also, an agreement among all underwriting syndicate members will then be settled, 
and each member commits to purchasing his share of the issue at the agreed price. The par value 
of securities that underwriting banks commit to purchasing is classified by the Federal Reserve 
banks as ‘‘gross commitments to purchase”.  After the agreements of purchase are signed, the 
underwriting banks begin to solicit the issued securities to the public, either to institutional 
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investors or to individual customers. If the sale is agreed upon by both the banks and the 
investors, the par value of the underlying securities will be regarded as ‘‘gross commitments to 
sell’’. Thus, one can clearly observe that underwriting activities are indeed off-balance sheet 
commitments. 
 
The issuance closes approximately one week after the underwriting begins. On the closing date, 
the securities are delivered and the issuer is paid. If the securities remain unsold until the closing 
date, they will be held by the underwriting banks and displayed in the banks’ balance sheets. 
However, literature reports that underwriters usually have a strong incentive to sell all shares 
before the closing date, even if doing so may mean suffering a loss(Walter 1994, pp146). 
3.2.2. Costs and benefits of securities underwriting 
The above mentioned description of firm commitment underwriting also illustrates the 
mechanism of how a bank makes profits and incurs risk. The spread between the agreed price 
and the offered price constitutes the underwriting revenue of a bank. This revenue must be high 
enough to cover all the expenses related to providing underwriting services, so that the 
underwriting bank can make a profit. The market is volatile, however, and the issued securities 
could suffer from a declining market price. In such a situation, a bank’s expected premium from 
underwriting may be eroded and even become negative. Thus, an underwriting bank bears the 
risk that the market has a poor assessment of the value of the issued securities, and that it is 
difficult to solicit the securities with sufficient spread. 
 
Underwriting risk is unavoidable when the underwriting deals with volatile securities. However, 
the risk can be effectively managed, given proper financial instruments and adequate inspection 
of market and issuer.  
 
Firstly, underwriting risk can be hedged by proper derivatives. An underwriter is exposed to risk 
after he signs an agreement to commit to purchasing the underwritten securities at a certain price. 
He suffers losses if the offered price of the securities is lower than his purchasing price. Walter 
(1994) argues that this commitment is similar to writing a put option, with which the issuer is 
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entitled to put securities at the strike price to the underwriter. Therefore, to hedge the risk, the 
underwriter can buy another put option on the securities. This option will allow the underwriter 
to sell the securities to other parties, in an amount equal to the amount underwritten and with a 
strike price equal to the offer price. If the option on the newly issued securities is unavailable in 
the market, an option on other highly correlated securities might also work well. The gains from 
holding a put option will offset the losses from price falls, whereas the losses (if the stock rises) 
are limited to the purchase price of the option. The only disadvantage is that the cost of the 
option premium will wipe out a portion of the spread. 
 
Secondly, the risk borne by the underwriters depends largely on their ability to gauge the market 
demand for the issue by estimating how much would be bought at what prices. Asymmetric 
information is essential in underwriting activities. Potential investors have incomplete 
information about issuers; potential issuers have incomplete information about investors. 
Underwriters serve as an intermediary specialist collecting information about investors (so as to 
advise issuers) and issuers (so as to assure investors that purchases of the issuer’s securities are 
good investments.) Therefore, by enhancing the information assessment, an underwriter 
promotes his skill to line up potential buyers, and effectively reduces the risk. 
3.2.3. Conflicts of interest and regulatory firewalls 
Regulatory mandates are imposed on underwriting activities of US banks to insulate a bank and 
its customers from the potential hazards of combining commercial and investment banking. A 
focus of the firewalls lies between underwriting and lending.  
 
It is frequently argued that banks could “tie in” underwriting and lending (Drucker and Puri 2002; 
Laux and Walz 2004) in order to facilitate the underwriting. This tying-in exists in many ways, 
and the banks could tie in loans either to the buyers of the securities or to the issuer of the 
securities.  In the first case, a bank gives out loans to investors to encourage them to buy 
securities underwritten by it. Bank loans are made at relatively favorable rates to investors, on 
the understanding that part or all of these funds will be used to purchase certain new issues 
underwritten by the bank and its syndicates. In the second case, a bank makes imprudent loans to 
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issuers of securities, before underwriting, during underwriting or after. Before the underwriting, 
a bank may promise to make loans to the issuer at favorable rates in order to convince the issuer 
to choose the bank as underwriter. During the underwriting, the loans are made to the issuer to 
“beautify” the financial statements of the issuer. Imagine an issuer facing some negative 
financial situation which could increase its default risk. The underwriting bank may lend loans to 
the issuer, increase his cash flow, and allure investors into buying the issued securities at a higher 
price. Even after the underwriting, an underwriting bank could continue supplying imprudent 
loans. Consider a bank underwrites bonds of a firm, who later faces strong financial difficulties 
to repay the bonds. To prevent the firm from failing, and to avoid possible litigation costs arising 
from investors’ suits against the underwriter (relating to insufficient informational disclosure and 
lack of due diligence), the bank may infuse loans to the firm, in the hope that its financial 
situation will improve in the future (Walter 1994).  
 
These conflicts of interest constitute the incentive of a bank to pursue its own interests by 
sacrificing the interests of its deposit holders. They disturb the fairness of the market competition 
by cross-tying. They also jeopardize the market transparency and efficiency by sending out false 
signals to their securities investors. Without effective control, these conflicts of interest will 
result in a weaker financial stability and financial soundness.  
To oppose the conflicts of interests and prevent possibly tying, regulators have set up various 
firewalls. Section 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act impose quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions on the internal transactions between a bank, its securities affiliates and securities 
clients. The two sections require the transactions to be on “market terms” and on an “arm-length” 
basis. In order to generate underwriting business for its securities affiliate, a bank is not to offer 
any credit below market prices to customers. Section 23B specifically prohibits a bank from 
purchasing any security for which its securities affiliate is a principal underwriter during the 
existence of the underwriting or selling syndicate, unless such a purchase has been approved by a 
majority of the bank’s board of directors. These directors are neither officers of any bank nor of 
any affiliate. If the bank acts as fiduciary, the purchase must be permitted by the fiduciary 
agreement, court order, or state law. Similarly, the federal anti-tying statute prohibits a bank 
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from offering discounted credit enhancements on the condition that an issuer obtains securities 
services from a section-20 affiliate. These firewalls have effectively prevented banks from 
providing imprudent credit involving their securities activities, and help maintain financial 
soundness and stability37. 
3.3 Fiduciary activities 
3.3.1. Definition of fiduciary activities  
Fiduciary activities refer to the activities that banks (namely fiduciaries) hold and manage assets 
on behalf of their clients (namely trustors). The assets must be prudently managed in a manner 
required by the fiduciary agreement, while banks as fiduciaries have a duty to act primarily for 
the client's benefit and not for the fiduciary's own personal interest.38  
 
Our current study classifies fiduciary activities as one type of securities activities, based on the 
understanding that a primary part of fiduciary activities involves buying and selling securities for 
customers. Banks that have a discretionary investment authority over a trust or fiduciary account 
purchase and sell securities for the account to ensure that the account is properly diversified and 
managed in the manner required by the governing trust agreement and applicable fiduciary 
principles. Banks also provide investment advice concerning securities, real estate, and other 
assets to non-discretionary fiduciary accounts, and execute securities transactions for these 
accounts. 
 
This understanding is in accordance with various supervisory and regulatory arrangements for 
fiduciary activities. The SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) conducts regular examinations 
of banks’ fiduciary activities. The Federal Reserve Board also claims that buying and selling 
securities is “an essential part of the trust and fiduciary operations of banks”. The OCC (Office 
                                                 
37 The effectiveness of these firewalls are discussed in detail by Federal Reserve Governor Susan M. Phillips, in her 
testimony Restrictions on securities underwriting and dealing, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
and Regulatory Relief of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, March 20, 
1997 
38 For the definition of fiduciary activities, see, among other, The New Palgrave Dictionary on Economics and Laws, 
vol 2. p. 127-128. Sources also available online in http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/trusting/unit5all.html. 
 54
of Comptroller of Currency) defines fiduciary activities as including eight items altogether: 
among these, six are closely related to securities transactions, covering a wide range from 
collective investment funds (CIFs) to collective trust admissions and withdrawals, common trust 
funds, investments of employees benefit account assets and short-term sweeping funds.39  
 
A major category of fiduciary activities are collective investment funds. As defined by the 
OCC’s regulatory standards, collective investment funds consist of two types of funds: index 
funds and model-driven funds. Index funds seek to replicate the performance of a specified index, 
such as the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. Trading decisions are made according to a formula 
that tracks the rate of return of the index by replicating the entire portfolio of the index or by 
investing in a representative sample of that portfolio. The model-driven funds seek to outperform 
a specified index or benchmark based on a pre-determined investment strategy. The index or 
benchmark must represent the investment performance of a specific segment of the public 
market for debt or equity securities. In addition, the index or benchmark must be established by 
an independent organization. In short, the objective of the collective investment funds 
management is to choose an asset allocation to beat specified performance benchmarks.  
 
Collective investment funds and other similar trust funds have witnessed a rapid growth in recent 
decades. Total assets of the fund industry have exceeded total deposits of the commercial 
banking system since 1996.40 US banks have begun to get actively involved in the fund industry 
since 1972, when the Board of Federal Reserve authorized bank holding companies to act as 
mutual fund advisers, transfer agents, and custodians. Up to now, banks manage nearly 900 
billion dollars in fund assets, more than one fourth of the total assets of the whole fund 
industry.41 These facts stand for our argument that the asset management activities, particularly 
                                                 
39  These eight items are: (1) Collective Investment Funds, (2) Collective Investment Trust Admissions and 
Withdrawals, (3) Collective Investment Trust Withdrawals, (4) Collective Investment Funds/common trust funds, (5) 
Investment of Employees Benefit Account Assets, (6) Nationwide Trust Services, (7) Real Estate Brokerage and 
Related Activities as a Fiduciary ,(8) Self-deposit in Short-term Investment Fund (Sweeping fund). See Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, March 26, 2005. 
40  Board of Federal Reserve System, Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr, June 26, 1996, testimony before the 
Subcommitte on Capital markets, Securities, and Government-sponsored Enterprises of the committee on banking 
and financial services of the US house of representatives.  
41 Source: Investment Company Institute, ICI Statistics & Research. 
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those related to mutual funds, should not be neglected while examining the BHC’s securities 
activities. 
 
Fiduciary activities, although closely related to securities transactions, are not touched by the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Banks continue to buy and sell securities for their customers, under 
the supervision of relevant federal and state banking agencies. The Financial Service 
Modernization Act of 1999 also permits banks to effect securities transactions which comply 
with fiduciary principles. To ensure that banks do not attempt to operate a full-scale brokerage 
operation out of their trust department, the GLB Act has established two limitations. First, a bank 
relying on the trust and fiduciary exception must be "chiefly compensated" for the securities 
transactions it effects for its trust and fiduciary customers on the basis of certain types of 
traditional trust and fiduciary fees specified in the act. Second and more importantly, the act 
prohibits the bank from publicly soliciting securities brokerage business other than in 
conjunction with its trust activities.  
3.3.2. Conflicts of interest and regulations 
Fiduciary activities can involve potential conflicts of interest. The legal role of fiduciary requires 
a bank to serve the best interests of its trustors, but the profit-driven nature of the bank indicates 
that the bank also has an incentive to run for its own above the trustors’ interests. Scotland (1980) 
has documented an extensive list of potential conflicts that arise during fiduciary activities of 
banks.42 One of the most notorious examples of the conflicts of interest is that banks used their 
trust accounts as a “dumping ground” for the “unwanted” securities during the 1920s and early 
1930s.43  When underwritten securities are unsold until the underwriting closes, an underwriting 
bank tries to dispose the securities into its fiduciary department. The losses then have to be born 
by the trustors. 
 
Given the explicit potential of interest conflicts, federal and state fiduciary laws have developed 
strong external control mechanisms to limit the probability of conflict exploitation. Common law 
                                                 
42 Scotland, Abuse on Wall Street, 1980, p. 134. 
43 Report by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 1934. See also Stock Exchange Practices:  Hearings 
before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56, 73d Cong. , 2d Sess. 7986,8063-68. 
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rules prohibit self-dealing between a trustee (that is, a bank serving as fiduciary) and its 
affiliates.44 These rules also apply to purchases by a corporate trustee from a syndicate of which 
it is a member and whose profits it shares. The common law prohibition against self-dealing has 
been reinforced by federal and state trust laws and statutes. The Investment Company Act of 
1940 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, for example, treat self-dealing 
as a “prohibited transaction”, and substantial penalties are imposed for any violation by 
fiduciaries.   
 
At the same time, banks conducting fiduciary activities are subject to multiple supervisions and 
examinations from various supervisory agencies, including the Federal Reserve Banks, the OCC, 
and the SEC. These supervisions are quite strict and sometimes prove to be to much, imposing 
significant burdens on banks (Meyer, 2001).45  
 
A frequently cited critique of the burdensome examinations alludes to the SEC’s rule on 
examining fiduciary accounts of banks. The Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999 
exempts a bank from registering as broker under the condition that the bank’s fiduciary activities 
are “chiefly compensated”. The SEC defines the term “chiefly compensated” as meaning that the 
“relationship compensation” (that is, an administration or annual fee, a per order processing fee, 
or any combination of these fees) exceeds sales compensation. The SEC also requires this 
definition to be determined generally on an account-by-account basis.46 In order to fit with the 
condition of the Act, a bank must provide evidence that each of its fiduciary accounts is chiefly 
compensated. This requirement is based on the understanding that each account is a separate 
contractual relationship that contains specific obligations. However, it imposes significant 
burdens on the banks, since a moderately sized bank trust department may have around 10,000 
separate trust and fiduciary accounts, and a large trust department may have even more than 
                                                 
44 Banks’ fiduciary activities are subject to extensive regulatory standards under 12 CFR part 9 as well as under state 
laws that are made applicable to national banks’ fiduciary activities by 12 USC. 92a. 
45  Federal Reserve Governor Laurence H. Meyer, The securities activities of banks, testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance 
and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, 
August 2, 2001 
46 See Securities Exchange Commission, June 15, 2004 in its document 2004-73: SEC Votes to Propose Provisions 
Implementing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Bank Broker Rules. 
 57
100,000 such accounts47. And, in order to comply with the rule, a bank has to establish complex 
and costly systems and procedures for tracking the amount and types of fees received from each 
trust and fiduciary account. These further increase the operating costs of banks’ fiduciary 
activities. 
 
Another supervisory authority in the multiple-supervision system are the Federal Reserve Banks 
(Fed). The Feds argue that the risk of conflicts of interest exists when the fiduciary activities are 
not observed and documented. Based on this understanding, a bank is required to document all 
its assessments and executions of fiduciary investments, even if the bank does not exercise any 
investment discretion on the fiduciary assets. These documents are to be tracked by the Feds 
during their examination of a bank’s fiduciary department or affiliate, which for big banks recurs 
annually. 
 
The OCC also conducts regular examinations of banks’ fiduciary activities, and has developed a 
rating system named UITRS (Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System). Under the UITRS, 
each bank is assigned a composite rating based on an evaluation of five components of its 
fiduciary activities. These components address: the capability of management; the adequacy of 
operations, controls and audits; the quality and level of earnings; compliance with governing 
instruments, applicable laws (including self-dealing and conflicts of interest laws and 
regulations), sound fiduciary principles; and the management of fiduciary assets. 
3.3.3. Costs and benefits of fiduciary activities 
Revenue and expense 
We measure a bank’s fiduciary activities by the revenue that these activities generate. Principally, 
a bank’s income from fiduciary activities is composed of the management fee charged on the 
assets managed by them.48 Management fees are expressed as a percentage of the fund's total 
value.49  
                                                 
47 Sources: Meyer 2001, Board of Federal Reserve System.  
48 In our database, and under the current regulation of Federal Reserve banks, income from fiduciary activities 
mainly consists of management fees. The distribution fee, which banks earn through their selling of investment 
funds, is classified under the Federal Reserve statistical item of “other services charged”. We acknowledge this 
 58
 
The management fee is paid for the bank’s services such as security analysis, security selection, 
trade placement, office space, administrative support personnel, portfolio recordkeeping, and 
preparation of regulatory filings. In consistence with the services, the bank occurs the following 
expenses: (1) management expense, including salaries of the fund's managers and analysts, and 
marketing costs; (2) dealer and advisor compensation, that is, fees paid for dealer operations, 
fees paid to advisors whose expertise proves valuable for the successful investment of the 
managed assets; (3) administrative costs, for example, regulatory costs, client relationship costs, 
documentation costs, data processing, custody and audit fees, and (4) tax. 
 
Most compositions of the above expenses are relatively fixed. In other words, most costs do not 
increase proportionally when the managed assets increase. A SEC survey reports that in 
collective investment funds, the average management expense ratio falls with the increase of 
fund assets. Other things held equal, a fund's management expense ratio falls 11 basis points as 
fund assets rise from $1 million to $10 million. A fund's management expense ratio falls 42 basis 
points as fund family assets rise from $1 million to $10 billion.50  Thus, economies of scale are 
evident in the fund industry (Keil, 2004).51 
 
Duty and risk 
When a bank serves as fiduciary, it is subject to certain fiduciary duties, as stipulated by various 
laws, regulations, standards and guidelines. The bank’s fiduciary duties include:  
                                                                                                                                                             
classification as justified, since these selling activities do not involve any transaction in the securities market. 
Therefore, the item of “income from fiduciary activities” exclusively relates to banks’ fiduciary activities concerning 
securities transaction and advising. 
49  This might be different for some very actively managed fiduciary instruments. Hedge funds, for example, 
typically charge a fee greater than 1 percent of the fund assets, plus a “performance fee” of 20 percent of the fund’s 
profit. 
50 Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, December 2000, Division of Investment Management, SEC. 
51 Testimony of Jeffrey C. Keil, Global Fiduciary Review, before the Subcommittee on Financial Management, the 
Budget, and International Security Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, January 27, 
2004,Washington, DC. 
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(1) Loyalty: Administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary. This duty prevents the 
fiduciary from putting itself in a position where its own interests conflict with those of the trust 
that it is representing. 
(2) Prudence: Exercise the same care and skill in administering the trust, as a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in dealing with his or her own property.  
(3) Compliance: comply with the terms of the fiduciary will (fiduciary agreement), trust or 
pension plan. A bank should also comply with the common law of trusts, state and federal 
statutory law and regulation, jurisdiction rulings and orders. 
(4) Due diligence: the duty to diversify investments of the plan. A bank could be liable when an 
obvious mismanagement of the fiduciary assets is observed. 
 
Fiduciary assets do not stand in a bank’s balance sheet, and the profits or losses of the assets are 
born by the trustors. However, as a fiduciary, the bank is far from risk-free. The risks of 
fiduciary activities involve the following several points: 
 
Strategic Risk: This is the risk that arises from improper business planning, poor decision-
making, failure to implement decisions or inadequate responses to changes in the industry. This 
risk focuses on the management’s ability to develop sound business strategic goals, implement 
processes compatible with these goals and deploy appropriate resources to achieve them. The 
strategic risk can seriously jeopardize the bank’s reputation as a professional and due diligent 
asset manager. 
 
Compliance Risk: There are two aspects to the compliance risk. On one side, the bank may fail to 
comply with the investment guidelines stipulated in a particular fiduciary agreement. Among 
these guidelines are sometimes even ethnic or moral-based restrictions. Compliance risk 
increases with the rapid development of collective investment funds. A large fund or a fiduciary 
department of a large bank could have more than 5,000 different fiduciary agreements, and it is a 
great task to keep accordant with each of these agreements (Morony, 1999). On the other side, 
the bank faces compliance risk if it does not properly adhere to the regulations and requirements 
of governmental and regulatory bodies. 
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Counterparty Risk: This is the risk that a counterparty (for example, an issuer, or a securities 
broker) fails to meet the commitment. An example of the counterparty risk is that a broker 
defaults, owing money to the fiduciary clients. In such a case, the clients may indemnify the 
bank for it has failed to evaluate the creditworthiness of the broker.  
 
Market Risk: Financial market fluctuation leads to profits or losses of the managed fiduciary 
assets. Although the profits or losses are in principle born by the trustors, they also affect the 
bank as fiduciary. Market fluctuation increases the difficulty to keep track of the pre-determined 
benchmark, and adds “tracking errors” to the fiduciary assets management. Particularly, portfolio 
management models are based upon historic volatility, which can and indeed often changes over 
time. Besides, even if the bank has successfully followed the pre-determined benchmark, market 
fluctuation may still affect the bank’s fiduciary income. Morony (2005) points out that investors 
sometimes confuse the relative performance with the absolute performance. Although the 
fiduciary agreement requires the fiduciary bank to follow the relative return of the benchmark, 
most investors, especially individual investors, still concentrate on the absolute return. When the 
market index and the benchmark exhibit a significant rise, the clients are happy with the bank 
even if their fiduciary assets slightly underperform the benchmark. On the contrary, if the market 
index and the benchmark slide down, the clients feel frustrated even if the fiduciary outperforms 
the benchmark to a small degree. Thus, the market fluctuation affects the investors’ assessment 
of the bank, and exposes the bank to market risk.   
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Chapter 4  The consequences of securities activities for the profitability of US banks 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Do securities activities enhance bank profitability? Literature provides inconsistent answers. 
Theoretical arguments suggest that banks benefit from scope economies when conducting 
securities activities, which helps promote bank profitability (see Santos 1994; Claessens 1998; 
Claessens and Klingebiel 2002). Empirical findings, however, do not widely support these 
arguments. Several empirical studies come to very mixed results concerning banks’ securities 
activities profitability. Early literature uses an aggregate industry comparison between securities 
and banking industry. Wall and Eisenbeis (1984), Litan (1985, 1987), and Wall et al. (1993) 
report that securities firms exhibit a higher aggregate ROA and ROE than US commercial banks. 
Saunders and Walter (1994, p. 191)52, on the contrary, find that commercial banks have a much 
higher profitability than securities firms.  Later developed models use simulated mergers 
between banks and securities firms to form “synthetic universal banks”. Boyd and Graham (1988) 
and Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) report a significantly higher profitability when banks are 
combined with securities firms. Saunders and Walters (1994, p. 195--205) use a similar 
simulation method but get to very different results. They find that a simulated expansion into 
securities activities strongly reduces bank profitability. Dale (1988)53 also argues that entering 
investment banking is tougher and less profitable than what commercial bankers had hoped for.  
 
A possible explanation for these mixed results in literature might lie in the classification of 
banks’ securities activities. Securities activities are conceptually very complex, covering various 
sub-items which differ from each other in both profitability and risk. If we ignore their 
differences and simply mix all these sub-types together, their effects will show very controversial 
                                                 
52 Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter, Universal Banking in the United States, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
53  Dale, Betsy, "The Grass May Not Be Greener: Commercial Banks and Investment Banking," Economic 
Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 12, no. 6, November/December 1988, pp. 3-15. 
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results, depending on which one (or ones) of these sub-type activities dominates. A clear 
classification helps to examine the exact effect of each individual securities activity, and 
provides better policy implications. 
In Chapter 3 we categorize the bank’s securities activities into three types---------securities 
trading, underwriting, and fiduciary activities-------according to their individual profitability and 
risk characteristics. In the present chapter, we regress bank profitability on these three securities 
activities, to see their respective effects on bank profitability. Profitability is measured in both 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Several control variables that could directly 
influence bank profitability are also incorporated in the regression.  
Based on the data from 620 US banking holding companies, our empirical results confirm that 
the profitability effects of banks’ securities activities are sub-type dependent. We firstly develop 
a linear model to analyze the effects of these three securities activities on bank profitability. The 
linear regression finds that securities trading significantly enhances the profitability of US banks, 
thanks to the banks’ professional assessment on the securities value. Underwriting and fiduciary 
activities lower bank profitability. Various market barriers make it very costly for banks to 
conduct securities underwriting activities. Fiduciary activities suffer from heavy operating costs, 
imposed by regulatory complexity. Only banks whose underwriting and fiduciary incomes are 
high enough to compensate for the heavy costs could make a profit. To test this issue we further 
develop a nonlinear model. We find that banks’ securities activities bear a positive quadratic 
relation to bank profitability. This indicates that banks whose securities incomes are above a 
certain threshold could make a profit from securities activities.     
Our sample period covers the 12 years between 1993 and 2004. This period is very interesting 
due to the fact that during that time US banks were allowed to legally participate in and 
gradually expand their securities activities. It is important to remember that US banks had been 
banned from undertaking securities activities for more than half a century since 1933. This is the 
reason why previous studies have usually suffered from “bad” sample periods during which 
banks have been allowed to conduct only a very limited number of securities activities such as 
specializing in government bonds. Those studies largely had to conduct an aggregate industry 
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comparison or “synthetic mergers” which are not for real (see Kwast 1987, Wall 1984, Litan 
1985 and 1983). From 1987 on, however, the Federal Reserve Bank began to deregulate banks’ 
securities activities step-by-step. Allowing for some time lag for banks’ response in the securities 
market after the Fed’s deregulatory action, our sample period which starts in 1993 can examine 
banks’ “real” securities activities better than previous studies:  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data sources. Section 4.3 
and Section 4.4 derive econometric models with both linear function and quadratic function, 
providing discussion and economic interpretation of the empirical results. Conclusions are drawn 
in Section 4. 5. 
4.2. Data 
The dependent variables of our empirical model are banks’ return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). On the right side of the regressions, assets and incomes from the banks’ three 
securities activities------securities trading, underwriting and fiduciary activities---- are used as 
explanatory variables. We also adopt several control variables that directly influence bank 
profitability including banks’ loan assets ratio (LOANratio), cash assets ratio, equity to assets 
ratio (EQUITYratio), banks’ overheads expenses (Overheads) and loan loss reserves to total 
assets (LOANLOSSratio).  
 
All the aforementioned variables are calculated from banks’ financial statements. Our data set is 
taken from Bankscope (Version 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) and includes data for 620 US bank 
holding companies that provide consolidated financial statements. The sample period covers the 
12 years from 1993 to 2004. We use yearly data from the sample banks’ financial statements, 
including banks’ balance sheets and income statements. The data are provided in unit of million 
dollars. 
 
Apart from that, population data from the US Census Archive and bank number data from the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve System are also used. We use 
them to calculate the competition intensiveness of the banking industry in each Federal Reserve 
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District, which is also a control variable in the regression. The average population number per 
bank is 40,573, indicating that an average bank has forty thousand potential customers. A lower 
average population per bank suggests a strong competition among local banks. Only residents are 
counted in the population number, since mobile population is difficult to census.   
 
Table 1 supplies an overview of the 11 variables in our empirical model. The data is rounded to 2 
decimals. Any data, which is smaller than 0.005, is shown as 0 in the table.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables and regressors: 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Return on average assets (ROA) % 1.18 0.83 -6.24 16.53 
Return on average equity (ROE)% 12.66 7.08 -120.00 122.01 
Loan assets ratio (loanratio) 0.62 0.13 0.00 0.95 
Loan loss reserves to total assets (loanlossratio) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.10 
Cash assets ratio (cashratio) 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.33 
Equity to asset (equityratio) 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.97 
Fiduciaryincome ratio (fidratio) 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.77 
Underwriting income ratio (feeratio) 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.85 
Trading securities assets ratio (traratio) 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.57 
Overheads per dollar assets (overheadsta) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.41 
Population number per bank (competition proxy, unit: thousand) 40.75 23.23 5.81 96.15 
 
An average bank has a ROA of 1.18%, while the average ROE is 12.66%. The ROE is much 
larger than the ROA in absolute value, due to high financial leverages in the banking industry. 
The equity ratio suggests that US banks averagely hold only 10% of equities compared to their 
total assets, which also confirms that the ROE should be 10 times larger than the ROA.  
 
The average overhead to manage per dollar banking assets is 0.017$. The loan assets ratio is 0.62, 
indicating that credit lending still dominates US banks’ operations. All three kinds of securities 
activities----trading, underwriting and fiduciary----together account for nearly 15% of banks’ 
business. Underwriting activities is the most important securities activity of US banks. Banks 
earn almost 8% of their total operating income from underwriting activities, through both private 
placement channels in local markets and public offering channels in national stock markets. This 
is even more than the aggregate of trading securities (2%) and fiduciary income (5%).  
.  
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4.3. Empirical evidence on the profitability effects of securities activities: Linear regression 
with time effects 
                               
In this section we present econometric models and discuss their empirical results. As described 
in Chapter 3 and in the above sections, banks’ securities activities are classified into three 
different types: securities trading, underwriting, and fiduciary activities. Bank profitability is 
regressed on these activities and a group of control variables. We firstly assume the model 
follows a simple linear form, as discussed in Section 4.3. After realizing that there might exist a 
possible non-linear relationship, we adopt a refined approach in Section 4.4. This examines the 
quadratic relationship between the profitability and banks’ securities activities.  
 
For the linear regression, we use the following econometric model to test the empirical impact of 
investment banking activities on the profitability of banking institutions.  We regress bank 
profitability, measured in return on average asset (ROA) and return on average equity (ROE), on 
a bank’s involvement in three different types of investment banking activities. Particularly, 
admitting that omitting important latent variables might bring with it a serious bias, we adopt 
time dummies to catch these effects.  These omitted variables include incomes from underwriting  
and fiduciary services influencing both the dependent and independent variables simultaneously. 
 
Unlike securities trading activities, a bank’s underwriting and fiduciary activities are both off-
balance-sheet activities. They provide incomes for a bank without explicitly using the bank’s 
own financial assets. In fact, the main base of a bank’s underwriting and fiduciary activities is its 
personnel expertise, the bank’s brand name, and parts of its client network. For this reason, we 
find it difficult to use an assets ratio to describe a bank’s involvement in underwriting and 
fiduciary activities. Therefore, the only alternative is to use the income ratios (i.e., the incomes of 
these two activities divided by the total operating income of a bank) as proxies for a bank’s 
involvement in these two activities.  
 
However, this approximation could raise the question about the regression’s endogeneity. The 
numerator of our dependent variables, ROA and ROE, is the bank’s return (namely, a bank’s net 
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income). This equals a bank’s gross revenue deducted by total costs. Furthermore, the gross 
revenue is an aggregation of a bank’s various incomes, including incomes from underwriting 
activities and fiduciary activities. At the same time, underwriting income and fiduciary income 
are also numerators of two explanatory variables----FEEratio and FIDratio.  Thus, underwriting 
income and fiduciary income are endogenous in both sides of our regression. We see the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables move simultaneously, since they are all affected by 
the same factors. Endogeneity, therefore, comes with the omitted variables. If we ignore the 
endogeneity caused by the omitted factors behind them, there will be a significant bias.   
 
Are FEEratio and FIDratio endogenous in a bank’s profitability? What are the effects of omitted 
factors? Part of the answer lies in the use of time dummies. We feel that time dummies may 
considerably reduce the effects of endogeneity problem of the fee income and fiduciary income, 
since these two kinds of income have strong time effects.  
 
We believe that a bank’s underwriting and fiduciary incomes have strong time effects for two 
reasons: Firstly, as described in Chapter 1, the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on a commercial 
bank’s securities activities have been released step-by-step since the Fed’s re-explanation of the 
G-S Act starting at the end of the 1980s. Therefore, over our sample period, the bank’s 
engagement in these two securities activities should exhibit an upwards trend over time. 
Secondly, these two securities activities may be strongly affected by specific market situations, 
which happen in each specific year. Canals (1997, p. 280), for example, claims that incomes 
from securities activities are very sensitive to business cycles54. A bank’s underwriting income 
and fiduciary income are strongly related to the US stock market cycle. For these two reasons we 
use year dummies to describe the time effects of the omitted variables of underwriting and 
fiduciary activities. The coefficients of year dummies should be compositive effects of both the 
deregulation time trends and the stock market cycle effects. 
 
                                                 
54 Canals, Jordi, 1997, Universal Banking International Comparison and Theoretical Perspectives, Clarendon Press. 
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4.3.1. Linear Regression Model 
The model, as defined in Equation (1), is used to test the profitability effect of the investment 
banking activities.  
 
tjtjtjtjtjtj TXFIDratioTRAratioFEEratioR tj ,,6,5,4,3,21 *****, εδδδδδδ ++++++=      (1) 
 
Where: 
tj
R
,
denotes the return of average asset (ROA) or return on average equity (ROE) of bank j in 
time t; 
 
FEEratioj,t denotes the underwriting fee and commission income proportion of bank j in time t; 
 
tjTRAratio ,  denotes the net securities trading position of bank j in time t; 
 
FIDratioj,t  denotes the fiduciary and fiduciary income proportion of bank j in time t; 
 
Xj,t is a vector of control variables on the individual bank level; 
 
Tj,t is a group of year dummies catching time effects from the years 1993 to 2004 
 
 εj,t is the error term. 
Dependent Variables 
The two following dependent variables are used for measuring a bank’s profitability.   
 
ROA (return on average asset): the bank’s post tax profit over a bank’s average assets (an 
algebra average of a bank’s total assets at the beginning of a year and at the end of a year).  
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ROE (return on average equity): the bank’s post tax profit over the bank’s average equity (an 
algebra average of a bank’s total equity at the beginning of a year and at the end of a year). 
 
Both ROA and ROE are popularly adopted to measure a bank’s profitability (see Wall and 
Eisenbeis, 1984, Saunders and Walter, 1994; Estrella, 2001; Stiroh, 2003, 2005). However, they 
slightly differ from each other.  
 
ROA is relatively independent of a bank’s financial leverage ratio and its equity policy. 
Therefore, it is more objective to compare a bank’s ROA than to compare ROEs. ROE, on the 
contrary, can be strongly affected by a bank’s equity policy. Managers may easily manipulate the 
ROE, by reducing or increasing a bank’s equity reserves through various equity policies.  
 
ROE, nevertheless, also has its own advantage. Modern capital adequacy accords55  usually 
require banks to hold equity in accordance with the riskiness of their assets. If a certain kind of 
investment is particularly risky, it would be assigned a high risk weight. This promotes a bank’s 
minimal equity requirement and reduces its ROE. Therefore, a highly risky investment might 
have a lower ROE, even if it had a high ROA. Thus, ROE actually measures a bank’s risk-
adjusted profitability, provided all banks conform to capital adequacy principles. 
 
Since ROA and ROE both have their advantages, we use both as dependent variables in the 
regressions. Coefficients of most independent variables have similar signs and significances for 
ROA as for ROE. For those that are not similar, we provide explanations.  
Explanatory Variables 
To measure the respective impact of various investment banking activities on bank profitability, 
we employ as explanatory variables the proportions of the following three types of investment 
activities in a bank’s total operation.  
 
                                                 
55 For example, the BASEL Capital Adequacy Accord I and II for international banking industry, and the CAMEL 
principle adopted in the US 
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TRAratio:  To estimate the impact of securities trading activity we include as a regressor the 
assets ratio of a bank’s securities trading, defined as the ratio of a bank’s trading securities over 
total assets (TRAratio). Trading securities refer to securities that are acquired for the purpose of 
selling in the near term or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term 
price movements56. This includes trading securities held by the banks themselves and their 
consolidated subsidiaries.  
 
FEEratio: The explanatory variable FEEratio is included in the effects of underwriting, 
measured by the ratio of a bank’s fee and commission income to the total operating income. This 
includes fees and commissions from underwriting ( or participating in the underwriting of ) 
securities, private placements of securities, merger and acquisition services, investment advisory 
and management services, and other related fees from the banks themselves and their 
consolidated subsidiaries. The dataset reports a zero or “missing” underwriting activity income if 
the bank has no income from these services and no consolidated subsidiaries that render these 
services. 
 
FIDratio: The bank’s fiduciary activity is measured by FIDratio, the ratio of fiduciary activity 
income to total operating income. The fiduciary activity income is the gross income from 
services rendered by the bank’s trust department or by any of its consolidated subsidiaries acting 
in any fiduciary capacity. Commissions and fees on sales of annuities that are executed in a 
fiduciary capacity by the bank’s trust department (or by any of its consolidated subsidiaries) are 
included. The dataset reports a zero or “missing” fiduciary activity income if the bank has no 
trust department and no consolidated subsidiaries that render services in any fiduciary capacity.                        
 
                                                 
56 Banks report their trading securities each year in their financial statements. According to the regulations of 
Federal Reserve banks, a bank should determine whether it intends to hold an asset for trading when a security or 
other asset is acquired. Nevertheless, there might be some speculation as to defining trading securities. Banks may 
define some assets as trading securities with the intent to resell them soon. But in certain cases, unexpected price 
movements might force a bank to keep these securities longer than expected. However, for simplicity, we do not 
question a bank’s reported trading securities assets, supposing that banks generally have rational expectations when 
defining their assets. 
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Control variables: 
Several control variables are included in the econometric models. They are variables that have 
direct influence on a bank’s profitability, so that we think it necessary to control their effects. 
Among them are variables from bank balances sheets, which are used to catch the impacts of a 
bank’s assets portfolio: the ratio of a bank’s total loans, the ratio of non-earning assets (cash and 
due from banks). A bank’s equity also has impact on its profitability in that equity provides free 
capital (which is free of interest expense) for a bank’s operation. A bank’s overheads expenses 
and loan loss reserves are also included as control variables, in that they are directly related to 
bank profitability. We also introduce a competition variable to control its effect on a bank’s 
profitability.  
 
These control variables are: 
 
LOANratio: the ratio of a bank’s net loans (netting loan loss reserves) to total assets. The 
coefficient of LOANratio measures the impact of loan activities on bank profitability (Brewer, 
1989; Espahbodi, 1991). 
 
CASHratio: the ratio of a bank’s cash and due from other banks to total assets. Since cash and 
inter-bank dues are primarily non-interest bearing, they are regarded as non-earning assets, 
which do not contribute to bank profitability. A higher CASHratio indicates too many resources 
allocated in non-earning assets, and therefore is expected to be negatively related to bank 
profitability. 
 
EQUITYratio: A bank’s equity over its total assets. Compared with the interest-bearing liabilities 
like deposits and bonds, bank equity provides free capital for a bank’s operation. It lowers a 
bank’s interest expense and promotes its profits. The return on assets (ROA) is therefore 
expected to be positively related to EQUITYratio. But a higher EQUITYratio also raises the 
denumerator of the return on equity (ROE), so that the coefficient on ROE could be either 
insignificantly positive or negative . 
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LOANLOSSratio: a bank’s loan loss reserves over its total assets. Loan loss reserves directly 
refer to bank profits, so that they must be controlled when testing bank profitability. 
LOANLOSSratio is expected to have a significant negative sign for both ROA and ROE 
regressions. 
 
OverheadsTA: a bank’s overhead expenses over its total assets. It measures how many overhead 
costs a bank has in order to manage one dollar in assets. Overheads are compositions of a bank’s 
operating expenses; they directly refer to a bank’s profits. Overhead per unit assets is an 
important measurement for bank management efficiency. The more overheads/assets a bank has, 
the lower should be its profitability. Its coefficients are therefore expected to be negative. 
  
LNTA: The natural logarithm of bank total assets. It adjusts for size differences in the 
aforementioned relationship between the profitability control measures and profitability. The 
relationship between bank size and bank profitability, however, is not clear-cut. Keeping other 
factors unchanged, a bigger bank could either have a higher profit due to its larger market power 
and greater possibility for scope economy, or have a lower profit owing to difficulties in 
management and internal control. Therefore, the coefficient could be positive or negative, 
depending on which one of these two forces dominates. 
 
Competition: Competition influences bank profitability because inadequate competition gives a 
bank a certain monopoly to charge more for its products. We divide our 620 sample banks into 
12 Federal Reserve districts, according to the state they register in. The competition variable is 
then calculated for each district, defined by population number per bank (equaling the total 
population in one FED district divided by the number of total FDIC registered banks in this 
district). A lower average population per bank suggests a strong competition among local banks. 
This will reduce bank profitability. We therefore expect the coefficients of competition variable 
to be positive in regressions for both ROA and ROE.  
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4.3.2 Estimation results and discussion 
In the current subsection we present the results of the linear analysis of the impact of various 
securities activities on bank profitability, measured by both ROA and ROE. Indeed, the 
estimated results - especially the signs of the three explanatory variables - are very similar in the 
regression of ROA and ROE, thus enhancing the results’ credibility..  
 
Table 2 illustrates the results of the regressions on bank profitability. Generally speaking, it 
suggests that a bank’s securities trading enhances bank profitability, but finds the profitability 
effects of securities underwriting activities and fiduciary activities to be negative. Coefficients of 
year dummies are presented in the appendix. 
 
We find coefficients in the ROE regression to be typically much larger than coefficients in the 
ROA regression. This, however, is fully understandable. Since banks have very small 
equity/asset ratios (averagely 10% for our sample banks), the ROE are also averagely 10 times 
larger than ROA. This difference has an impact on the absolute value of the coefficients in the 
ROE and ROA regression, but does not affect the economic meaning of the regression. 
 
In general, the coefficients in ROA regression and ROE regression are similar in signs and 
significance, which makes our empirical results more convincible. All 11 pairs of coefficients 
have the same signs for ROA and ROE; only 3 pairs of coefficients (Equityratio, Traratio, 
Loanratio) show different significant levels for ROA and ROE. We will provide an explanation 
for the difference in these three coefficients in the following discussions.   
 
Table 2: Estimation results with time effects 
 ROA (R-square=0.77) ROE (R-square=0.49) 
 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
t-
ratio Coef. Std. Err. t-ratio 
Trading securities assets ratio (traratio) 1.45*** 0.41 3.56 4.98 5.03 0.99 
Underwriting fee income ratio (feeratio) -0.76*** 0.25 -3.04 -6.18** 3.09 -2.00 
Fiduciary income ratio (fidratio) -1.12*** 0.33 -3.37 -12.12*** 4.12 -2.94 
Logarithm of total assets (lnta) -0.03* 0.02 -1.68 -0.76*** 0.24 -3.11 
Loan assets ratio (loanratio) 0.14 0.12 1.15 3.01** 1.47 2.04 
Loan loss reserves to total assets (loanlossratio) - 1.80 
-
13.37 - 22.28 -11.92 
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24.04*** 265.65*** 
Cash assets ratio (cashratio) -3.04*** 0.72 -4.24 -32.00*** 8.88 -3.60 
Equity to asset (equityratio) 8.05*** 0.32 25.41 0.53 3.93 0.13 
Overheads per dollar assets (overheadsta) -3.07** 1.45 -2.11 -71.58*** 18.01 -3.97 
Population number per bank (competition proxy, unit: thousand) 0.005** 0.002 2.200 0.086*** 0.026 3.300 
_cons 0.68*** 0.22 3.13 16.14*** 2.68 6.02 
 
The regression suggests that securities trading activity (TRAratio) enhances profitability. 
Coefficients of TRAratio are 1.45 and 4.98 for ROA and ROE respectively. The impact on ROE 
is much greater than on ROA, due to the high equity/assets leverage in the banking industry.  
 
However, we find the coefficient of TRAratio on ROE is much more insignificant than the 
coefficient on ROA. This might be due to a stricter capital requirement on trading securities. 
Banks, according to the Basel II Capital Requirement, should hold their equity capital in 
accordance with different classes of assets safety. Trading securities are exposed to short- term 
price volatility. Basel II therefore classifies trading account securities into risky assets categories 
with 100% risk weights. Thus, trading activities increase a bank’s required equity, and to some 
extent reduce a bank’s return on equity (ROE). Although trading securities have a significantly 
high return on assets (ROA), they tend to have very insignificant positive effects on ROE. 
 
Various previous studies confirm our results of bank securities trading activities. Kwan (1997) 
studies bank holding companies (BHCs) with Section 20 subsidiaries from 1990 to 1997. 
Securities trading is found to have a higher ROA than banking, regardless of whether the Section 
20 subsidiary is a primary or a non-primary dealer. Kwast (1989) also finds that a bank’s trading 
account securities on average have a higher ROA than a bank’s non-trading assets.  
 
The positive profitability of securities trading could be interpreted by a bank’s professional 
assessment of securities prices. Santos (1994) points out that banks acquire securities in the 
expectation of reselling them at a higher price. The profitability of securities trading activities is 
therefore very dependent on the bank’s assessment of the value of the securities and on the 
market, he argues. Banks have for a long time collected credit information on various corporate 
clients. This information would could easily be reutilized in assessing corporate securities, 
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helping banks make the right decision in securities trading activities. Claessens and Klingebiel 
(2002), and Claessen (1998) all agree that banks enjoy informational advantages when 
evaluating securities.   
  
The relationship between bank profitability and underwriting activity is found to be significantly 
negative. FEEratio’s coefficients on ROA and ROE are -0.76 and -6.18 respectively, indicating 
that underwriting activity lowers a bank’s profitability. Although this comes a bit as a surprise, 
this result is consistent with the finding of Kwan (1998) who also claims that underwriting 
activities lower the profitability of nonprimary banks.  
 
The reason that commercial banks’ underwriting activities do not bring about positive profits as 
expected might be the high barriers to entering and competing in the underwriting field. Pugel 
and White 57  (1985, p. 112) suggest that barriers to entering the underwriting market are 
substantially high. The key aspects appear to be personnel and reputation. A commercial bank, as 
a new entrant of the underwriting playfield, must prove to its clients that it is able to design and 
price the issues, and to form a syndicate in order to manage a successful distribution. Much 
depends on the quality of personnel, especially on their expertise and capability in corporate 
finance advising. People with this expertise are limited in number. An entrant may have 
difficulties luring them away from the established firms to participate in its own, relatively risky 
operations. The entrant also faces a marketing-based barrier, because the established firms 
already have a reputation and track record, whereas the entrant’s capabilities are relatively 
untested.  
 
Besides, the structure of syndicates might also enhance barriers in the underwriting industry. 
Syndicates are widely adopted in both debt and equity underwriting in the US (Walter, 1994). 
The issuers choose a leading underwriter as syndicate manager. The syndicate manager is then 
responsible for organizing a group of investment banks to jointly undertake the issue, setting 
underwriting spreads and sharing underwriting fees. A syndicate manager may not invite new 
                                                 
57 Thomas A. Pugel and Lawrence J. White, An Analysis of the Competitive Effects of Allowing Commercial Bank 
Affiliates to Underwrite Corporate Securities, Chapter 5 in “Deregulating Wall Street”, edited by Ingo Walter, Press 
John Wiley & Sons, 1985. 
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commercial banking entrants to join the syndicate, thus effectively shooing new entrants away 
from the market. Commercial banks may face difficulties and high costs to break into the 
syndicated underwriting group, if they do not have strong customer relationships with the issuers 
or keep versatile marketing ties with the syndicate managers. All these barriers could result in 
highly expensive operating costs for a bank’s underwriting activities. Most small banks whose 
income is not high enough to compensate these costs would experience difficulties in making a 
profit from underwriting activities. 
 
Fiduciary activities (FIDratio) also lower a bank’s profitability. A one percent increase in 
fiduciary activities brings down the bank’s ROA 1.12%. The finding is in accordance with 
DuBay (1993)58. He claims that banks are dragged into offering funds by a need to serve 
longstanding customer relationships, rather than by aiming at a higher profitability. Various other 
studies also suggest that banks tend to shrink in the fiduciary industry (Comizio and Hare, 2004; 
LoBue industry research 1998; Investment Company Institute Annual Report 2000—2005).   
 
A possible explanation for the negative profitability consequences of fiduciary activities might 
be the stringent regulation in this field. Regulators and academic personae have long been 
concerned about the potential conflict of interests in a bank’s fiduciary activities (see Tillmann 
1986; Saunders 1985; Kroszner and Rajan 1992, Walters 1994).  A good example of this is that 
banks may “dump” unwanted securities into fiduciary accounts, given that banks have 
difficulties selling these securities to outsiders. To avoid such conflicts of interests, numerous 
juristic restrictions are placed on banks’ fiduciary activities in the US by federal and states laws59. 
Besides, banks involved in fiduciary activities have to accept dual supervisions from both 
banking regulators and securities regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
Although strict regulations efficiently protect customers from a bank’s potential abuse of its 
fiduciary power, they also put high operating costs on a bank’s fiduciary activities. An example 
                                                 
58 DuBay, Keith, 1993, “ IBAA worries that bank rush into funds will backfire,” American Banker, 158 (September 
23), pp.15 and 17.  
59 For a detailed discussion on these jurisdictions, see Baris (1994). Also see Herman (1980) for a full discussion of 
all regulatory approaches to conflicts control. 
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is the bank fiduciary capacity examination rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission60. 
These rules require a bank to provide review over every single trust and fiduciary account, in 
order to demonstrate that each and every account has been “chiefly compensated”.61. A survey 
by the Federal Reserves62 finds that a moderately sized bank trust department may have around 
10,000 separate trust and fiduciary accounts, whereas a large trust department may have more 
than 100,000 such accounts. Therefore, the account-by-account approach imposes significant 
burdens on a bank. Banks must adopt a highly expensive system in order to track their fiduciary 
activities through each individual account. Those banks whose fiduciary incomes are not high 
enough to compensate these costs suffer losses.  
 
As a result of the high operating costs imposed by the complex regulatory requirements, banks 
are increasingly losing their market share in trust and fiduciary activities. Surveys find that in 
1990, banks used to take 65 percent of the market share in the US trust and fiduciary industry 
while this share dropped to 40% in 1996 and to 30% in 200463. Comizio and Hare (2004)64 also 
confirm that banking institutions tend to shrink in the fiduciary market. The number of collective 
investment funds at depository trust institutions has dropped 27% since 1996.  The number of 
banking institutions with trust powers and assets under management has also decreased 20.1% 
since 1996, despite the pleasing market environment for the fiduciary industry in general. 
 
Although we find no literature exploring banks’ fiduciary activities, our empirical results in 
banks’ underwriting and trading activities are consistent with conclusions of Kwast (1989) and 
Kwan (1998). Kwast reports that banks’ trading account securities have an averagely higher 
ROA than banks’ non-trading assets, indicating that trading securities enhance a bank’s 
                                                 
60 For the current version of the rules, see Securities and Exchange Commission File No. S7-12-01. 
61  Under certain conditions,the Securities and Exchange Commission may also allow an exemption from this 
account-by-account examination. But this can only be viewed as an exceptional rule for banks that comply with 
strict preconditions. 
62 Testimony of Governor Laurence H. Meyer, The securities activities of banks, before the subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, August 2, 2001. 
63 See LoBue industry research (1998) and Investment Company Institute’s Annual Report (2005). 
64 Gerard Comizio and Jeffrey L. Hare, Regulatory Development for Banks and Thrifts Conducting Trust and 
Fiduciary Activities, The Business Lawyer, Annual Banking Law Survey, Vol. 59, Number 3, May 2004. 
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profitability. Kwan finds that banks’ securities trading activities result in higher profits, and that 
banks’ underwriting activities lower a bank’s profits or leave profits untouched, depending on 
different bank groups.  
 
Our empirical results help explain the reason why previous studies have mixed results on banks’ 
securities activities profitability. Since each type of securities activities has its own profitability 
profile, banks with a full range of securities activities may have very different profitability 
effects, depending on which type of securities activities dominates.  
 
Coefficients of control variables and year dummies 
 
The coefficients of control variables all meet their economic expectation.  
 
Competition lowers a bank’s profitability. The population number per bank has significant 
positive coefficients in the regressions of both ROA and ROE. This fits well with our expectation. 
A lower average population per bank suggests a strong competition among local banks, which 
reduces bank profitability. A higher average population number per bank means more people 
rely on fewer banks. This implies banks have certain monopoly powers and could utilize them to 
reap higher profits.  
 
Overhead per dollar assets (OVERHEADSTA), as expected, also significantly reduce a bank’s 
profitability, measured in both ROA and ROE.  
 
A higher equity/assets ratio significantly increases a bank’s ROA, but, as anticipated, has 
insignificant effects (0.53, t-ratio=0.13) on a bank’s ROE. 
 
As expected, we see non-earning assets like cash bring down bank profitability. Coefficients of 
CASHratio to ROA and ROE are both significantly negative.  
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Loans significantly increase a bank’s ROA and ROE. As we have anticipated, the coefficients of 
the loan loss reserves ratio exhibit very significant negative signs. This clearly illustrates the 
deductive effects of loan loss reserves on bank profitability. 
 
Bank size, measured by the logarithm of a bank’s total assets, reduces bank profitability 
significantly. Its effect on a bank’s ROA is -0.03 (p-value 0.06) and on a bank’s ROE -0.76 (p-
value 0.002). This fits with various research surveys on banking profitability. The US Treasury 
Department and FDIC65, for example, suggest that the profitability of small banks has remained 
relatively strong and stable over the past years. They find that banks with assets under $1 billion 
have on average achieved higher returns on assets (ROAs) than larger banks in seven of the last 
ten years. Small banks operate and make decisions closer to their customers, which in that way is 
difficult for large banks to replicate, as suggested by the US Treasury Department. Starkmann 
and Meyer (2005) cite a case analysis on mega big banks like the Bank of America and Citigroup. 
They claim big banks often stumble into a range of regulatory complexity.66 Hanley (2004)67 
finds that big banks are too big to manage. As banks become large and complex, they get farer 
away from and slower to the market. The information reporting structure becomes too complex, 
bureaucracy increases. Processes and departments disconnect. Units focus on achieving their 
own goals and often lose sight of the overall demands of the customer. Consequently, it is hard 
for large banks to organize themselves around customer’s individual requirements and to deliver 
solutions and service that satisfy the customer. 
 
For time effects we observe that the coefficients of the year dummies display deregulation effects 
in the period before 1997 and that they are strongly influenced by stock market cycles over the 
whole period. During the first half period from 1993 to 1997 the deregulation effects seem to 
dominate the year dummies (except for an interruption in 1995, which is very insignificant when 
measured by p-value), pushing the coefficients of year dummies for both ROA and ROE steadily 
                                                 
65 Remarks of Under Secretary of the Treasury Peter R. Fisher to the independent community bankers of America, 
US Treasury, office of public affairs, May 13, 2002, PO-3090. 
66 Dean Starkman and Caroline E. Mayer, Washington Post, July 1, 2005 
67 Claude A. Hanley, Jr. ,Too big to manage: does the law of diminishing returns apply to synergies? 2004. 
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upwards. We interpret this with the deregulation on banks’ ineligible securities activities68, 
which start at the end of 1989. The deregulation effects peak in the year 1997. This is one year 
after the FED’s take another deregulatory action in 1996, allowing bank holding companies to 
earn as far as 25% of their total revenue from securities activities. Deregulation actually 
continues and peaks in 1999 when Congress passes the Financial Modernization Act. But the 
stock market cycle also exerts its effects on the year dummies. The coefficients show a sudden 
drop in 1998, probably due to the shrinking effects caused by the Russian Default69. This effect 
lasts only very shortly; in 1999 the coefficients of year dummies pick up again and reach a high 
point. The upwards trend is broken in the years 2000 and 2001 with very small and even negative 
coefficients, probably due to the significant downfall of the stock market from 11,000 to around 
7400 at end of the year 2000. The coefficients then once again rise up for the years 2002 and 
2003 (the year dummy for 2004 is dropped to avoid multicollinearity), when the Dow Jones 
Industry Average (DJIA) comes back from a low of 7400 to around 10000. 
 
4.4. Empirical evidence on the profitability effects of securities activities: Regression with 
quadratic function 
In the aforementioned regression we find bank underwriting and fiduciary activities both to have 
negative profitability effects. Discussions suggest that banks encounter high market barriers in 
the underwriting industry, thus incurring high expenses imposed by complex regulatory 
mandates for fiduciary activities.  
 
These discussions, however, encompass an implicit proposition: both underwriting and fiduciary 
activities could probably bring about profit if the banks are strong enough to generate sufficient 
incomes. This implies their overcoming the highly expensive costs imposed by market barriers 
for underwriting. On the other hand, for a bank to be strong enough to generate a high fiduciary 
income in order to compensate the regulatory costs could also bring about profit. Were these 
                                                 
68 For detailed explanation of the 1989 deregulation on banks’ ineligible securities activities from the Board of 
Federal Reserve System, see Chapter 1. See also 75 Federal Reserve Bulletin 192 (1989).   
69 See Jonathan Broader for further discussion on the Russian Default’s influence on US markets, 1998, Salon 
Research Archive. Also see: Mark P. Taylor and Elena Tchernykh Branson, Asymmetric Arbitrage and Default 
Premiums Between the US and Russian Financial Markets, IMF staff paper, Volume 51, Number 2, 2004. 
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claims true, the relationship between bank profitability and FEEratio (for underwriting) or 
FIDratio (fiduciary activities) might follow a non-linear function: a low FEEratio or FIDratio 
brings down bank profitability, while a high FEEratio or FIDratio promotes it.  
 
To test this proposition, we now include SquaFEEratio (FEEratio square) in our regression, to 
see whether it takes a high FEEratio to make profits. We also indiscriminatingly include 
SquaFIDratio (FIDratio square, for fiduciary activities) and SquaTRAratio (TRAratio square, for 
trading activities) as well. Other control variables stay the same as in the regression in Section 
3.1. 
 
We now augment Equation (1) in the linear regression with the square variables, to get Equation 
(2): 
tjtjtj
tjtjtjtjtj
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Estimation Results and Discussion 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. Coefficients of year dummies are presented in 
the appendix.  
 
Table 3: Regression with interaction effects between bank size and securities activities 
 
ROA (R-
square=0.77) 
ROE (R-square=0.49) 
 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
t-
ratio Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t-ratio 
Trading securities assets ratio (traratio) 0.27 0.89 0.31 -13.27 11.00 -1.21 
    ---------- TRAratio Square   2.91 1.93 1.51 45.14* 23.98 1.88 
Underwriting fee income ratio (feeratio) -1.93*** 0.60 -3.24 -17.91** 7.40 -2.42 
    ---------- FEEratio Square   3.04** 1.31 2.33 30.70* 16.21 1.89 
Fiduciary income ratio (fidratio) -4.41*** 0.75 -5.84 -48.00*** 9.36 -5.13 
    ---------- FIDratio Square   6.27*** 1.28 4.90 68.79*** 15.86 4.34 
Logarithm of total assets (lnta) -0.04** 0.02 -2.05 -0.83*** 0.24 -3.41 
Loan assets ratio (loanratio) 0.14 0.12 1.14 3.01** 1.47 2.04 
Loan loss reserves to total assets (loanlossratio) 
-
23.64** 1.80 
-
13.1
-
260.75** 22.30 
-
11.69 
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* 5 * 
Cash assets ratio (cashratio) -2.59*** 0.72 -3.60 -27.42*** 8.95 -3.07 
Equity to assets (equityratio) 7.98** 0.32 
25.2
6 -0.32 3.92 -0.08 
Overheads per dollar assets (overheadsta) -4.01*** 1.46 -2.74 -81.18*** 18.14 -4.47 
Population number per bank (competition proxy, unit: 
thousand) 0.005**
0.00
2 
2.20
0 0.087*** 0.026 3.330 
_cons 0.89*** 0.22 4.01 18.36*** 2.76 6.64 
 
A bank’s underwriting activities have a significantly positive square relationship with bank 
profitability. The minimum value of this square function is 31% for ROA and 30% for ROE70. If 
a bank’s FEEratio is beyond 30%, the profitability slides down with expanding underwriting 
activities. Only after this 30%-threshold, a bank’s underwriting activities begin to promote its 
profitability. In our data set, only 26 bank holding companies (BHCs) out of the total 620 BHCs 
successfully climb above this threshold. All other 96% of banks lie below the threshold. The 
quadratic function means that after crossing the threshold, bank profits rise overproportionately 
to underwriting incomes. This might be due to the improved market position, that is, a better 
position in the underwriting syndicate and a wider client network to facilitate its underwriting. 
  
Thus, the findings implicate a concentration potentiality in bank underwriting activities. Most 
small banks have to either contract their underwriting activities, or suffer from losses. Only very 
small numbers of “top players” make a profit and survive71 . Previous studies confirm our 
findings. Pugel and White (1994) suggest that US securities underwriting is dominated by about 
                                                 
70 By taking the first order condition, we can calculate this inflex point through the coefficients of Feeratio and 
SquaFeeratio:  
ROA= 3.04* SquaFeeratio- 1.93*Feeratio +(effects of other control variables and constant)  
ROE= 30.70* SquaFeeratio- 17.91*Feeratio +(effects of other control variables and constant) 
The F.O.C. provides the inflex point: 1.93/(3.04*2) =31% for ROA, and 17.91/(30.70*2)=30% for ROE.  
However, it might be important to understand that the inflexion point is not the same as the break-even point. The 
break-even point is where the profitability of underwriting equals zero. Since we can not decide how many effects of 
other control variables and constants should be attributed to the underwriting activities and how many should be 
attributed to trading and fiduciary activities, the F.O.C provides no information about the break-even points.  
71 The “top player” here refers to the very small number of banks which lie above the threshold. They are relatively 
specialized in securities activities, with a higher underwriting income ratio. In most cases, they are big-sized banks 
in our data set, equipped with better expertise and broader client network. Descriptive statistics also find that larger 
banks generally have a higher average FEEratio than smaller banks. However, some small banks could also have an 
FEEratio that is quite high, depending on their business strategies. Here in the paper we focus on the banks’ 
securities activities income ratio threshold, not on the bank size. The relationship between bank size and their 
specialization in securities activities, however, could be another very interesting topic. Kwan 1997 has done some 
valuable work in this field. The same goes for FIDratio and TRAratio.  
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20-25 large investment banking firms. Heyal, Spence and Marks (1983)72 explore the average 
concentration in securities underwriting. They find the first 15 firms to hold 89% of market 
shares in US negotiated securities underwritings, as well as 85% of market shares in competitive-
bid underwriting.    
 
In the light of fiduciaries, the results indicate that a bank’s fiduciary activities exhibit a positive 
square function in relation to bank profitability. The inflexion point of the square function lies at 
35% for ROA and 34% for ROE73. Thus, most banks whose fiduciary incomes count for less 
than 34% of their total operating income, feel negative profitability effects. Only a few top banks, 
whose Fidratio lies above the threshold, benefit from a positive fiduciary profitability. 
 
Similar to the results of bank underwriting activities, the findings suggest a “top player” rule in 
the fiduciary market. This is consistent with conclusions drawn in various studies. Kane (1995)74 
suggests that only relatively large banks have truly stampeded into fiduciary funds.  He clarifies 
that only 1,835 banks, among a total of 12644 US banks in 1994, offer fiduciary funds. Even 
among this small number of banks that offer funds, most small and midsize banks essentially act 
only as brokers who sell funds for an unaffiliated third-party fund provider.  Another survey 
conducted by American Banker (1996) also finds that the 100 leading banks have significantly 
increased their market share in the fiduciary industry over the last decades75.  Latzko (1999)76, 
Mack (1993)77, Malhotra and McLeod (1997)78 come to a similar conclusion.  
 
Trading activities also share a square function with profitability. The coefficient of 
SquaTRAratio is significantly positive with ROE (45.14, with p-value=0.06) and nearly as 
                                                 
72 Samuel L. Hayes, III, A. Michael Spence, and David Van Prang Markes, Competition in the Investment Banking 
Industry: Harvard University Press, 1983, Table 3,4, and 5. 
73 This inflexion is calculated through the coefficients of Fidratio and SquaFidratio: 4.41/(6.27*2) =35% for ROA, 
and 48.00/(68.79*2)=34% for ROE. 
74 Edward J. Kane, What is the value-added for large US banks in offering mutual funds, NBER working paper, 
April 26, 1995. 
75 Ranking the Banks, American Banker, 1996. 
76 David A. Latzko, 1999, Economies of scale in mutual fund administration, Journal of Financial Research. 
77 Mack, P., 1993, Recent trends in the mutual fund industry, Federal Reserve Bulletin 79, 1001-12. 
78 Malhotra, D.K. and R. McLeod, 1997, An empirical analysis of mutual fund expenses, Journal of Financial 
Research 20, 175-190. 
 83
significant with ROA (2.91, with p-value=0.13). The coefficients of TRAratio itself, however, 
are insignificant for both ROA and ROE. Starting from a statistics point of view we interpret 
coefficients of TRAratio as not being significantly different from zero. The threshold for 
TRAratio is therefore zero, too79 . This indicates that trading activities result in a positive 
profitability for all banks. This conclusion is also consistent with the positive coefficients of 
TRAratio in Section 3.1.  
 
The quadratic function suggests that bank profitability increases overproportionately with trading 
assets. The reason may lie in the concave structure of securities trading costs. Demchuk(2002)80, 
Konno and Wijyanayake (2001) all suggest that the securities trading cost rate is assumed to be a 
decreasing step function of the trading volume. They argue that if investors trade more, they 
receive a transaction cost rate discount and pay a lower cost fraction for the trading volume. 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) examine the upstairs market of NASDAQ for big block trading. 
They also find that the marginal cost of trading upstairs is significantly lower than the marginal 
trading cost downstairs.81  
 
The quadratic model helps to further understand why previous studies show very mixed results. 
The profitability effects of a bank’s securities activities are both sub-type dependent and level-
dependent. Only when a bank’s securities activities reach certain levels (the threshold), do they 
begin to exhibit positive profitability effects for all three kinds of securities activities. If a bank’s 
securities activities ratio lies below the threshold, only securities trading brings about profit, 
while underwriting and fiduciary activities will have a negative impact on bank profitability. 
Since banks have various levels of securities activities, it is quite understandable that previous 
studies come to very inconsistent results. 
 
                                                 
79 This threshold is calculated through a method similar of that for FEEratio and FIDratio, see page 22. 
80 Andriy Demchuk, Portfolio Optimization with Concave Transaction Costs, International Center for Financial 
Fiduciary and Engineering, FAME Research Paper Series, Nr. rp103. 
81 Ananth Madhavan and Minder Cheng, In Search of Liquidity: Block Trades in the Upstairs and Downstairs 
Markets, Review of Financial Studies,vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 1997):175–203. 
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The empirical findings of the quadratic model came up very recently but still have some linkage 
to previous studies. Although no previous literature uses nonlinear regression as we do, we find 
one author (Kwan 1998) using categorized regression. This categorized regression also 
distinguishes between banks with higher securities activities ratios and those with lower ones. 
Although Kwan does not mention a bank’s fiduciary activities, his conclusion fits our findings in 
both underwriting and trading activities. 
 
Kwan divides his sample bank holding companies into two groups: Primary dealers and non-
primary dealers. Primary dealers engage in many more securities activities than non-primary 
dealers. The average securities underwriting ratio is 19.13% for primary dealers and 0.94% for 
non-primary dealers. The mean trading securities to banking assets ratio is 29.97% for primary 
dealers but only 1.02% for non-primary dealers. Kwan reports that securities trading activities of 
bank holding companies have a higher ROA than their commercial banking activities, regardless 
of the banks being primary securities dealers or not. Therefore, his findings essentially confirm 
our conclusion that trading activities result in a positive profitability for all banks. Kwan also 
reports that securities underwritings performed by non-primary dealers have a lower ROA than 
commercial banking activities, and that underwritings by primary dealers have a similar level of 
return to commercial banking. Since primary securities dealers have a much higher securities 
activities ratio than the non-primary dealers, Kwan’s conclusion is consistent with our findings 
that underwriting lowers bank profitability if the FEEratio is small. Only banks whose FEEratio 
is high enough can reach their break-even point or gain a positive profitability from underwriting.      
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this paper we present evidence on the profitability effects of a bank’s expansion into 
investment banking activities. Bank securities activities are categorized in three types according 
to their different characteristics.  
 
The empirical section creates panel data models of the effects of a bank’s securities activities on 
bank profitability. 620 US bank holding companies in the US were examined between 1993 and 
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2004. Linear regression suggests that securities trading (TRAratio) enhances bank profitability 
significantly. For their part underwriting (FEEratio) and fiduciary (FIDratio) activities reduce 
bank profitability. We argue that high market barriers restrain a bank’s underwriting profitability. 
Fiduciary activities suffer from regulatory complexity, which imposes heavy costs on banks. 
Only securities trading seems to reap profit for banks, thanks to the banks’ professional 
assessment of financial products.  
 
A further non-linear regression finds a positive quadratic relationship between bank profitability 
and FEEratio, FIDratio, and TRAratio. Only above a certain threshold, the fiduciary and 
underwriting activities begin to promote bank profitability. This implies a “top player” rule in 
bank securities activities. Only a very small number of banks who generate a sufficient income 
from securities activities can enjoy a high profitability. All other banks whose securities 
activities income is not high enough to cover the high costs have to be cautious when stepping 
into the securities market.  
 
These findings suggest that the profitability effect of a commercial bank’s expansion into the 
securities market is sub-type dependent. Mixing all these different sub-types together, like 
previous literature typically does, might thereby result in a severe bias. 
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Appendix:  
Panel regressions of three types of investment banking activities on bank profitability 
 ROA ROE 
 
Linear regression 
(with timeEffects) 
Non-linear regression 
(with timeeffects) 
Linear regression 
(with timeEffects) 
Non-linear regression 
(with timeeffects) 
 (R-square=0.77) (R-square=0.77) (R-square=0.49) (R-square=0.49) 
Trading securities assets 
ratio (traratio) 1.45*** 0.27 4.98 -13.27
    ----------TRAratio Square  ----- 2.91 ----- 45.14*
Underwriting fee income 
ratio (feeratio) -0.76*** -1.93*** -6.18** -17.91**
    ---------- FEEratio Square   ----- 3.04** ----- 30.70*
Fiduciary income ratio 
(fidratio) -1.12*** -4.41*** -12.12*** -48.00***
    ---------- FIDratio Square  ----- 6.27*** ----- 68.79***
Logarithm of total assets 
(lnta) -0.03* -0.04** -0.76*** -0.83***
Loan assets ratio (loanratio) 0.14 0.14 3.01** 3.01**
Loan loss reserves to total 
assets (loanlossratio) -24.04*** -23.64*** -265.65*** -260.75***
Cash assets ratio 
(cashratio) -3.04*** -2.59*** -32.00*** -27.42***
Equity to asset (equityratio) 8.05*** 7.98** 0.53 -0.32
Overheads per dollar assets 
(overheadsta) -3.07** -4.01*** -71.58*** -81.18***
Population number per bank 
(competition proxy, unit: 
thousand) 0.005** 0.005** 0.086*** 0.087***
_cons 0.68*** 0.89*** 16.14*** 18.36***
y1993 0.09 0.06 1.59** 1.36*
Y1994 0.09* 0.06 1.68*** 1.37**
Y1995 0.04 0.01 0.70 0.46
Y1996 0.12*** 0.10** 1.79*** 1.55***
Y1997 0.15*** 0.13*** 2.15*** 1.96***
Y1998 0.09** 0.07* 1.29*** 1.15**
Y1999 0.10*** 0.09** 1.56*** 1.46***
Y2000 0.04 0.03 1.19*** 1.13***
Y2001 -0.02 -0.02 0.40 0.33
Y2002 0.07** 0.06** 1.11*** 1.03***
Y2003 0.05 0.04 0.71* 0.64
Y2004 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
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Chapter 5 The effect of securities activities on risks of US public listed banks 
 
5. 1. Introduction 
Bank risk is one of the most vigorously discussed topics when arguing the consequences of 
securities activities, given the unique role of banks in the monetary system. Commercial banks 
offer continuous access to liquidity by jointly supplying deposits and loans. When financial 
turbulences occurred outside the banking system, they could be controlled as long as banks were 
in a position to support the liquidity needs of other financial institutions. When commercial 
banks are now allowed to set their feet into the field of securities activities, however, shocks 
from the securities market could directly hit the commercial banks themselves. These fall-outs 
might shrink the liquidity supply of the whole financial system and jeopardize financial stability. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of commercial banks’ expansion 
into securities activities on banks’ risks. The analysis is based on micro level data on 436 public 
listed US bank holding companies dating from 1993 to 2004. We derive three risk dependent 
variables to measure banks’ total risk, market risk and interest rate risk, and regress them on 
banks’ various securities activities. The empirical study finds evidence of the risk reduction 
effects of banks’ engagement in various securities activities. The results are interesting in that 
they find these securities activities to affect various kinds of banks’ risks in different ways. This 
indicates that an appropriate combination of these activities could serve as a useful instrument in 
bank operations, helping bank managers to adjust banks’ risk exposure accordingly. 
 
Over decades, a rich array of literature has been published, debating the rationality of the old 
regulation to separate and the proposal of current legislation to integrate commercial and 
investment banks. On the one hand, it is widely argued that an expansion into the securities 
business may increase the risks banks may face, because securities activities are inherently 
riskier than traditional commercial banking activities (See Boyd and Graham, 1986; Boyd, 
Graham, and Hewitt, 1993, Wall 1993). A bank may become exposed to the losses of its 
securities affiliates, particularly if the firewalls are not adequately enforced.  On the other side, 
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however, another body of evidence points out that banks conducting securities activities may 
benefit from diversification. Some literature reports a low or even negative correlation between 
returns from commercial banking and securities activities, suggesting that banks providing 
securities services tend to have a broader and more stable income base than “narrow” banks with 
a sole commercial banking product( see Kwan and Ladermann 1999, Eisenbeis and Wall 1984 
et.al ).  
 
Both sides of the argument have been supported by empirical literature. This leads to a puzzle as 
to why the empirical results are not generally uniform on the same question. We presume that 
one important reason comes from the complex nature of securities activities of banks which in 
the current study we divide into securities trading, underwriting and fiduciary activities. We 
believe that a clear classification helps to examine in detail the exact effects of each individual 
securities activity, and to provide better policy implications. 
 
The methodology of our empirical model has its roots in two strands of modern literature, 
utilizing various risk measures to investigate the effects of commercial banks’ expansion into 
securities activities on bank risks. 
 
The first strand of literature uses a variation of bank returns to measure bank risk. The standard 
deviation of ROA, the standard deviation of ROE, and the standard deviation of stock returns are 
among the most widely adopted risk measures. Wall and Eisenbeis (1984), Litan (1985), and 
Wall et al. (1993) report that the levels of both earnings and cash flows in the securities industry 
exhibit a higher degree of variability than in the banking industry. Boyd et al. (1988, 1993) and 
Walter (1994) report that securities firms have a higher variance of ROE than banking firms.  
 
The second strand of literature uses the market beta to measure risk, which is the coefficient of 
regressing bank stock return on the market portfolio according to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (Sharpe and Lintner, 1972). Stone (1974) expands the Sharpe-Lintner asset pricing theory 
into a two-factor model, adding the interest rate index as the second risk factor. This helps to 
examine both the market beta and interest rate beta, the latter of which captures the interest rate 
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risk as a special characteristic of financial institutions. Flannery and James (1984a, 1984b), 
Neuberger (1992), Choi and Elyasiani (1996) all report that the inclusion of an interest rate factor 
adds substantial explanatory power when examining the stock movement of financial institutions. 
 
Both strands of literature provide good methodology in their sense. The first kind is widely 
adopted as it is both simple to use and comprehensive in economic meaning. The standard 
deviation of banks’ stock return provides information for bank risk in a comprehensive meaning, 
covering market risk, interest rate risk and even other risks that are not clearly classified. 
However, the second strand of literature decomposes banks’ total risk into market risk and 
interest risk, so that we can keep better track of each specific risk.   
 
In our model we use both methodologies. We calculate both a bank’s total risk, as measured by 
bank stock return deviations, and a bank’s market risk and interest rate risk, decomposed through 
the two-factor model. This allows us to fully analyze and understand the total and each specific 
risk. We then regress these three risk measures on banks’ different types of securities activities. 
This way, we follow the former literature in their risk measures, but develop them a step further 
by examining the different risk effects of each individual securities activity respectively.  
 
This methodology, however, has the disadvantage that it restricts the data sample to public listed 
banks. Since the calibration of stock return variation and of market beta are dependent on the 
monthly stock return data which is only available from a limited number of public listed banks, 
previous literature is basically built on relatively small samples. Flannery and James (1984b) for 
instance release a sample with only 67 banks contrary to the thousands of banks in the US.  
Neuberger (1992) also only works with 119 banks.  
 
Therefore, it is positive that the current study provides 436 sample bank holding companies. The 
sample accounts for more than 70% of the total 620 bank holding companies collected by 
Bankscope from 1993 to 2004. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest sample in 
existing banking studies using stock market data. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the data sources. Section 5.3 
provides the two econometric models in the study, while results of the estimations are discussed 
in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 follows up with the conclusion. 
 
5.2. Data sources 
The data set consists of 436 US bank holding companies from 1992 to 2004, based on the 
combination of the databanks Bankscope and Datastream. Indeed, Bankscope (Version 2002—
2005) covers a total of 620 US bank holding companies, but only 436 among them are public 
listed. Datastream provides monthly stock data of all these listed banks, and the annual financial 
statement data is delivered by Bankscope.  Besides, Datastream also provides other financial data, 
like the interest rate and the stock market indices.   
 
In the regression we use the banks’ three risk exposures as dependent variables. They are total 
risk, market risk and interest risk, calculated on the basis of the banks’ monthly stock return. The 
total risk is measured by standard deviation of the banks’ monthly stock return; the market risk 
and interest risk are calculated through a two-factor model, by regressing the banks’ monthly 
stock return on the stock market return and interest rate change, as illustrated in Section 3. The 
bank stock return is calculated on the basis of composite return, that is, a combination of the 
stock dividend yield and the capital gains from bank stock price fluctuation. In the regression we 
use the Wilshire 5000 Index as a proxy for the stock market index, and 1 year Constant Maturity 
Treasury (CMT) interest rate as the interest rate index. Both of these indices are provided by 
Datastream.  
 
We calculate the three risk measures on the basis of two-year period rolling windows, so that we 
have 24 monthly stock return observations for each rolling window regression per bank. We 
employ bank stock return data in Datastream from the year 1992 to 2004, altogether 13 years for 
12 rolling windows, that is, the years 1992—1993 construct the 1st rolling window, years 1993—
1994 the 2nd rolling window, and so on. The three risk measures are calculated for each bank in 
each rolling window, enabling us to obtain a panel with 12*436 observations for each risk 
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measure. The panel is unbalanced, however, since not all banks are listed during all 12 rolling 
windows. 
 
We then regress the three risk measures on the annual data of balance sheet ratios and income 
statements, to examine how securities activities impact on banks’ risk exposure. We draw out 12 
years of data from Bankscope for the 436 banks dating from 1993 to 2004, which also provides 
an unbalanced panel of 12*436. The risk betas of each rolling window are regressed on banks’ 
securities activities in the last year of that window, that is, risk betas of the 1st  window (1992-
1993) are regressed on bank data of the year 1993. This is based on the understanding that stock 
returns in the early months of the window have already incorporated rational expectations as to a 
bank’s operation in a later period of the window.  
 
The three explanatory variables describing the banks’ three types of securities activities are: 
FIDratio (banks’ fiduciary income over total operating income) to measure fiduciary activities; 
FEEratio (banks’ underwriting fee and commission income over total operating income) to 
measure underwriting activities; and TRAratio (banks’ trading securities assets over total assets) 
to measure securities trading activities. A group of control variables is also included in the 
regression. They are basically banks’ assets, liabilities and income terms, which have non-
negligible effects on the banks’ risks. The P/E ratio (price to earning) is also included as a 
control variable.   
 
Table 1 delivers an overview of the variables in our empirical model. The data is rounded to two 
decimals. Any data which is smaller than 0.005, is shown as 0 in the table.  
 
Table 5- 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables: 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Interest rate (%) 4.51     1.82       1.07      8.56 
Wilshire 5000 Index 8045.21  3423.80    2856.92   14329.94 
rm (Percentage change of stock market index, in %) 0.68    4.04  -12.83   11.78 
rint (Percentage change of interest rate, in %) -0.30    7.31   -32.25   26.30 
rj (monthly stock return of banks, in %) 1.10 11.87 -550.13 529.83 
Fidratio (fiduciary income over total operating income) 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.67 
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Feeratio (underwriting fee and commission income 
                over total operating income) 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.86 
Traratio (trading securities assets over total assets) 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.42 
Lnta (logarithm of total assets) 7.60 1.70 4.09 14.21 
Patio (P/E price to earning ratio) 15.76 28.25 -534.10 362.60 
Liquidratio (liquid assets over total assets) 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.71 
Loanratio (total loan to total assets) 0.62 0.13 0.00 0.92 
Loanlossratio (deducted loan loss reserves to total assets) 0.004 0.004 0.00 0.062 
ddratio (demand deposits over total liabilities) 0.16 2.25 0.00 1.00 
Mmfratio (money market funds liabilities over total liabilities) 0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.80 
 
 
The average monthly return of bank stock is 1.1%, indicating an annual return of nearly 13%. 
The monthly stock market return is 0.68%, which brings about more than 8% of the annual yield. 
Although this high yield appears to be unexpected, it is consistent with empirical studies of the 
US stock market. Bernanke (2003)82 shows that the US equity market provides a pretty high 
return as risk premiums, thus justifying the reported high return in our sample.  The average 
interest rate with 1 year maturity is 4.52%.  
 
We find that the average loan ratio is 0.62, indicating that credit lending is still the most 
important banking activity. The average loan loss ratio is 0.004. It accounts for less than 1% of 
the total loan, implying the credit risk of lending activities of US banks stays at a relatively low 
level. Deposits account for 85% of the total liability of banks, among which demand deposits 
come to 16% on average and time deposits make up 69% of the total liabilities. Among the three 
types of securities activities, underwriting activities are the most important. Banks earn almost 
8% of their total operating income from underwriting activities, through both private placement 
channels in local markets and public offering channels in national stock markets. This amounts 
to even more than the aggregate trading securities (2%) and fiduciary activities (5%).  
5.3. Risks effects of securities activities: Econometric models  
The current study utilizes two models to regress the three risk exposures on banks’ securities 
activities: Model 5.3.1 explores the impact of securities activities on banks’ total risk, measured 
                                                 
82 Federal Reserve Governor Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the Fall 2003 Banking and Finance Lecture, Widener 
University, Chester, Pennsylvania, October 2, 2003 
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by the standard deviation of the banks’ monthly stock return. Model 5.3.2 examines the banks’ 
market risk and interest rate risk, calculated through a two-factor model proposed by Stone 
(1974). 
 
5.3.1 Total risk regression 
The model, as defined in Equation (1), is used to test the impact of securities activities on the 
banks’ total risk.  The dependent variable is the standard deviation of bank stock return, which is 
used to measure total risk of banks. The total risk is regressed on the three types of securities 
activities and a group of control variables.   
 
 σj,t =η1 +η2 * TRAratioj,t +η3 *FEEratioj,t +η4 *FIDratioj,t+η5 *Xj,t +η6 *Tt +ξj,t                      (1) 
 
where we introduce: 
 
σj,t as the variation of stock return for bank j in period t, denoting the banks’ total risk; 
 
tjTRAratio ,  denotes a bank’s trading securities assets over the total assets for bank j in period t; 
 
FEEratioj,t denotes a bank’s gross underwriting fee and commission income over the total 
operating income for bank j in period t; 
 
FIDratioj,t  denotes a bank’s gross fiduciary income over the total operating income for bank j in 
period t; 
 
Xj,t is a vector of control variables on the individual bank level; 
 
Tj,t is a group of year dummies catching time effects from the years 1993 to 2004; 
 
ξj,t  as the error term.                     
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5.3.2. Market risk and interest rate risk regressions 
There is, however, a problem arising from the total risk regression: Bank risk consists of both 
stock market risk and interest rate risk.  If, for example, securities activities increase one of these 
two risks and decrease the other, the composite effect of these two forces on the banks’ total risk 
is quite ambiguous. The empirical result of regressing the bank’s variance of returns on its 
securities activities may thus seem to be very insignificant. Therefore, in this section we 
decompose bank risk into market risk and interest rate risk. This helps us to track down the two 
important specific risks of banks, and to make up for the deficiency of the total risk model.  
 
The model is defined by the following three equations. Equation (2) decomposes the banks’ risk 
into market risk and interest risk by employing a two-factor model, calculating the stock market 
risk beta and interest rate risk beta for each bank j in period t. Equations (3) and (4), respectively, 
further examine the impact of securities activities on these two risks.83 
 
Equation (2) is built on the two-factor model proposed by Stone (1974) and Stover (1977). They 
expand the single-factor market index asset pricing model of Sharpe and Lintner (1972) by 
adding an interest rate factor to the model. Empirical research has found that the inclusion of an 
interest rate risk factor adds substantial explanatory power to bank stock movement. Since 
banking institutions usually function by borrowing funds and lending them out to earn the 
interest spread, the interest rate risk is widely regarded as one of the most important risks faced 
by banks, as pointed out by various studies (Flannery and James 1984a, 1984b; Merton and 
Bodie 1998; Mishkin 1995 and 1998.). The current study therefore follows the two-factor model 
to decompose bank risk into market risk beta and interest rate risk beta, and then examines the 
two betas accordingly. 
                                                 
83 Thus, the model essentially consists of a two-stage regression. In the first stage, Equation (2) calibrates the two 
risk betas, and in the second stage, Equations (3) and (4) regress the risk betas on banks’ securities activities.  
The methodology of a two-stage regression is sometimes criticized as it introduces the measurement error of the first 
stage into the regression of the second stage, hence lowering the accuracy of the regression. A two-stage regression, 
however, is in many cases more informative than a single-stage regression, and is therefore widely adopted in 
banking research literature (for example, Flannery and James 1984a, 1984b; Choi and Elyasiani 1996; Gallo, 
Apilado and Kolari 1996, 1997).    
 95
 
The two-factor model, however, faces a possible multicollinearity problem between stock market 
movement and the change of interest rate. Various studies report that changes of interest rate can 
move asset prices, including stock prices, at least during short periods. This indicates a possible 
interaction between rm and rin, which could introduce a bias into our regression. Estimating the 
size and duration of these effects, however, we find no straightforward relationship between 
interest rate change and stock market.84 Because traders in stock markets generally have rational 
expectations, any interest rate change that is widely anticipated will already have been taken into 
the stock prices’ account and will elicit little reaction when it really happens. Further reflection 
on our data set also denies the multicollinearity between stock market return and interest rate 
change: the correlation between rm and rin is only 10%, enabling us to ignore the 
multicollinearity without causing bigger problems to our calculations.85 
 
rj,tc =αj,t + β1j,t*rm,tc + β2j,t*rin,tc +φj,t                                                                            (2) 
 
β1j,t = θ1 +θ2 * TRAratioj,t +θ3 *FEEratioj,t +θ4 *FIDratioj,t+θ5 *Xj,t +θ6 *Tt +ψj,t                        
(3) 
 
β2j,t= γ1 +γ2 * TRAratioj,t +γ3 *FEEratioj,t +γ4 *FIDratioj,t+γ5 *Xj,t +γ6 *Tt +υj,t                        
(4) 
 
where, in addition to the notations in Equation (1), 
 
rj,tc  denotes the stock return of bank j in month c in period t; 
 
rm,tc denotes the market return in month c in period t; 
                                                 
84 Federal Reserve Governor Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the Fall 2003 Banking and Finance Lecture, Widener 
University, Chester, Pennsylvania, October 2, 2003  
 
85 Here we follow Maher (1997), who suggests that the simultaneity problem can be ignored if the correlation 
between the two indices is below 30%. See Maher, Matt (1997), Bank Holding Company Risk from 1976–1989 with 
a Two-Factor Model, Financial Review 32 (2), 357-371. 
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rin,tc  is the change of interest rate in month c in period t; 
 
β1j,t is the sensitivity of bank stock return to the market return for bank j in year t, denoting the 
bank’s market risk beta; 
 
β2j,t  is the sensitivity of bank stock return to the interest rate change for bank j in year t, denoting 
the banks’ interest risk beta; 
 
φj,t , ψj,t , υj,t are error terms.  
 
The two risk factors in Equation (2), rm and rin, are the percentage change of stock market index 
and the change of interest rate. In the choice of the stock market index, we use the Wilshire 5000 
Index, a market capitalization-weighted index that includes virtually all stocks traded in the US. 
The Wilshire 5000 is considered to be the most broad-based domestic market proxy available 
(Radcliffe, 1994, p. 105). The reason why we choose the Wilshire Index instead of the Dow 
Jones Index lies in the fact that the 436 sample banks are listed in various stock exchanges like 
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq National Market as 
well as in local stock exchanges countrywide. So the Wilshire Index is used as a proxy for a 
composite market index of all sample banks in the US. To choose the interest rate proxy we 
follow Flannery and James (1984b) to adopt the Treasury Constant Maturies 1-year interest 
rate86.  
 
The coefficient of the market return, β1j,t, measures the sensitivity of bank stock to the movement 
of the stock market. It is a proxy for the banks’ exposure to market risk87.  The coefficient of the 
interest rate term, β2j,t, measures the return of a bank’s stock to changes in interest rates, 
                                                 
86 Stone (1974), Flannery and James (1984b) point out that time characteristics of interest rates can have an impact 
on the calibration of the interest rate beta. Utilizing very short term interest rates (like 1-month interest rates) and 
very long term interest rates (up to 7-year interest rates) might bring about different results. A 1-year interest rate is 
seen as a compromise in between.  
87 For a detailed illustration of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and its two-factor expansion, see Sharpe and Lintner 
(1972), and Stone (1974).  
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controlling for changes in the return on the market. In that sense it can be interpreted as a 
measure of a bank’s interest rate risk exposure. β1j,t and β2j,t  are also known as the co-movement 
of an individual bank’s stock and stock market index or stock and interest rate index, 
respectively. Stone (1974) argues that the market risk beta β1j,t can be given by Cov (rj, rm)/ 
Var(rm) and the interest rate risk beta β2j,t by Cov (rj, rin)/ Var(rin) respectively. 88 
 
5.3.3. Explanatory variables and control variables 
 
The above discussed two models have utilized three risk dependent variables: banks’ total risk, 
σj,t2, which is the variation of banks’ ROA; banks’ market risk β1j,t; and banks’ interest risk β2j,t . 
To examine the relationship between the three bank risks and the various securities activities, we 
employ the proportions of the following securities activities in the total spectrum of bank 
operations as explanatory variables. Several control variables are also included, to increase the 
explanatory power of the regression. These explanatory variables and control variables are: 
 
TRAratio:  To estimate the impact of securities trading activity we include as a regressor the 
assets ratio of a bank’s securities trading, defined as the ratio of a bank’s trading securities over 
total assets (TRAratio). Trading securities refer to securities that are acquired for the purpose of 
selling in the near term or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term 
price movements89. This includes trading securities held by the banks themselves and their 
consolidated subsidiaries.  
                                                 
88 Betas would be either positive or negative. A positive market risk beta states that a bank’s stock moves in the 
same direction as the whole stock market; while a negative market risk beta means that when the stock market index 
goes up as a whole, the individual bank stock declines, due to various bank characteristics.  Similarly, a negative 
interest rate beta denotes that when interest rates rise up, bank stocks suffer from a lower return. The value of the 
betas, however, does not necessarily correspond to the riskiness of bank stocks. A small beta value could indicate a 
very high risk sensitivity, if the beta goes way down into the negative domain. Based on this argument, Hirtle (1996) 
suggests using the absolute value of beta instead of beta itself. However, most literature still utilizes beta itself as the 
risk measurement, because it provides clear information on the direction and extent of the co-movements of an 
individual bank stock and its indices. See, among others, Flannery and James (1984a, 1984b), Choi and Elyasiani 
(1996); Gallo et al. (1996, 1997).    
89 Banks report their trading securities each year in their financial statements. According to the regulations of 
Federal Reserve banks, a bank should determine whether it intends to hold an asset for trading when a security or 
other asset is acquired. Nevertheless, there might be some speculation as to defining trading securities. Banks may 
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FEEratio: On the effects of underwriting, the explanatory variable FEEratio is included, 
measured by the ratio of a bank’s fee and commission income to the total operating income. This 
includes fees and commissions from underwritings (or participating in the underwritings of) 
securities, private placements of securities, merger and acquisition services, investment advisory 
and management services, and other related fees from the banks themselves and their 
consolidated subsidiaries. The dataset reports a zero or “missing” underwriting activity income if 
the bank has no income from these services and no consolidated subsidiaries that render these 
services. 
 
FIDratio: The banks’ fiduciary activity is measured by FIDratio, the ratio of fiduciary activity 
income to total operating income. The fiduciary activity income is the gross income from 
services rendered by the banks’ trust department or by any of its consolidated subsidiaries acting 
in any fiduciary capacity. Included are commissions and fees on sales of annuities that are 
executed in a fiduciary capacity by the banks’ trust department (or by any of its consolidated 
subsidiaries). The dataset reports a zero or “missing” fiduciary activity income if the bank has no 
trust department and no consolidated subsidiaries that render services in any fiduciary capacity.           
              
We also include in the model a group of control variables, which we think have non-negligible 
effects on banks’ risk exposures. Not all control variables are included in the three risk 
regressions. We assign different groups of control variables to the regressions of different risks, 
according to the specific risk characteristics of the control variables. 
 
Lnta: the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets, adjusting for size differences in bank risk. On 
the one hand side, large banks have a better potential to diversify, which makes them stable. But 
on the other side, large banks sometimes invest too riskily, as they believe in the “too big to fail” 
                                                                                                                                                             
define some assets as trading securities with the intent to resell them soon. But in certain cases, unexpected price 
movements might force a bank to keep these securities longer than expected. However, for simplicity, we do not 
question a bank’s reported trading securities assets, supposing that banks generally have rational expectations when 
defining their assets. 
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rule. Therefore, the coefficients of Lnta to bank risk can be either positive or negative, depending 
on which side dominates.  
 
Loan ratio: To measure the impact of loan activities on a bank’s market risk and interest rate risk, 
we use the ratio of a bank’s net loans to total assets (e.g., see Brewer, 1989; Espahbodi, 1991). 
Bank loans are relatively illiquid and subject to higher credit risks than other assets, implying a 
positive relationship between Loanratio and the risk measures. The sign of the loan ratio, 
however, is of big complexity.  
 
Bank loans are highly interest sensitive assets. Yet the relationship between Loanratio and 
interest risk is not clear-cut. When the interest rate increases, the long term, fixed interest loans 
suffer from depreciation. However, the banks’ liability-deposit also depreciates. The way in 
which a bank reacts to the interest risk depends on the time-structure and the relative amount of 
bank interest bearing asset and liability. 
 
In light of the market risk, loans can also increase the stock market exposure of banks in that 
some parts of loan collaterals are marketable securities or securities-like instruments. But these 
collaterals are typically provided with considerable discounts, which helps to isolate banks from 
the stock market fluctuation. This way, the coefficients of Loanratio in the market risk regression 
can be indefinite ex ante.     
 
Loan Loss ratio: The deducted loan loss reserves over a bank’s total assets. The loan loss ratio is 
exclusively utilized in the regression of total risk: it is a proxy for credit risk and operational risk 
in credit lending activities. Credit risk and operational risk compose important parts of the total 
risk, but cannot be classified into either market risk or interest rate risk.  
 
We understand that the loan ratio has very complex impacts on both market risk and interest rate 
risk. Therefore, it can display very ambiguous coefficients in the total risk regression, failing to 
reveal the real risk of lending activities. For this reason, the loan loss ratio is chosen as a proxy 
for the credit risk and operational risk in lending activities, while the loan ratio itself is a proxy 
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for the market risk and interest rate risk. We expect the loan loss ratio to have a significant sign 
in the total risk regression.   
 
The demand deposit ratio (DDratio): the demand deposit over a bank’s total liabilities terms. 
Demand deposit is typically free of interest expenses, which differs from other liabilities. 
Therefore, an increment of the demand deposit ratio reduces a bank’s interest risk. However, the 
demand deposit could increase the liquidity risk, hence promoting a bank’s total risk. 
 
The money market fund liabilities ratio (MMFratio): the money market fund liabilities over a 
bank’s total liabilities. This is the liabilities that a bank borrows from money market funds90 by 
issuing short-term certificates.  
 
The money market fund liabilities are borrowed by a bank on its own initiative. In this way, the 
money market fund liabilities are different from bank deposits, which the bank receives from the 
depositors in a rather passive way. Thus, money market fund liabilities provide useful 
instruments for a bank to actively manage its liabilities, and help to achieve a more balanced 
credit position in its liabilities and loan assets, which hence will lead to a lower interest rate risk.  
 
As to market risk, we expect that money market fund liabilities increase a bank’s market risk. 
Money market funds are institutional investors, which are essentially very similar to the 
institutional investors in the stock market91. When a bank borrows from money market funds, the 
funds will evaluate the bank through a professional inspection into the bank’s financial 
statements and into all possible events affecting the bank’s operation. This evaluation differs 
from how the individual depositors evaluate the bank, but is rather similar to the evaluation of 
the bank made by the stock market. This way, borrowing from the money market funds exposes 
the bank to a group of institutional investors which are essentially similar to the stock market 
investors, and therefore the bank’s market risk is increased. Concerning the total risk, the 
                                                 
90 Money market funds are mutual funds that primarily invest in the money market. A bank’s money market 
liabilities are typically large CDs or negotiable large CDs, with maturities ranging from 14 days to 1 year.  
91 Mishikin (1998, p. 107) cites data from the Federal Reserve Board and points out that institutional investors 
dominate the US stock market. 
 101
coefficient of the MMFratio in the total risk regression would be unclear ex ante, since it consists 
of the effect of a negative coefficient in the interest rate risk regression and the effect of a 
positive coefficient in the market risk regression. However, we tend to believe that money 
market fund liabilities will have a positive coefficient in the total risk regression, since they also 
increase the liquidity risk.   
 
P/E ratio: the price to earning ratio affects the risk of stock. A relatively high P/E ratio means 
that the bank’s stock is evaluated on a very high level, compared with its earning ability. This 
high evaluation is built on optimistic expectations as to a bank’s future earnings, or is due to 
possible speculation factors. The impacts of the P/E ratio on bank risks are two-fold: on the one 
hand side, stocks with lower earnings and high evaluations are relatively vulnerable to 
information shocks, so that the P/E ratio is expected to be positively linked to the risk measures. 
On the other side, highly evaluated stocks are in many cases well qualified stocks, behaving 
relatively stable in the market volatility. The coefficients of the P/E ratio therefore depend on an 
aggregate impact from both sides.  
 
Liquid ratio: liquid assets over a bank’s total assets. This includes cash, interbank lendings, dues 
to central banks, bills and CDs. A high liquid asset ratio could help reduce a bank’s market risk, 
but may enhance its total risk, since liquid assets are highly exposed to inflation risks. 
 
5.4. Estimation results and discussion 
In the current subsection we present the results from the empirical analysis of the impact of 
various securities activities on bank risks. We first report the estimation results without time 
dummies, followed by the results with time dummies. We find the inclusion of time dummies 
substantially increases the R-square of the total risk regression, implying that the total risk is 
largely influenced by macro environments in various years. 
 
Among the three risk measures we utilize, the total risk is the most comprehensive measure for 
catching the risk impacts of securities activities. However, the total risk is more than a simple 
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aggregation of market risk and interest rate risk. It also covers other risks like operational risk or 
default risk, which cannot be independently identified. We find that securities activities have 
different effects on a bank’s total risk, market risk and interest rate risk. This probably implies 
the possibility that certain securities activities would help banks to adjust their risk structure. 
Banks could better manage their market risk or interest rate risk exposure by flexibly increasing 
or decreasing their exposure in certain securities activities.   
 
5.4.1. Estimation results  
 
The empirical results show securities activities to have a significant impact on all three risks 
banks face, although the directions and extents of these impacts vary with different sub-types of 
the securities activities. We find fiduciary activities significantly increase a bank’s total risk, 
while underwriting activities effectively reduce the total risk. Securities trading activities exhibit 
no apparent influence on the total risk, whereas they significantly increase a bank’s market risk 
but reduce the interest rate risk banks face.  In section 5.4.2 we will provide a detailed discussion 
of the economic intuitions behind these impacts. 
 
In most cases, coefficients in the regression of total risk are much larger than the coefficients in 
the regression of the other two risk measures, except for the TRAratio, which is very 
insignificant (t-ratio=0.17). This is probably due to the fact that the total risk σj,t2  has a much 
larger absolute value than the two betas. From the definition of the three risk measures we know 
that the standard deviation σj,t  is an absolute value, whereas the two betas represent relative 
covariances between a bank’s stocks movement and the stock market movement and interest rate 
movement as the two risk factors.92 In most cases, this makes them much smaller.  In our data set, 
the average σj,t  is 7.28, while the average market risk beta is 0.44 and the average interest rate 
risk beta is 0.10.    
 
                                                 
92 Denoted by formulas,  β1= Cov (rjbank, rmarket)/ Var(rmarket) and β2= Cov (rjbank, rinterest)/ Var(rinterest). In section 3.2 we 
provide a detailed explanation of the two betas, based on the two-factor asset pricing model. 
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A noticeable issue is the low R-square of the total risk regression without time effects, 
advocating rerunning the regression by including time effects. Certainly, researchers keep 
arguing that a panel regression typically provides a much lower R-square than time series 
regressions, since the aggregation process washes out a lot of the noise in the panel data (Gould 
and Diesel 2003; Kruse 2000). But the low R-square of 0.07 still lets us doubt whether we have 
omitted some important macro factors or not.  
 
Our regression examines how banks’ securities activities affect their risks on a micro level, in 
that the risk of each sample bank is individually linked to its respective securities activities. 
However, there are lots of macro factors which might strongly influence our regression. The 
stock market cycle effect, for example, is an omitted macro factor that affects both sides of the 
regression. Various researchers have found that the stock market has significant cycle effects. 
These might substantially affect a bank’s stock risk as well as its securities activities. Bank risks, 
especially when they are measured by bank stock volatilities, are significantly influenced by the 
volatility of the whole stock market, as suggested by Officier (1973) and Schiller (1981). A 
bank’s securities activities are also affected by the stock market volatility, in that a bank may 
choose to contract or to expand its securities activities in volatile periods of the market, 
depending on the different risk strategies of that bank.  Canals (1997, p. 280), for example, 
claims that a bank’s income from securities activities is very sensitive to business cycles.93 This 
justifies that omitted macro factors affect both sides of the regression, which might introduce a 
significant bias to our empirical results.  
 
We therefore rerun the regression by adding year dummies as control variables to capture the 
influences of these macro factors. Hereinafter we report the empirical results of our regression on 
a bank’s three risk measures, both with time effects and without. The results of these two groups 
of regressions are then compared and their generality and differences discussed below.  
 
 
Table 5- 2: The panel regressions of the three types of securities activities on bank risks, 
                                                 
93 Canals, Jordi, 1997, Universal Banking International Comparison and Theoretical Perspectives, Clarendon Press. 
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without and with time dummies. 
 
 
Without time effects With  time effects Without time effects With  time 
effects 
Without time 
effects 
With  time effects 
R-square=0.07 R-square=0.18 R-square=0.40 R-square=0.42 R-square=0.42 R-square=0.44 
σj,t2 
(total 
risk) 
 coef Stdv. coef Stdv. 
β1 
(market 
risk) 
 coef Stdv. coef Stdv. 
β2 
(interest 
Rate 
 risk) 
 
coef Stdv. coef Stdv. 
FIDratio 13.70** 6.35 12.91** 6.12 FIDratio 0.99 0.65 1.13* 0.64 FIDratio -1.10 1.52 -1.20 1.51 
TRAratio -2.42 14.13 -3.32 13.43 TRAratio 2.88** 1.34 2.67** 1.32 TRAratio 
-
5.74** 2.59 -6.54*** 2.59 
FEEratio -13.27*** 4.22 
-
10.72*** 3.97 FEEratio 0.31 0.60 0.51 0.60 FEEratio -0.04 0.75 -0.31 0.76 
lnta -0.59** 0.25 -0.09 0.61 lnta -0.10** 0.04 0.04 0.06 lnta 0.31** 0.08 0.14 0.13 
mmfratio 2.67 3.06 -1.67 3.06 mmfratio 0.55 0.41 0.38 0.43 mmfratio -0.35 0.57 -0.49 0.62 
ddratio 5.72 4.77 4.45 4.59      ddratio -0.35 0.92 -0.51 0.56 
loanratio 0.98 2.64 -0.64 3.03 loanratio 0.16 0.34 0.18 0.34 loanratio -0.41 0.55 -0.23 0.86 
liquidratio 9.63** 4.29 8.45** 4.09 liquidratio -2.99*** 0.58 
-
2.61*** 0.58 liquidratio -0.28 0.86 -0.12 0.92 
peratio 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01      peratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
loanlossratio 86.91* 49.26 103.00** 48.30           
_cons 10.70*** 1.05 3.04 5.86 _cons 1.42*** 0.36 1.30 1.82 _cons 
-
1.68** 0.82 -0.05 1.22 
_cons 10.70*** 1.05 3.04 5.86 _cons 1.42*** 0.36 1.30 1.82 _cons 
-
1.68** 0.82 -0.05 1.22 
 
 
For the regressions with time effects, we report the coefficients of year dummies in the appendix. 
Although the year dummies do not prove to be significant for all of the individual dummy 
coefficients, they do show a strong joint significance judged by F-test (see Appendix), justifying 
the inclusion of dummies as a proxy for omitted macro factors. 
 
After rerunning the regression with time effects, most coefficients of the three securities 
activities explanatory variables still keep the same signs and significances as they had in 
regressions without time effects, reiterating the impacts of the securities activities on banks’ risks.  
There are, however, a few changes in the results, as discussed below.  
 
The most noticeable change is the R-square of total risk regression. The inclusion of time effects 
substantially increases the R-square from 0.07 to 0.18, confirming our presupposition that bank 
stock volatility is strongly influenced by the macro level market situation during different 
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periods.  Former literature also justifies that stock volatility is highly time-variant. Some 
empirical evidence reports that stock volatility is higher at some times than at others, and lists 
various reasons for that phenomenon. Officer (1973) argues that stock volatility is closely related 
to the volatility of macroeconomic variables, whereas Schiller (1981a, 1981b) suggests that ex 
post variability of dividends and discount rates cause the volatility of stock return. Schwert (1989) 
links the volatility of stock return to the stock trading volume and the number of trading days per 
month. All this literature justifies the time series property of the bank stock volatility, a proxy for 
bank total risk. 
 
The R-squares of the market risk beta regression and the interest rate risk beta regression 
increase only very slightly from 0.40 to 0.42 and from 0.42 to 0.44, respectively. The two betas 
are essentially the covariance between bank stock movement and market index movement or 
interest rate index movement, divided by the deviation of these two index changes. Therefore, 
betas measure the relative responses of bank stock to the market risk factors and interest rate 
factors, which are independent of the absolute level of the stock market volatility. It is for this 
reason that regressions of the two risk betas have much smaller time effects than the regression 
of total risk.  
 
Despite the changed R-square, the coefficients of the three securities activities’ explanatory 
variables are generally very similar to the coefficients we get in Regression 4.1 above.  The only 
slight difference is that in the regression of the market risk beta, fiduciary activities have a more 
significant (t-ratio=1.78) coefficient compared with the coefficient (t-ratio= 1.53) we get when 
leaving time effects out of the calculations. This is attributed to the strong stock market cycle 
that influences fiduciary activities, banks’ average fiduciary income reached its peak in the years 
1999 and 2000, and then significantly slid down until 2003 when it finally picked up once again, 
exhibiting an evident time cycle. Hence, with the inclusion of time effects, the FIDratio is 
cleansed from the influence of the stock market cycle, making its impact on the bank risk clearer 
to observe.  
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As to the control variables, all of them except for Lnta (logarithm of banks’ total assets) leave the 
signs and significances of their coefficients untouched. Interestingly, descriptive statistics find 
Lnta is the only control variable that displays a very strong time trend, rising continuously and 
steadily from 7.05 to 7.96 during the 12 year period. This probably explains the reason why the 
significance of Lnta has changed after we have included the time effects in the regressions. 
5.4.2. Discussions of the empirical results  
Fiduciary activities:  
We find that the fiduciary activities have a significant impact on all three risk measures. Since 
fiduciary contracts usually prescribe that risks of fiduciary investments are to be born by trust 
clients, there could exist some naive intuition that banks as fiduciaries are risk-free. This 
intuition, however, fails to see the complexity of fiduciary risks. Our empirical results indicate 
that fiduciary activities significantly increase a bank’s total risk while also raising its market risk, 
but they do not affect a bank’s interest risk.  
 
The exposure of fiduciary activities to market risk could be attributed to two sources: a high 
possibility of benchmark tracking errors due to the securities market’s fat tail risk distribution; 
and a biased investor perception on fiduciary performance.  
 
In fiduciary activities, mandates (or contracts) of fiduciary assets usually set out a benchmark 
that fiduciary managers are expected to match or out-perform. This pre-set benchmark defines 
return and risk parameters, which guideline the fiduciary assets portfolio. Deviations from the 
benchmark would be regarded as “tracking errors” of bank fiduciary managers, and could 
probably put the bank at risk by way of a large scale fiduciary redemption from clients.  
Nevertheless, unexpected market turbulences limit the usefulness of the return and risk 
parameters, rendering the pre-set portfolio model ineffective while driving the managers of 
fiduciary assets to deviate from their benchmarks.  Various studies report that the securities 
market exhibits leptokurtosis (or a “fat tail” distribution). 94  Essentially, fat tails imply that 
                                                 
94 See, among others, Rachev, Menn, and Fabozzi 2005, Fat tailed and skewed assets return distribution, Published 
by John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey. 
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extreme events in the securities market occur much more frequently than implied by normal 
distributions. Therefore, risk pegging could be very difficult ex ante and fairly imprecise ex post. 
For that reason, unexpected market turbulences induce fiduciary “tracking errors”, thus exposing 
banks to a larger market risk. 
 
In addition, banks also face market risks because fiduciary clients may have a biased judgment 
on a fiduciary’s performance, depending on different market situations. Usually, the objective of 
fiduciary assets management is to choose asset allocations to beat specified return-risk 
performance benchmarks. However, the clients’ satisfaction often depends on the absolute 
profits or losses of the fiduciary assets, which deviate from the fiduciary investments’ relative 
performance compared to the predetermined benchmark. If the market index as a whole rises up, 
trust clients could still have irrationally good sentiments when seeing that their fiduciary assets 
earn some profits, and be they ever so small, which under-perform the benchmark. However, 
when the whole market goes down, trust clients might still feel frustrated about their fiduciary 
assets suffering from even relatively small losses, if they out-perform the benchmark.  In extreme 
cases, some trust clients could possibly withdraw from the fiduciary contract, as punishment to 
the fiduciaries, which leads to declined profits or even losses for the fiduciaries themselves. It is 
typically argued that as far as investment decisions are concerned, individual investors are more 
likely to behave irrationally than institutional investors. Since banks’ fiduciary activities are 
largely based on retail investors, banks are more prone to market risk than other kinds of 
fiduciary institutions. (Also see Morony 1999 for a fiduciary clients psychology diagram.) 
 
Empirical evidence fails to find a significant interest rate risk for fiduciary activities. 
Theoretically, fiduciary managers could also face risks from interest rate movements, as they 
face risks from stock market turbulences. Compared with stock market volatility, however , the 
interest rate movement is much easier to capture.  This makes the tracking error of the interest 
rate benchmark much smaller than that of the stock market benchmark. Besides, interest rate 
sensitive assets account for only a small proportion of the total fiduciary industry. Research 
points out that the interest rate environment impacts on the fiduciary industry, mainly through its 
impacts on the fiduciary bond funds or money market funds. Investors compare the yield 
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between bank deposits and fiduciary bond funds or money market funds, resulting in ebbs and 
flows in purchasing and redemption of these funds. Since bond funds and money market funds 
only account for around 20% of the total fiduciary funds assets in the US95, it is understandable 
that the interest rate does not compose a major risk factor for fiduciary activities.    
 
Empirical results also report a significant positive relationship between fiduciary activities and 
total risk. Certainly this is partly due to the enhancing market risk of fiduciary activities, which 
composes the total risk. Other factors like operational risk and regulatory risk, however, may 
also contribute to the increment of total risk.  Operational risk refers to the risk that fiduciary 
portfolio managers fail to comply with the investment guidelines stipulated by certain client 
mandates.  With the growing of the fiduciary industry, the number and diversity of client 
restrictions also increases dramatically. Studies find that big banks’ fiduciary affiliates could face 
up to 5000 different client restrictions, making it stringently hard for fiduciary portfolio 
managers to fulfill all the restrictions relevant to each specific mandate.  Regulatory compliance 
risk alludes to the possibility that a bank’s fiduciary department or affiliates do not properly 
adhere to the regulations and requirements of governmental and regulatory bodies and industry 
standards of practice. In the light of the historical experience that banks improperly profited from 
interest conflicts through fiduciary activities, fiduciary assets management is now one of the 
most strictly regulated financial services. Banks have to abide by both federal and state trust laws, 
aimed at preventing a bank from exploiting the fiduciary customer’s interest to serve the bank’s 
interest. For the same purpose banks are also subject to the dual regulation of both banking 
regulators and the Securities Exchange Commission. The complexity of operating in a manifold 
jurisdictional and regulatory framework greatly increases the compliance risk of banks.  
 
Securities trading activities: 
We do not find securities trading activities to significantly influence the total risk of banks. 
However, securities trading significantly increase a bank’s market risk and decrease its interest 
rate risk, indicating that securities trading activities could effectively change a bank’s risk 
structure.  
                                                 
95 See US mutual fund industry statistics: Mutual fund fact book, 1996—2005.  
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The market risk of trading activities is based on the fact that banks buy securities in anticipation 
of reselling them at a higher price. This makes the success of the trading activities critically 
dependent on the bank’s assessment of the value of the securities and on that of the market. A 
big price swing, when unexpectantly happening, might be driving the bank out of its balanced 
position in a very short time. The market fluctuation therefore impacts on the value of bank held 
securities as well as on the value of a bank’s net long or short position in these securities, thus 
exposing banks to the risk of market volatility.  
 
Furthermore, securities trading will significantly decrease the interest rate risk beta. Trading 
securities are highly liquid assets, providing good instruments for banks to better manage their 
net position in lending and deposits. In the securities market, banks could easily adjust their net 
long /short position through buying or selling securities. Various literature states that the 
securities market responds positively to interest rate cuts, at least for a short period. In this way, a 
bank’s securities trading profits respond aversely to the interest rate movement, therefore 
decreasing the interest rate risk beta of banks. 
 
Underwriting activities:  
Empirical results also suggest that securities underwriting significantly reduces a bank’s total 
risk. However, underwriting does not change the market risk and interest rate risk significantly. 
Both of the two coefficients of the FEEratio to market risk and interest rate risk are small in their 
absolute values and insignificant in t-statistics. 
                                                    
Concerning the market risk coefficients, our empirical results find no significant evidence 
suggesting that underwriting increases a bank’s market risk. This result stands in contrast to the 
common idea that underwriting activities are always linked to market volatility. Certainly, as we 
illustrated in Chapter 3, the spread and volume of the underwritten securities heavily depend on 
the market situation. When the stock market reaches a low point, banks may find it difficult to 
solicit the underwritten securities with a sufficient spread, leading a bank’s underwriting 
activities closer to the market risk.  This risk, however, can be minimized by using put options of 
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the underlying securities. Walter (1994), for example, suggests that the underwriting risk can be 
hedged, given proper financial instruments. He finds that the underwriting risk has a lopsided 
character, which is akin to that of writing a put option. Therefore, the underwriter can buy 
options on the underlying stock for an amount equal to the amount underwritten and with a strike 
price equal to the offer price. Empirically Kwan (1997) also comes to a similar conclusion as the 
current study. As concerns his 23 sample bank holding companies, he reports that underwriting is 
not riskier than commercial banking,.  
We find no evidence showing that underwriting affects a bank’s interest rate risk. Although it is 
frequently argued that banks could “tie-in” underwriting and lending, thus increasing banks’ 
interest rate risk and credit risk, the current study finds no evidence supporting that argument.  
Drucker and Puri (2002), and Laux and Walz (2004) all argue that “tie-ins” are a practice widely 
used with bank products. To facilitate the underwriting activities of a bank (especially, when the 
bank is a new entrant into the underwriting business), bank loans are made at relatively favorable 
rates to securities investors, on the understanding that part or all of these funds will be used to 
purchase certain new issues underwritten by the affiliate and his syndicate. In such a case, 
imprudent bank loans can be used to support or subsidize the prices of those securities, exposing 
banks to a larger interest risk and credit risk. However, the regulatory framework has put various 
firewalls against tying in underwriting and lending. The Board of Federal Reserve, for example, 
prohibits lending to retail customers for securities purchases during the underwriting period96.  
The newly amended Bank Holding Company Act (section 106)97 also stipulates that a bank 
should not have a pre-arrangement or understanding with an affiliate to fund a syndicated loan 
for which the affiliate acts as syndicate manager. This applies when the affiliate has conditioned 
the availability (or price) of its syndication services on a requirement that the customer obtain 
securities underwriting services from the affiliate. Here, our empirical results lend some support 
to the efficacy of these regulatory firewalls, by reporting that a bank’s underwriting activities do 
not significantly increase the interest rate risk.   
                                                 
96 Testimony of Governor Susan M. Phillips, Restrictions on securities underwriting and dealing, March 20, 1997.  
97 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 2003, [Docket No. OP-1158], Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the 
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970.  
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We find that a bank’s underwriting activities have a significant negative coefficient in the total 
risk regression. This result does not lead us to neglect the riskiness of underwriting activities. On 
the contrary, we admit that underwriting could be risky if not properly managed, and we would 
rather interpret our empirical results by suggesting that underwriting risk has been effectively 
hurdled by US banks. This successful risk management can be attributed to various financial 
instruments and policy regulations, including the put option of the underlying securities to reduce 
market risk, as well as the anti-tying regulation to block the interest rate risk from imprudent tied 
lending. Last but not least, prudent capital requirement also helps to reduce a bank’s risk by 
forcing the banks to keep sufficient capital for underwriting activities. The Basel Capital 
Adequacy Accord II, for example, explicitly requires banks to measure the risks of their 
underwriting activities as well as their credit loans, and to assess their minimum required capital. 
Control variables: 
 
Coefficients of the control variables generally fit our expectations ex ante. We find that liquid 
assets significantly lower a bank’s market risk. Liquid assets mainly consist of cash, dues from 
central banks, treasury bills and Federal Reserve funds, whose values are generally independent 
of the stock market volatility. However, liquid assets suffer from inflation risk, especially in an 
environment where the economy growth is relatively strong and the nominal interest rate is at a 
relatively high level. This contributes to the significant positive sign of the liquid assets ratio in 
the regression of bank total risk.  Deducted loan loss reserves have a significant positive 
coefficient with banks’ total risk. Loan losses are included in the total risk regression in order to 
capture the credit risk and operational risk in a bank’s commercial lending. A high loan losses 
ratio indicates that the bank suffers a lot from problem loans, which increase a bank’s total risk.  
The coefficients of the loan ratio, on the contrary, are insignificant in the risk regressions, 
demonstrating the complexity of the lending business.  
5.5. Conclusion:  
The risk effects of a bank’s expansion into the securities activities sector are examined in this 
paper. The securities activities are categorized into securities trading, underwriting and fiduciary 
activities, and their respective risk characteristics are discussed. The empirical part consists of 
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two models. Model 1 examines the effects of securities activities on a bank’s total risk. Model 2 
employs a two stage regression to check the effects on two risk measures, by firstly decomposing 
the total risk into market risk and interest rate risk, then secondly regressing the securities 
activities on these two risks. 
  
436 public listed banks in the US are examined through the regressions over the time span 
between 1993 and 2004. Empirical results find that banks’ fiduciary activities significantly 
increase the banks’ total risk, largely due to the increment of the banks’ market risk. Securities 
trading activities do not touch the banks’ total risk, but have significant effects on the two 
specific risks. Trading increases a bank’s exposure to market risk, but lowers its interest rate risk, 
due to the adverse movement of the interest rate and securities market index. Finally, 
underwriting lowers the total risk of banks and leaves the two specific risks untouched, 
indicating that the underwriting risk could be properly hedged. 
 
The policy implication of the study is that the risk effects of commercial banks’ expanding into 
securities activities are case-specific and therefore should not be feared too much. Furthermore, 
since these securities activities affect various kinds of bank risks in different ways, an 
appropriate combination of these activities could serve as a useful tool in bank operations, 
helping bank managers to adjust the bank’s risk exposure. The conclusion therefore supports the 
current deregulation of commercial banks’ expansion into the securities market.  
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Appendix: 
 
Panel regressions of three types of investment banking activities on bank risks, with time 
dummies 
 
σj,t2 
(total 
risk) 
coef Stdv. β1 
(market 
risk beta) 
coef Stdv. β2 
(interest 
rate 
 risk beta) 
coef Stdv. 
lnta -0.09 0.61 lnta 0.04 0.06 lnta 0.14 0.13
TRAratio 3.32 13.43 TRAratio 2.67** 1.32 TRAratio -6.54*** 2.59
FIDratio 12.91** 6.12 FIDratio 1.13* 0.64 FIDratio -1.20 1.51
FEEratio -10.72*** 3.97 FEEratio 0.51 0.60 FEEratio -0.31 0.76
mmfratio -1.67 3.06 mmfratio 0.38 0.43 mmfratio -0.49 0.62
ddratio 4.45 4.59    ddratio -0.51 0.56
loanratio -0.64 3.03 loanratio 0.18 0.34 loanratio -0.23 0.86
liquidratio 8.45** 4.09 liquidratio -2.61*** 0.58 liquidratio -0.12 0.92
peratio 0.01 0.01    peratio 0.00 0.00
loanlossratio 103.00** 48.30       
_cons 3.04 5.86 _cons 1.30 1.82 _cons -0.05 1.22
y1993 Dropped   y1993 Dropped  y1993 Dropped 
Y1994 Dropped  Y1994 -0.59 1.89 Y1994 Dropped  
Y1995 Dropped  Y1995 -0.77 2.05 Y1995 Dropped  
Y1996 Dropped  Y1996 -1.10 2.06 Y1996 Dropped  
Y1997 Dropped  Y1997 -0.95 2.06 Y1997 Dropped  
Y1998 3.52 7.16 Y1998 -1.01 2.07 Y1998 -0.57 0.30 
Y1999 5.96 9.18 Y1999 -0.84 2.07 Y1999 -0.19 0.30 
Y2000 4.37 9.76 Y2000 -1.10 2.07 Y2000 -0.29 0.29 
Y2001 5.67 9.93 Y2001 -1.15 2.07 Y2001 -0.33 0.29 
Y2002 4.33 9.98 Y2002 -1.13 2.07 Y2002 -0.21 0.29 
Y2003 4.71 9.20 Y2003 -1.12 2.07 Y2003   
Y2004 3.25 8.96 Y2004 -1.00 2.07 Y2004 -0.20 0.28 
F-test on the joint  
significance of  
year dummies 8.97 0.00 
F-test on the 
joint  
significance of  
year dummies 4.75 0.00 
F-test on the 
joint  
significance of  
year dummies 3.23 0.00 
R-square=0.18 R-square=0.42 R-square=0.44 
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  Chapter 6   
The Efficiency Promoting Role of Securities Activities in US Bank Holding Companies 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
A perpetual topic in economics is the art of producing more output with possibly less economic 
resources. This was defined as firm efficiency by Farrel (1957) and for decades roused an 
enormous interest among economists. Based on this concept, Leibenstein (1966) coined the term 
X-efficiency and noted that, for a variety of reasons, people and organizations normally work 
neither as hard nor as effectively as they could. This constitutes a wastage of economic resources: 
we often observe firms using systematically more inputs than others to produce the same output, 
which is regarded as inefficient.  
 
The efficiency that we measure in this paper is the cost X-efficiency which refers to a bank’s 
ability to control costs for any given set of production outputs. Measuring the inputs in terms of 
costs, and setting the cost frontier to a minimum level of costs at which it is possible to produce a 
certain level of output, we can define the X-inefficiency as the excess of actual cost over the 
minimum cost (Button and Weyman-Jones 1992, Kwan 2001). The topicality of cost X-
efficiency is justified by Berger and Mester (1997) who assert that the most important reason for 
cost problems in the banking industry is the X-inefficiency. Most of the time, inefficiencies are 
caused by inappropriate operations, like excessive use of labor in branch offices, or financial 
inefficiency, such as excessive interest paid for funds. Many researchers have used X-efficiency 
to study the performance of individual banks and of the whole banking industry. X-efficiency 
has been linked to organizational structure (Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins 1993; 
Mester 1993), executive compensation (Pi and Timme 1993), market concentration (Berger and 
Hannan 1996), risk-taking (Kwan and Eisenbeis 1996), mergers and acquisitions (Peristiani 1997 
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and Berger 1997), and common stock performance (Kwan and Eisenbeis 1996), suggesting that 
X-efficiencies have potentially important implications for public policies and bank management. 
 
Our current study aims at examining the efficiency change caused by a bank’s securities 
activities. Empirically, this paper stems from the newly reviving strand of research exploring the 
OBS (Off Balance Sheet activities) and bank efficiencies. This new strand highlights that 
traditional bank efficiency measures omitting OBS in the estimation of bank efficiency may 
result in a misspecification of bank output and lead to incorrect conclusions. Siems and Clark 
(1997) estimate bank efficiencies and find that failing to account for OBS activities seriously 
understates bank output. Rogers (1998), and Clark and Siems (2002) test US commercial banks 
and argue that excluding OBS items will result in less accurate indicators of the true bank 
efficiency. Stiroh (2000) researches US bank holding companies (BHCs) and comes to a similar 
conclusion.  
 
Nevertheless, as these papers aim at researching the OBS activities, the bank’s newly expanded 
securities activities have not yet been explicitly accounted for. Securities activities and OBS 
activities are two different - although closely related - concepts. OBS activities refer to all 
activities that are not related to a bank’s assets or liabilities. Important items of OBS include 
various derivatives, commitments, letters of credit, and participation in bank acceptance and bills 
of exchange. Securities activities, however, cover both in- and off-balance sheet items. Securities 
underwriting activities are defined by the FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council) as commitments98, whereas securities trading activities relate to in-balance sheet items. 
Partly due to the complexity of the securities activities, and also attributed to the fact that 
securities activities have only be permissible in the US for the past few years, we find no study 
addressing the topic of securities activities and bank efficiency for US banks. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only few papers examining banks’ securities business and efficiency cover 
European universal banks, e.g. Swiss banks (Rime and Stiroh 2003) and a panel of German, 
Italian, Spanish, French and British banks (Casu and Giradone 2002). Thus, our study aims at 
                                                 
98 See FFIEC 031 and 041,  SCHEDULE RC-L – DERIVATIVES AND OFF-BALANCE SHEET ITEMS (3-02). 
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supplementing the new strand of literature on bank OBS activities, and takes it a step further into 
the field of various specific securities activities for US banks. 
 
This chapter examines how the efficiencies of US bank holding companies’ (BHCs’) reacted to 
the banks’ expansion into the sector of securities activities. The BHCs’ securities activities are 
divided into three types (securities trading, underwriting, and fiduciary activities), and their 
respective impact on bank efficiency is analyzed through the stochastic frontier approach. 
 
Our empirical conclusion indicates that traditional measurements of bank efficiency which 
neglect the bank’s involvement in securities activities, seriously bias the bank efficiency scores. 
We found that all three types of securities activities increase bank efficiency scores significantly, 
and that fiduciary activity brings about the biggest efficiency improvement. The efficiency 
improvement can be explained through increased managerial compensation and organizational 
effectiveness. Our results of the securities activities’ efficiency improvement effects for US bank 
holding companies are consistent with former literature on European banks, which argues that 
universal banks are more cost efficient than specialized banks. 
 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 lays out the concept of X-efficiency, 
describing the stochastic frontier methodology and translog cost function to measure efficiency 
scores. Section 6.3 reviews the data sources. Section 6.4 displays our empirical methodology and 
the main results. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2. The concept of bank efficiency and econometric methodology 
 
In this part we introduce the concept of bank efficiency explored in the current study, and discuss 
our econometric methodology to estimate the efficiency scores. 
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6.2.1 The concept of bank efficiency 
Generally speaking, the cost efficiency refers to a bank’s ability to minimize its cost given an 
output set. The bank using the minimum cost to produce the given output is regarded as the most 
efficient, or “best-performing” bank. The cost of this best-performing bank (i.e.,the minimum 
cost to produce the given output) will be used as a benchmark to measure cost efficiency. The 
cost of every studied bank will be compared with this benchmark. The more its costs exceed the 
benchmark, the more inefficient a bank is. 
    
Coined by Leibenstein (1966), the term X-efficiency describes the effectiveness with which a 
firm uses its resources to produce a given output. In the framework of neoclassical 
microeconomics, the production possibility curve provides various input combinations to 
produce a certain output set. However, irms will automatically aim at operating at the minimum 
feasible cost since any firm having higher costs than others can not stay in business in the long 
run. This way, neoclassical microeconomics formulates a deterministic relationship between 
output and input during the production process.  In contrast to that, the X-efficiency theory 
assumes that the input-output relationship is non-deterministic. The input to produce a certain 
output may vary according to several non-material factors, such as insufficient employee effort 
and a complex organizational process. This way, the firms exhibit X-inefficiency. X- 
inefficiency is explicitly displayed in wasteful expenditures such as maintenance of excess 
capacity, luxurious executive benefits, political lobbying and litigation99, so that the cost to 
produce a certain output in most cases is higher than the minimal feasible cost defined by the 
deterministic production function.  
 
Empirical studies have linked X-(in)efficiency to various reasons. A widely explored source of 
the inefficiency is insufficient competition. In a market with perfect competition, there will be no 
X-inefficiency because any firm less efficient than the others will in time be forced out of 
business . With other market forms such as market segmentation and products differentiation, 
however, it may be possible for x-inefficiency to persist, because the lack of competition makes 
                                                 
99 OCED glossary of statistical terms, see http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3332 
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it possible to use inefficient production techniques and still stay in business. Berger and Hannan 
(1996) find bank inefficiency is positively linked to market concentration.  
 
Another source of inefficiency lies in the discretionary effort of the employees. The employees 
of a bank might not always try their best to run the bank. Employees are economic persons and 
try to maximize their utility. Since no contract can exactly stipulate every single action of the 
employee, there is a grey area where the employees can discretionally decide on an effort level 
by trading off the employment income, pressure and leisure. Pi and Timme (1993) find higher 
executive compensation leads to lower inefficiency, in that high-income employees or executives 
are more motivated to work hard in order to keep their position. 
  
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993) and Mester (1993) link bank inefficiency 
to organizational structure. Firms or organizations never work as hard and as efficiently as they 
could. Bureaucracy, misunderstandings, reciprocal mistrust and buck-passing behavior between 
various internal divisions all increase the organizational inertia and decrease organizational 
effectiveness. In principle, organizational effectiveness is negatively related to the size of the 
organization. When an organization grows bigger and contains a more complicated internal 
structure, the bureaucratic behavior inside and the inertia become more serious.  
 
Imperfect information is viewed as another source of inefficiency (Wheelock and Wilson 1995100; 
Vander Vennet 2002; Matthews and Ismail 2006101). Information is an essential factor in a 
bank’s production process. Banks serve as as financing intermediaries and investment agents in 
economies, based on the fact that they deal better with informational asymmetry than individual 
investors in the financial market. Lack of information or poor qualified information sends wrong 
signals to a bank about the market demand and about how to organize the bank’s production 
according to the demand. On the contrary, rich sources of information help a bank to better 
                                                 
100 David C. Wheelock and Paul W. Wilson, Evaluating the Efficiency of Commercial Banks: Does Our View of 
What Banks Do Matter? JULY/AUGUST 1995, Review, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS. 
101 Kent Matthews and Mahadzir Ismail,  Efficiency and Productivity Growth of Domestic and Foreign Commercial 
Banks in Malaysia, Cardiff Economics Working Papers, No. 2006/2, January 2006. 
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organize its production by more accurately allocating resources among various banking branches, 
thus promoting bank efficiency.  
. 
 
To measure bank efficiency, accounting information on inputs and outputs is used to formulate 
the cost frontier of a bank. This frontier is defined as the cost of the best-performing bank under 
observation with the lowest costs to produce the same outputs as other banks.  Given the 
observed efficient frontier, each bank can be compared to the best-practice bank and assigned an 
efficiency score over (0,1] .   
 
More concretely, taking into consideration a bank i, whose cost Ci is higher than the feasible 
minimal cost C* of the best-performing bank, given the same output set Y , variable input price 
set W and fixed input set Z:  
 
C*= C (Y,W,Z) 
Ci = Ci(Y,W,Z) 
C*< Ci 
 
where  C* is the minimum cost defined by the cost function, Ci  is the actual output of the studied 
bank, Y=(y1,y2,……….yn) is the bank’s output set, W=(w1,w2, ………wm) is the bank’s price set 
for variable inputs, and Z=(z1,z2, ………zj) is the bank’s fixed input set. Variable inputs of a bank 
may consist of labor and borrowed funds, while the fixed inputs are composed of fixed assets 
and capital. Variable inputs and fixed inputs are both necessary factors for producing outputs. 
They both constitute important parts of a bank’s costs, and are sometimes partially substitutive of 
each other. Therefore, both of them must be included in the cost function, although they have to 
be treated differently. Variable inputs enter into the cost function in terms of prices. Fixed inputs 
enter into the cost function in terms of their book values, because they are slow to adjust and it is 
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difficult to measure a price for these durable inputs (Berger and Mester 1999, Adongo, Stork and 
Hasheela 2005).102  
 
The cost efficiency of the bank i is measured by the ratio of its cost compared to the feasible 
minimal cost under the given output set: 
 
EFFi= C*/ Ci. ∈(0,1]                                                                                                          (1) 
  
The efficiency score is automatically located in the range from 0 to 1 in that C* is no larger than 
Ci by definition. The efficiency score equals 1 for the most efficient bank, and is smaller than 1 
for all the other inefficient banks. The higher the efficiency score, the more efficiently a bank 
operates. An efficiency score of 0.8 means that the studied bank achieves 80 percent of the 
performance of the most efficient bank. In other words, the studied bank wastes 20 percent of its 
resources during its operation, due to organizational inertia or insufficient managerial effort. 
Based on this understanding, economic studies generally prefer a higher efficiency score, in that 
it is linked to less resource wasting and sound management in the banking industry. 
6.2.2. Using the stochastic frontier approach to measure bank efficiency 
 
We adopt the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to estimate bank efficiencies. This approach 
was initially introduced by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and has been widely adopted by 
various studies in recent years. The approach has the virtue of allowing for “noise” in the 
measurement of efficiency, and has been shown to be more robust than the alternative method of 
data envelopment (Eisenbeis, Ferrier and Kwan 1998, Kwan 2001) 
 
                                                 
102 The classification of variable inputs and fixed inputs widely exists in modern bank efficiency studies. In this 
literature, variable inputs enter the cost translog functions as a price term, while the fixed inputs enter the function in 
terms of their book value. Their interaction terms are also included in the function, allowing for partial substitutions 
between fixed and variable inputs. For detailed descriptions of the cost functional form of the variable inputs and 
fixed inputs, see among others Battese and Coelli (1988, 1993), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Van Vennet 
(2002). 
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The SFA uses a parametric technique to estimate the characteristics of the “best-practice” bank 
from the bank cost function. The best-practice bank represents the institution which uses minimal 
input resources to obtain the given outputs, by most efficiently utilizing the productive factors. 
The cost function of the best-practice bank is defined as the efficient cost frontier of the banking 
industry under the present technical condition. Any banks that systematically deviate from the 
frontier, are regarded as inefficient.  
 
This efficient cost frontier is named stochastic frontier in that it incorporates the stochastic 
fluctuation. The difference between the best performing bank and other banks is composed of 
two items: an inefficiency score and a random disturbance. This stochastic characteristic allows for 
errors in the estimation and so prevents the benchmark from being driven by outliers. The SFA assumes 
that inefficiency follows an asymmetric half-normal distribution, while random fluctuations 
follow a symmetric normal distribution. 
 
The stochastic cost frontier is estimated by measuring the cost of the most efficient bank in the 
data set, that is, it is an extant frontier estimated from all sample banks.103 For the purpose of the 
estimation, Ci,t (the cost of bank i in period t ) can be related to the cost frontier in the following 
form: 
 
Ci,t=C(Yi,t,Wi,t,Zi,t)*Vi,t                                                                                                        (2) 
ln Ci,t=lnC(Yi,t, Wi,t, Zi,t)+vi,t    i=1,2,...n, t=1,2,...T                                                            (3) 
 
 
where Ci,t denotes the total operating cost of the studied bank, Y is a vector of output quantities, 
W is a vector of input prices; n is the number of banks, T is the number of periods. C(Y,W,Z) is 
the cost frontier calculated on the basis of the cost function of the best-performing bank in the 
data sample. The term vi,t can be viewed as an error term, which measures the distance between 
the cost of the studied bank i and the efficient cost frontier.    
                                                 
103 Habib and Ljungqvist, 2003, Firm Value and Managerial Incentive: A Stochastic Frontier Approach, Wharton 
Financial Institution Center Working Paper, 
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In the line of the stochastic frontier approach, the term vi,t consists of two components: a 
inefficiency score and a random error. This way, vi,t can be decomposed in the following form: 
 
vi,t=ui,t +εi,t                     εi,t ~ N(0,,σε2 ),  ui,t ~ N |µi,t,σu2|, cov (ui,t, εi,t)=0.                               (4) 
 
where ui,t denotes an inefficiency factor that pushes the bank’s cost above those of the most 
efficient bank, and εi,t is the traditional random error. In the light of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977), εi,t may take a positive as well as a negative value, and is supposed to follow a symmetric 
normal distribution. ui,t is zero for the most efficient bank, whose cost will be used as the cost 
frontier, and ui,t takes a positive value for the other banks, whose costs are systematically higher 
than the cost frontier. Thus, ui,t could take only non-negative values, i.e. ui,t is a truncated normal 
distribution. Therefore, the distribution of the composite error term vi,t is positively skewed. 
 
In order to actually estimate ui,t and εi,t, we must make certain assumptions about their 
distributional forms. We assume ui,t is obtained by truncation of N(µi,t,σu2 ) at zero, where 
truncation at zero captures the non-negativity of ui,t. εi,t is independently and identically 
distributed with a zero mean and a σε standard deviation, that is, N(0,,σε2 ). We further assume 
the stochastic error to be independent of the bank inefficiencies, that is, cov (ui,t, εi,t)=0. In other 
words, good or bad luck is assumed to be unrelated to systematic shortfalls of managerial ability.  
 
With these restrictions, we can estimate the parameters of the cost function and the inefficiency 
scores using maximal log-likelihood estimation.104 In the light of Jondrow et al. (1982) and their 
successors105, ui,t, can be expressed as the expected value of ui,t conditional on the composite 
error vi,t. Given the certain assumption of the distributional forms of vi,t, ui,t and εi,t , the first and 
                                                 
104  Ordinary least squares method could also be used to derive the model. However, maximal likelihood is 
statistically preferred by most studies. See Greene (1993) for a discussion on that. 
105 Among those important successors are Battese and Coelli (1988, 1993), and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). They 
extend the approach of Jondrow et al. (1982) into panel data studies with different assumptions. In the current study 
we use the Stata Version 8.2, which adopts the methodology of Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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second moments of vi,t can be calculated, and the conditional expected value of ui,t can be derived 
based on the two moments.   
 
The efficiency score of each individual bank is the inverse of exp(ui,t). According to the 
definition of the bank efficiency illustrated in Section 2.1, the efficiency score is: 
 
EFFi,t= C*/Ci,t                                                                                                                 (5) 
 
Suppressing the stochastic error term, which is assumed to be irrelevant with the efficiency, the 
equation becomes: 
 
EFFi,t= C*/Ci,t = )exp(
1
)exp(
)exp(
)exp(*),,(
)exp(*),,(
,,
*
,
*
tititi uu
u
uZWYC
uZWYC ==                                       (6) 
 
Since the most efficient bank is located on the cost frontier, u* is zero by definition. For all the 
other inefficient banks, ui,t is always positive, so that exp(u*) takes the value of 1 and exp(ui,t) is 
larger than 1. Therefore, the efficiency score EFF falls in the range of (0, 1]. EFF equals 1 for the 
most efficient bank, and EFF is smaller than 1 for all the other inefficient banks.  
6.2.3. Translog cost function 
The calculation of the inefficiency starting from Equation (3) requires that one specifies the form 
of the cost function. In the current study we adopt a multiproduct translog cost function à la 
Aigner et al. (1977).  
 
The translog function, essentially, describes the BHCs’ stochastic cost frontier. The translog 
function, as proposed by Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) and Diewert(1974), serves as a 
prevailing functional form in estimating cost function or production related problems. Figlio 
(1999) provides statistical evidence that shows translog forms provide better statistical fit.  
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The primary advantage of the translog is its flexibility. The translog is a mathematical 
generalization of the Cobb-Douglas function, but more flexible in that it does not place apriori 
restrictions on the substitution possibilities between different factors106.  The Cobb-Douglas form 
is restrictive in terms of the implicit substitution assumptions: elasticities of substitution between 
all inputs are 1 and shares of the inputs are constant. Extending the Cobb-Douglas form to the 
translog function enables these constraints to be relaxed because cross-effects between inputs are 
recognized and therefore more complex substitution patterns can then be captured. It allows the 
elasticity of substitution to vary with the type of inputs, and allows returns to scale and output 
elasticity to vary with the size of the inputs, thus helping to minimize any biases that might result 
from using the more restrictive specification. In fact, the translog is such a flexible and general 
functional form that it can approximate any continuous twice-differentiable production 
function.107  Conveniently, the Cobb-Douglas form can be recovered by the translog with various 
coefficient restrictions, and thus it is possible to test whether the fit is improved by employing a 
more flexible functional form.108 
 
However, the increased flexibility comes at the expense of additional regressors. Therefore, the 
disadvantage of the translog function is its increased complexity in evaluating marginal effects of 
the explanatory cost factors, and the statistical concerns with multi-collinearity and over-
parameterization due to the presence of many interaction terms.109  
 
Firstly, due to the large number of interaction terms, we should be very prudent in interpreting 
the parameters of translog functions. Generally, the parameters in a translog function should be 
interpreted as the elasticity of dependent variables with respect to any of the right hand side 
variables. This is clearly observed when we compute the first derivatives on both sides of the 
function to get: ∂ lnC/ ∂ lnRi = ( ∂ C/ ∂ Ri)(Ri/C), where Ri stands for any right hand side 
variables.  However, the large numbers of interaction terms add considerable difficulties to 
                                                 
106 Bodmer, Energy Substitution in Swiss Industry: The Role of Prices and Regulation 
107 Dan Segal, A Multi-Product Cost Study of the US Life Insurance Industry 
108 Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1995, Information Technology as a Factor of Production: The Role of Differences Among 
Firms, Published in Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 3 (Special Issue on Information Technology and 
Productivity Paradox): pp. 183-200.  
109 Gronberg, Jansen, Taylor and Booker, 2005, School Outcome and School Input : A Cost Function Approach 
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evaluating the effect of the cost determinant factors. On one side, no single coefficient in the 
translog is very informative about the cost characteristics for any individual independent factor 
(that is input price or output quantity in the function).  Due to these interaction terms, the 
elasticity of one independent factor on the dependent variable must vary with other input prices 
or output quantities. As some parameters of these interaction terms with other related 
independent factors are positive and others are negative, the overall effect of one input price or 
output quantity change on the total cost depends on which parameters dominate. On the other 
side, one could test whether combinations of coefficients simultaneously have the appropriate 
signs, but such tests would almost certainly be rejected by conventional standards of statistical 
significance, since not all of these parameters are usually significant. 
 
Besides, the translog cost function is structurally non-homothetic. A cost function is homothetic 
if and only if it is “separable” in input prices and outputs, that is, it can be written as C(p, y) = 
h(p)*φ(y), for any p>0 and y>0. The translog cost function corresponds to a homothetic 
production function only in one special case, namely if the coefficient of every interaction term 
is equal to zero. 
 
6.3 . Data Sources 
 
The sample covers 620 US bank holding companies. For data availability, the analysis is 
restricted to the period from 1993 to 2004. For some of the banks data is only available for some 
of the years, which leads to an unbalanced panel dataset. 
 
All the aforementioned variables are calculated from the banks’ financial statements. Our data 
set is taken from Bankscope110 (Version 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) and includes data for 620 US 
bank holding companies that provide consolidated financial statements. The sample period 
covers 12 years from 1993 to 2004. We use yearly data from the sample banks’ financial 
statements, including bank balance sheets and income statements.  
 
                                                 
110 BankScope is a database created by IBCA and Bureau van Dijk. 
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The average production cost of banks, as measured by the total operating expense, counts for 641 
million dollars. A translog function is used to determine the cost frontier, where we have defined 
four inputs and at least two outputs. The input vector contains both variable inputs and fixed 
inputs. Labour and borrowed funds are defined to be the two variable inputs. Data suggests that 
US banks averagely employ 4560 workers, whose mean wage is 60,000 dollars. The banks hold 
16.5 billion dollars in borrowed fund on average. The mean interest expense paid for one dollar 
of borrowed funds is six cents, that is a 6% interest rate. For the two fixed inputs, we gauge the 
equity capital and fixed assets with the average capital being twice as large as the fixed assets. 
 
The output vector includes two commercial banking outputs, namely bank loans and cash/other 
earning assets, and the securities activities outputs. The output for the securities trading activities 
is measured by the value of the banks’ trading securities, averagely 2.7 billion dollars. For the 
underwriting and fiduciary activities, their outputs are measured by either their revenue or their 
equivalent assets. The equivalent assets are computed by capitalizing the revenues with the rate 
of return of the commercial banking activities. After capitalization, the equivalent assets of 
underwriting and fiduciary activities amount to 2.5 billion and 2.8 billion dollars respectively, 
which are similar in size to the trading securities assets. Since the total loan assets of the banks 
average 9.4 billion dollars, each of these securities activities output counts for almost one fourth 
of the total loan. This indicates that securities activities have already become an important part in 
the banking production, and therefore should not be neglected. 
 
Table 1 supplies an overview of the 11 variables in our empirical model. The data is rounded to 
two decimals. Any data, which is smaller than 0.005, is shown as 0 in the table.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the cost frontier variables: 
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Cost: total operating expense  (unit: million dollars)      641.96 3053.69 0.00 58299 
Labor input: number of employees  4560.63 18024.46 3.80 287000 
Price of Labor W1:  
total personnel expenses over number of employees  
(unit: million dollars) 0.06 0.55 0.00 37.04 
Borrowed fund input: total liabilities(unit: million dollars) 16477.81 71428.08 0.00 1374810 
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Price of borrowed fund W2: 
total interest expense over total liabilities 0.06 1.09 0.00 64.04 
Fixed input Z1: fixed assets (unit: million dollars)      251.18 1514.33 0.00 46351 
Fixed input Z2: total equity (unit: million dollars)      1520.95 6327.17 4.20 109291 
Output Y1: total customer loan (unit: million dollars)      9443.82 37596.16 0.00 579857 
Output Y2: cash and other earning assets (unit: million dollars)    591.69 2397.98 0.00 35168 
Output of securities trading activities: trading securities 
(unit: million dollars)      2753.89 22130.02 -0.40 484420 
Rate of return of commercial banking activities 
(capitalizing rate for asset equivalent measure)  0.05 0.33 -2.95 17.53 
Output of underwriting activities: underwriting equivalent assets
(unit: million dollars)      2449.72 33335.66 -1827864 546489.60
Output of fiduciary activities: fiduciary equivalent assets 
(unit: million dollars)      2803.38 71158.07 
 
-724144.4
 
4316654 
Output of securities underwriting activities: underwriting income
(unit: million dollars)      105.75 647.73 -16.1 13591 
Output of fiduciary activities: fiduciary income 
(unit: million dollars)      56.69 264.77 0.00 4835 
 
6.4. The efficiency promotion effects of the securities activities: empirical evidence 
 
In this section we will present the empirical model to examine the impacts of the three types of 
securities activities on bank efficiency. The model is based on the translog cost function, using 
the stochastic frontier approach to measure bank efficiency. Following Roger (1998), Clark and 
Siems (2001) and Stiroh (2003), the efficiency effects of securities activities are examined by 
comparing the average efficiency score estimated with and without securities activities as output. 
We first calculate the efficiency score without securities activities as output by restricting the 
bank products to contain only the two commercial banking outputs.  We then calculate the three 
other groups of efficiency scores with each of the three securities activities by allowing the bank 
products to include the three securities activities. The latter three groups exhibit significantly 
higher average efficiency scores than the former one, leading to our argument that securities 
activities help promote bank efficiency. 
 
Two different measures are utilized to define the output, and their respective results are 
presented.  The Asset-Equivalent-Measure computes the equivalent assets of underwriting and 
fiduciary activities, whereas the Revenue-Based-Measure directly utilizes the underwriting and 
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fiduciary revenues as outputs. The two measures come to similar results, confirming the 
efficiency enhancement effects of securities activities.  
 
6.4.1. Efficiency estimation with Asset-Equivalent-Measure and Revenue-Based-Measure  
The translog cost function is used to estimate bank efficiencies. In order to construct the cost 
function, the inputs and outputs are to be defined. In this study, the outputs are defined by the 
two different measures, while the inputs are defined in accordance with the intermediary 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Banks, as intermediaries, borrow funds from depositors 
and lend them to loanees. In order to get loanable funds from depositors, banks do not only pay 
interest expenses. They also provide services like safekeeping, check clearing, bookkeeping, etc. 
to depositors; and these services implicitly constitute partial payment to the use of these funds.  
These services are based on capital, labor, and other material resources. These resources, as well 
as the deposit funding, are viewed as the inputs of the bank production. Accordingly, we set the 
input vector to contain both variable and fixed inputs: labor and borrowed funds as two variable 
inputs, and fixed assets and equity capital as two fixed inputs.  
 
To distinguish between the fixed and the variable inputs explicitly acknowledges the different 
characteristics of these two types of inputs, and thus helps to improve the accuracy of the cost 
frontier function. Fixed assets are taken as fixed input because they are slow to adjust and it is 
difficult to measure their prices (Berger and Mester 1998, 2001; Adongo et al. 2005). There 
could be discussions on the role of bank equity, though. The current regulatory framework of the 
minimum capital requirement demands a bank to increase its equity in accordance with the 
expansion of its total risk assets, implying that the bank equity could vary over time. Yet, 
literature commonly assumes the bank equity to be a fixed input by arguing that legal restrictions 
make issuing a new equity a complicated business so that a bank would not frequently adjust its 
equity capital (Eichberger and Summer 2004; Stein 2004).111 Besides, treating bank equity as a 
fixed input also has the explicit advantage that it allows us to utilize the quantity of bank equity 
instead of the price of equity as an explanatory variable of the cost frontier function. The price of 
                                                 
111 Stein (2004) cites several reasons to explain the economic inconvenience of issuing new bank equity. These 
reasons include asymmetric information, market inefficiencies and free-cash-flow-type agency problems. 
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bank equity is difficult to measure accurately and creditably, in spite of various imputation 
formulas suggested by literature. The widely used Capital Asset Pricing Model to estimate the 
cost of equity capital, for instance, depends largely on appropriate measures of the risk-free 
interest rate, the equity market risk premium and the risk beta of bank equity. As a result, the 
estimated price of equity capital is imprecise with a large standard error, due to the uncertainty of 
the true equity market premium and imprecise estimates of equity betas (Fama and French 1997, 
Green et al. 2001). We thus believe that treating bank equity as a variable input with its 
estimated price may not help to further improve the estimation accuracy for our cost frontier. We 
therefore prefer to regard it as a fixed input following Berger and Humphrey (1992, 1997), 
Cebenoyan et al. (2003) and Wang (2003).   
 
Suppressing individual bank superscripts, the models take the following form: 
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Where  
 
C represents cost, measured by the total operating expense of a bank.  
 
Y denotes the output quantities set, for N types of outputs. N=2 if we restrict banking outputs to 
result only from commercial banking activities, and N>2 if we also allow outputs of securities 
activities to be included; 
 
W denotes the input prices set for two variable inputs----labor and borrowed fund; 
 
w1 is the labor price calculated by a bank’s personnel expenses over its employee number; 
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w2 is the price of borrowed fund, measured by a bank’s total interest expenses divided by its total 
liabilities; 
 
Z is the fixed input set containing two fixed inputs: z1 for fixed assets and z2 for bank equity; 
 
u denotes the cost efficiency of each individual bank, and  
 
ε  denotes stochastic errors.  
 
The intermediary approach measures the output of the banking production process by the 
amounts of earning assets produced by a bank. Following the approach proposed by Roger 
(1998), Clark and Siems (2001) and Stiroh (2003), we estimate the impacts of securities 
activities on bank efficiencies by restrictedly specifying bank outputs. In our econometric model 
with N types of outputs, N=2 when we estimate the efficiencies of bank holding companies with 
only commercial banking activities, as y1 denotes a bank holding company’s total customer loan, 
and y2 denotes the bank holding company’s other earning assets like interbank dues and deposits 
and so on.  When estimating the efficiencies of bank holding companies with different kinds of 
securities activities, we define N=3, with the third output y3 specified respectively by: (1) the 
bank holding company’s trading securities assets ;(2) BHC’s fee income equivalent assets; (3) 
BHC’s fiduciary income equivalent assets.  Finally, we define N=5 to measure the overall 
efficiency effects of all three types of securities activities. The five outputs are two commercial 
banking outputs plus three securities activities outputs. 
 
6.4.1.1.Asset-Equivalent-Measure 
 
Measuring and estimating y3 requires specific methods. We estimate the output of securities 
trading activities by measuring the trading securities assets. The underwriting and fiduciary 
activities, however, are off-balance activities and intermediary activities, and therefore provide 
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only income data. In order to make outputs of underwriting and fiduciary activities comparable 
to y1 , y2 and the output of trading activities, their equivalent assets have to be estimated. 
 
Here we adopt the Asset-Equivalent-Measure proposed by Boyd and Gertler (1994). This 
measure computes the on-balance-sheet assets required to generate a BHC’s level of off-balance 
income by using the rate of return on on-balance-sheet assets to capitalize off-balance income. 
Assuming that off-balance securities activities incomes INCsec are generated by the equivalent 
hypothetical assets Ysec, and regarding the equivalent assets Ysec and commercial banking assets 
Yb as symmetrically profitable, the estimated value of Ysec can be derived as follows: 
 
Rate of return for commercial bank lending activities: r= (I-E-LP)/Yb 
Ysec= INCsec /r =Yb* INCsec /(I-E-LP) 
 
where 
 
INCsec denotes underwriting fee incomes and fiduciary incomes for the underwriting and 
fiduciary activity of BHC, respectively. Yb is the commercial bank lending assets, measured by 
the total customer loans of the banks. I is the total interest income; E is total interest expense; LP 
is the loan loss provision. 
 
6.4.1.2.Revenue-Based-Measure  
Although the asset equivalent measure is popularly adopted in measuring the off-balance sheet 
outputs of banks, it suffers from a possible bias resulting from an improper capitalization rate. In 
the above section we use the rate of return of the on-balance sheet loan activity to capitalize the 
off-balance sheet underwriting and fiduciary activities, based on the preposition that the on- and 
off-balance sheet activities have the same rate of return. This preposition, however, does not 
necessarily hold.  
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Various studies point out that on- and off-balance sheet activities could have different rates of 
return. Thus, the asset equivalent measure could significantly over-estimate or under-estimate 
underwriting and fiduciary activities assets, depending on whether the real rates of return of 
these two activities are lower or higher than the on-balance sheet return. If the off-balance sheet 
activities present a higher rate of return, capitalizing off-balance sheet assets with an on-balance 
sheet rate of return could exaggerate the real off-balance assets of underwriting and fiduciary 
activities. This biases the real outputs of those banks that have a higher share of underwriting and 
fiduciary activities, so as to bias the cost efficiency of those banks.  Siems and Clark (2002), 
Roger (1998) all report that cost efficiency estimation is sensitive to the different measurement 
of a bank`s off-balance outputs.112  
 
In the current section we rerun the efficiency estimation with the income measure in order to 
overcome the aforementioned estimation bias with the asset equivalent measure. Instead of using 
the capitalized assets, the income measure directly adopts the incomes of the underwriting and 
fiduciary activities as the third output.  The income measure has the apparent advantage that it 
completely avoids data distortion caused by any improper capitalization rate, hence increasing 
the credibility of the estimated efficiency scores. The income measure, however, is also criticized 
in that it is inconsistent with the output/input definition. In accordance with the intermediation 
approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), the two commercial banking outputs, y1 and y2, 
are defined in stock terms of earning assets. The third output y3, on the contrary, is defined in 
flow terms of income generated by the underwriting or fiduciary activities. This goes hand in 
hand with the production approach which argues that banking service flows are bank outputs.  In 
this way, an efficiency estimation with income measure suffers from the inconsistency of 
banking production definition approaches.     
 
Despite of the above criticism, the revenue-based measure is popularly adopted in various 
efficiency studies.  Lang and Wenzel (1995, 1998), Koetter (2005), and Shen (2005) all use non-
interest revenues to measure the off-balance sheet output of banks. Siems and Clark (2002) and 
                                                 
112 Siems and Clark (2002) compare the cost efficiency results estimated with Boyd-Gertler asset equivalent measure 
and their revenue-based measure. In their study, the mean efficiency scores resulting from these two estimation 
measures are significantly different. 
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Roger (1998) conduct a comprehensive survey on bank cost efficiency with both the assets 
equivalent measure and the revenue-based measure  
 
Table 2 in Section 6.4.2 presents the estimated cost efficiency scores. Cost efficiency is yearly 
measured for each BHC, resulting in a group of 7440 (12*620) scores for each efficiency 
measure. Let cte stand for the cost efficiency of BHCs without any securities activities; ctetra, 
ctefee and ctefid for cost efficiencies for BHCs with securities trading, underwriting and 
fiduciary activities respectively. cteAll represents the cost efficiency with all three types of 
securities activities. The cost efficiencies estimated with the Asset-Equivalent-Measure and the 
Revenue-Based Measure are jointly presented to provide a better view of the efficiency results.  
 
6.4.2. Testing the significance of efficiency enhancement 
Hereinafter we present the efficiency estimation results with RBM in Table 2, and compare the 
results between the two measures.  As typical for most literature using the stochastic frontier 
approach to estimate efficiencies, we present our empirical results by focusing on the efficiency 
scores while leaving out the presentation of the detailed translog functional parameters. The 
parameters of the translog function are presented in the appendix, and the signs of the parameters 
all fit well with what we economically expect of them. 
 
Table2: Means of estimated efficiencies  
Asset Equivalent Measure  Revenue-Based Measure 
Cost 
efficiency  mean Stv.dev  
Cost 
efficiency mean Stv.dev  
cte 
0.62 0.24
cte 
0.62 0.24 
cteTRA 
0.68 0.24
cteTRA 
0.68 0.24 
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cteFEE 
0.76 0.18
cteFEE 
0.82 0.16 
cteFID 
0.84 0.17
cteFID 
0.85 0.15 
cteAll 
0.87 0.20
cteAll 
0.90 0.20 
 
 
As displayed in the table, the regressions with RBM and AEM result in quite similar efficiency 
scores. All the groups with securities activities show significantly higher efficiency scores than 
the comparative groups without securities activities, so as to substantiate the efficiency 
enhancement of a bank’s securities activities. Among the three types of securities activities, 
fiduciary activities result in the highest efficiency gains (cteFID=0.84 and 0.85) for the banks. 
These results indicate that the efficiency estimation is unaffected by different measures. Their 
robustness stands in accordance with the reports of other aforementioned studies using both 
AEM and RBM (Siems and Clark 2002, Roger 1998).  
 
Despite the high similarity of the estimated efficiencies between AEM and RBM, the efficiency 
scores estimated by RBM are notably higher than those estimated by AEM for both underwriting 
and fiduciary activities. This leads us to doubt whether the AEM might have underestimated 
bank efficiency. The AEM utilizes the return rate of the commercial banking activities to 
capitalize the underwriting and fiduciary incomes. This capitalization strongly amplifies the 
variations of the underwriting and fiduciary outputs, since the return rate of the commercial 
banking also varies. Two banks having exactly the same underwriting or fiduciary revenue could 
exhibit very different equivalent assets in AEM, for instance. Reexamination of the data also 
suggests that the variations of underwriting and fiduciary equivalent assets have more than 
doubled compared to the variation of their original income data.  This large variation has 
exaggerated the gaps between the highest and the lowest outputs of underwriting or fiduciary 
activities in the sample banks, and may have wrongly attributed the gaps to inefficiency. Imagine 
two banks with similar costs and similar underwriting or fiduciary revenues, but having 
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completely different equivalent assets outputs in AEM. The bank with the highest equivalent 
assets output would be incorrectly regarded as the best-performing bank, and be improperly set 
as the frontier. The other bank with the lower equivalent assets output is viewed as inefficient, 
although it reaps the same revenue with the same costs. This way, the measure error in the 
equivalent assets will be improperly ascribed to cost inefficiency, leading to a lower average 
efficiency level. 
 
The aforementioned results suggest that securities activities considerably promote bank 
efficiency. Restricting the banking outputs to contain only commercial banking activities, we get 
a mean efficiency of only 0.62. In other words, 38 percent of the resources are wasted during the 
banking production.  However, when including the securities activities as banking outputs, the 
mean efficiency rises to above 0.68, indicating a considerable efficiency enhancement.  
 
T-test on the significance of efficiency enhancement 
To test the significance of this efficiency improvement, we run a series of t-tests on the null 
hypothesis that the estimated efficiency scores derived from the empirical cost functions are the 
same, regardless of whether securities activities are included in the BHCs or not. Table 3 
presents the t-statistics and p-values for both the AEM and RBM. The t-statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of no differences, suggesting that the efficiency improvement is statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 3:  t-test for differences between mean efficiencies of BHCs with and without securities 
activities 
 
H0:  BHCs have the same mean efficiencies when with and without securities activities 
Asset Equivalent Measure Revenue-Based Measure 
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  t-statistics p-value   t-statistics p-value 
cte vs. cteTRA -44.31 0.00 cte vs. cteTRA -44.31 0.00 
cte vs. cteFEE -120 0.00 cte vs. cteFEE -130 0.00 
cte vs. cteFID -120  0.00 cte vs. ctefid -120  0.00 
cte vs. cteAll -131 0.00 cte vs. cteAll -145 0.00 
 
Effects on the most inefficient 25% of all sample banks:  
Policy makers and regulators are interested in observing the effects of securities activities on the 
most inefficient banks. Literature finds that the most inefficient banks with the lowest efficiency 
scores are prone to potential failure, and therefore deserve more attention. Berger and Humphrey 
(1992), Cebenyon et al. (1993), and Barr et al. (1994) all report that banks with low efficiency 
scores fail at a greater rate than those with high efficiencies. For this reason we examine the 
efficiency enhancement of the most inefficient 25% of all sample banks as follows below.  
 
We first take a look at the minimum efficiency score in each group. The first row indicates that 
the minimum points of efficiency have risen considerably, from 0.13 to at least 0.15 and above. 
Using the 1% bound as a benchmark for the less efficient group of BHCs, the securities activities 
raise the lowest bank efficiencies from 0.18 to a range of 0.25 –0.39. We take the 25% as a 
threshold to define the most inefficient banks. In the last row, the average efficiency scores for 
the most inefficient 25% of all sample banks in each group are reported. The average scores 
display a significant increase when banks are allowed to conduct securities activities.  We 
therefore come to the conclusion that securities activities do not only improve mean efficiency 
for all banks observed, they also improve mean efficiency for the group of the most inefficient 
banks.The regulatory authorities therefore have good reason to support securities activities so 
that the “weakest banks” will have a chance to improve their operations, leading to a better 
overall financial stability.  
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Table 4:  Efficiency Percentiles for the most inefficient 25% of all banks with and without 
securities activities 
 Asset Equivalent Measure Revenue-Based Measure 
 cte cteTRActeFEEctefidcteAll cte cteTRActeFEE ctefidcteAll
Minimum 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.22
1% 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.18 0.25 0.37 0.38 0.39
5% 0.32 0.33 0.47 0.53 0.49 0.32 0.33 0.54 0.56 0.58
10% 0.35 0.36 0.53 0.59 0.55 0.35 0.36 0.60 0.63 0.65
25% 0.42 0.47 0.62 0.72 0.63 0.42 0.47 0.72 0.75 0.76
Mean efficiency for 
the most inefficient 25% of all banks
0.36 0.38 0.55 0.61 0.56 0.36 0.38 0.61 0.63 0.64
 
6.4.3. Discussions about the empirical results 
Both the asset equivalent measure and the revenue-based measure consistently lead to the 
conclusion that securities activities help promote bank efficiency. This efficiency promotion 
effect could be the result of several factors like enhanced competition, clearer organizational 
structure and higher managerial compensation, as discussed below. The impact of these factors 
varies with the different sub-types of securities activities, leading to the various levels of 
efficiency promotion caused by these activities.  
 
Fiduciary activities 
Among the three types of securities activities, fiduciary activities bring about the highest 
efficiency gains for US banks, as confirmed by both the asset equivalent measure and the 
revenue-based measure.  
 
Fiduciary services are widely regarded as one of the most competitive playfields of the financial 
service industry. Walter (1994) points out that bank trust and fiduciary activities have “so many 
competitors” and “the performance is so easy to measure”. Carlson, Pelz and Sahinoz (2004) 
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suggest that the fiduciary industry exhibits characteristics of the competitive market113, where a 
great number of funds sellers and almost no entry barrier for new fiduciary funds exists. They 
find that more than 8000 funds compete in the market and new funds are launched almost 
everyday. Other studies (Ney et al., 2003) cite the fiduciary management fee as a competition 
indicator. They point out that the average fiduciary fee has declined by 40% since 1980, referring 
to the enhanced competition in the fiduciary industry.114   More importantly, the service of 
fiduciary management is largely homogeneous so that it is easy to measure and to compare the 
quality of fiduciary services. Thus, the fiduciary market in many ways exhibits the characteristics 
of a fully competitive market.115  As illustrated by the general theory of X-efficiency, intensive 
competition exerts exogenous pressure on banks to move closer to the efficiency frontier. Banks 
and their employees have to work harder in order to lower the costs and exhaust the output 
potentiality, so that the bank will not be pushed out of the market.  
 
Another impulse for banks to behave efficiently is the clear organizational structure of fiduciary 
management. Usually, when a bank operates across various banking products lines, the 
organizational structure of the bank becomes larger and more complex. Bureaucracy, 
misunderstandings, ambiguous entrusts and buck-passing behaviors between various internal 
divisions increase the organizational inertia and decrease organizational effectiveness. This 
organizational deficiency, however, is unlikely to hold for the fiduciary activities of banks.  As 
stipulated by various regulatory authorities from states and national levels, the divisions 
conducting fiduciary activities have to be relatively independent of other divisions of the same 
bank, for the purpose of protecting the fiduciary assets holder from conflicts of interest.116  This 
independence makes the fiduciary division a concise but full-fledged financial service provider, 
largely free of various interferences from other parts of the bank. This effectively reduces the 
internal resource wastage among the organization, and hence helps increase the efficiency of the 
whole bank. 
                                                 
113 Mutual Funds, Fee Transparency and Competition, by John B. Carlson, Eduard A. Pelz, Erkin Y. Sahinoz, 2004 
114 Statement of Congressman Bob Ney before the Capital Markets Subcommittee hearing on “Mutual Fund 
Industry Practices and Their Effect on Individual Investors”, 2003. 
115Garczarczyk (2002), on the contrary, finds the quality of commercial banking to be difficult to define and to 
measure. See Józef Garczarczyk, 2002 (5), Determinants of Quality of Banking Services, in Ekonomia journal. 
116 Concerning the conflicts of interests in banks’ fiduciary activities, see Chapter 3 for a detailed description. 
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Besides, empirical studies also find that staff in the fiduciary industry, as staff in most securities 
activities related industries, receive comparatively higher wages than staffs in the commercial 
banking industry. The high wage effect helps enhance the working efforts of the employees in 
two ways: on the one hand side, namely from the perspective of the shareholders and bank 
managers, it is more intolerant for highly-paid employees to be slug and fraudulent than for 
lowly-paid ones. It is hard to imagine that managers will accept the sluggishness of employees 
who are much better paid than others.  On the other side, from the perspective of the employees 
themselves, highly paid staff usually have incentives to work harder, in order to keep their 
current income level and to come closer to a potential promotion. This way, the high wage levels 
help to promote the average working efforts of the employees, contributing to enhanced 
efficiencies of the banks.  
 
Underwriting activities 
Underwriting activities also help increase bank efficiency by stimulating the high managerial 
compensation and the project-guided performance evaluation. The efficiency promotion effect of 
the underwriting activities, however, is moderate compared to that of the fiduciary activities, 
probably due to the highly monopolized market structure in the underwriting industry. 
 
Various research reports that the underwriting industry averagely has much higher personnel 
expenses than the commercial banking industry. Walter (1994) argues that underwriting depends 
much on the quality of personnel, especially expertise and capability in corporate finance 
advising. Thus, the sluggishness of personnel in underwriting activities will result in a much 
worse financial service production than in other activities where the hardware takes more weight 
in outputs production.  The gravity of the personnel expertise in underwriting activities, joint by 
the high wage level in these activities, makes inefficient employees more intolerable in the 
underwriting industry. Fry et al. (2002) confirm that the employees in the underwriting industry 
work harder than in other financial service industries, implying that the enhanced X-efficiency is 
largely attributed to the improved working efficiency in the underwriting sector. 
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Bank efficiency also benefits from enhanced informational advantage gained through the 
underwriting process. In order to bring the newly issued securities smoothly to the public, and to 
set a reasonable price for the securities, a bank will thoroughly inspect the firms whose securities 
it underwrites. In other words, the bank has to show “due diligence or intelligence” about the 
financial conditions and the true prospectus of the firms. This intelligence is built on large 
quantities of information, including some information unannounced or unavailable to outsiders. 
This information could be spread to other parts of the bank to generate a more efficient resource 
utilization (Walter 1994).  Vander Vennet (2002) also argues that underwriting activities 
improve bank efficiency by reducing the cost of monitoring a bank’s clients. In general, banks 
face problems of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information between 
a bank and its customers. Monitoring the customers helps reduce the moral hazard, thus 
constituting an important part of the risk management of a bank. Underwriting activities give a 
bank access to private information which may improve the effectiveness of its monitoring efforts.  
 
Meanwhile, we find the efficiency promotion effect of underwriting activities to be significantly 
lower than that of the fiduciary activities, probably due to the highly monopolized market 
structure of the underwriting industry. Pugel and White (1994) suggest that US securities 
underwriting is dominated by about 20 to 25 large securities firms. Heyal et al. (1983)117 explore 
the average concentration in securities underwriting. They find that the first 15 firms make up 
89% of the market share in US negotiated securities underwriting, and 85% of the market share 
in competitive-bid underwriting.  The monopoly is largely attributed to the syndicated structure 
of underwriting, which constitutes higher barriers for new entrants, as argued by Pugel and 
White (1994). On one side, the entrant faces a marketing-based entry barrier, because the 
established firms already have a reputation and track record, whereas the entrant’s capabilities 
are relatively untested. On the other side, the structure of syndicates might also enhance barriers 
that have the syndicate manager control other participators. These factors lead to the 
monopolized structure of the underwriting industry, and may somewhat lessen bank efficiency. 
                                                 
117 Samuel L. Hayes, III, A. Michael Spence, and David Van Prang Markes, Competition in the Investment banking 
Industry: Harvard University Press, 1983, Table 3,4, and 5. 
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The monopolized banks that lack competition pressure would operate inefficiently but still keep 
considerable market shares. 
 
Securities trading activities 
Securities trading activities, similar to underwriting activities, display a significant efficiency 
enhancement. But this enhancement comes about to a lower extent when compared with that of 
the fiduciary activities. We explain this with the securities trading activities benefitting from the 
stimulation of the high managerial compensation but suffering from the ambiguous trading 
strategy. 
 
Staff of the securities trading sector, as well as of most of the other securities related sectors, 
enjoy a relatively high wage level. As illustrated above, high managerial compensation helps 
reduce sluggish work and thus enhances the X-efficiency of a bank. However, the securities 
trading activities of commercial banks, unlike the trading activities of most other institutional 
investors, are not fully profit-oriented. The securities trading strategies of banks are mainly based 
on the need for position management, instead of being based on the profit-risk analysis of the 
securities themselves. The banks call in securities when they have a long position in the loan-
deposit activities, and put out securities when they have a short position in the loan-deposit. In 
other words, trading securities are tools for banks to match their assets-liabilities positions. This 
way, the real contribution of the securities trading division is hard to gauge. It is improper to 
measure the performance of a securities trading division just by its profits. It is also unjustified to 
compare the profitability of the securities trading activities in a commercial bank to the trading 
activities in an investment bank or a mutual fund. Even comparing the trading profitability of one 
commercial bank to another would lead to an unjustified conclusion, given that the two banks 
may have different position managements. The above mentioned difficulties in measuring the 
real performance of trading activities create an “inertia area” for the securities trading managers. 
Managers may not try all their best when working, since responsibility for a lower trading 
profitability could be easily shifted off to other divisions. Thus, the efficiency enhancement of 
the securities trading activities is limited by the ambiguous trading strategy of banks.   
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With all the three types of securities activities 
The empirical results report that banks conducting a full range of all three types of securities 
activities exhibit the highest mean efficiency. The reason may lie in the fact that a universal bank 
enjoys better informational advantages from multiple securities activities. A bank’s 
informational advantage comes from its professional operation through various financial 
products and in various segments of the financial market. In terms of securities activities, each of 
the three types of securities activities provides certain information on the clients and on the 
financial market, which can be used to facilitate the bank’s production: fiduciary activities bring 
about a wider network of individual or institutional investors, and provides a better 
understanding of investors’ behaviors. Underwriting activities enable a bank to have more 
insight into firms whose securities the bank underwrites. Trading activities brings a bank closer 
to the financial market and help it to better catch the sentiment of the market.  
 
A Bank’s informational advantage stems from its professional operation in the various segments 
of the financial market. The more banking activities are conducted, the more information a bank 
draws from the financial market. When a bank operates within a full range of all three types of 
securities activities, the information gained from a certain type of securities activities spills over 
to the other activities, enhancing the information both qualitatively and quantitatively. The 
enhanced informational advantage helps a bank to allocate its resources more efficiently and 
more accurately, thus contributing to a higher efficiency of the bank.  
 
Consistent with our findings, various literature reports that information gained by one part of a 
bank can spill over to other parts, and that different types of securities activities can collaborate 
with each other and with the commercial banking activities, in order to better exploit this 
information (Vander Vennet, 2002; Johnson and Marietta-Westberg, 2004, 2005; Laux and Walz, 
2005). Johnson and Marietta-Westberg 118  (2004, 2005) report that a bank serving both as 
underwriter and fiduciary assets manager performs better than other banks. They claim that 
                                                 
118  William C. Johnson & Jennifer Marietta-Westberg, Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock 
Underwriting, Michigan State University, Department of Finance, First Version: February 20, 2004; Updated 
Version: April 22, 2005 
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combining underwriting and assets management activities provides a bank with superior 
information, while the diligence gained from the underwriting process can be utilized by the 
asset management branch or the trading branch of the bank. Vander Vennet (2002) suggests that 
a financial conglomerate with a full range of both securities activities and commercial banking 
activities enhances its informational advantage through multiple financial-related services. This 
informational advantage reduces the operating costs of the conglomerate, since the conglomerate 
otherwise has to incur more expenses to get information from outside sources. Thus, 
informational advantage helps improve cost efficiency. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
This paper aims at exploring the impact of the US BHCs’ expansion into the securities activities on 
bank efficiency. The stochastic frontier analysis is utilized to examine bank efficiency with and 
without different types of securities activities. The BHCs’ securities activities are divided into three 
types (securities trading, underwriting and fiduciary activities), and their respective impacts on bank 
efficiency empirically analyzed. 
 
Empirical results find that all three types of securities activities increase bank efficiency scores 
significantly, with the fiduciary activity bringing about the greatest efficiency improvement. We 
adopt both the Asset-Equivalent-Measure and the Revenue-Based-Measure to define the securities 
activities outputs, whereas the results are unaffected by different measures. The efficiency 
improvement can be explained by a higher managerial compensation, an increased organizational 
effectiveness and enhanced competition pressure. The conclusion of this paper indicates that 
traditional measurements of bank efficiency, which neglect the bank’s involvement in securities 
activities, seriously bias bank efficiency scores. 
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Appendix 
 
Parameters of the translog cost functions, for asset equivalent measure and revenue-based 
measure 
 
Following we present the coefficients and their standard errors estimated by the translog 
functions, for informative purpose. Due to the great number of interaction terms and square 
terms, the function has 36 coefficients altogether for only four inputs and three outputs. Thus, the 
total cost effects of a certain input or output must be very prudently interpreted, taking into 
consideration all relevant interaction and square terms. 
 
Generally our coefficients are in accordance with the economic common sense of cost functions. 
Among the four inputs and three outputs, most of them display significant positive signs in either 
their logarithm terms or their square logarithm terms.  These significant coefficients are 
primarily terms of z1, z2, p2, y1, y2 and y3. On the input side, the coefficients of lnz1 (fixed 
assets input), lnz2 (equity capital input) and their squared terms sqlnz1 and sqlnz2 are 
significantly positive in the cost translog function, which clearly shows that a rising fixed input 
pushes the BHC’s cost up. The sqlnp2, the square term of lnp2 (price of fund input) is also 
positive in most cases, indicating that increased interest expenses result in higher costs. On the 
output side, the positive coefficients ofsqlny1 (square of lny1, loan output), lny2 (cashes and 
interbank output) and sqlny3 (square of lny3, securities activities output) indicate larger costs 
needed to produce more outputs.  
 
The only exception to the positive relationship between inputs and costs is p1 (price of the labour 
input). We find significant negative coefficients in lnp1 and sqlnp1, surprisingly suggesting that 
a rise in labour cost brings down the operating costs of banks. We interpret it by arguing that 
there is a partial substitution between labour and other inputs like fixed assets.  Our studied 
period runs from 1993 to 2004. During this decade, the modern information processing 
technology was launched and widely adopted by the banking industry. Technical progress in the 
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field of computer and internet has greatly improved work efficiency, and has made it possible to 
lay off more workers. Especially with the price of labour input rising up, banks are motivated to 
replace the worker with the computer, which results in lower costs.  Thus, we find the negative 
coefficients of p1 in the cost function are understandable from an economic point of view. 
 
Revenue-based  measure 
 
Cte (taking no consideration of  
securities activities) 
 
CteTRA (with securities trading 
activities as the 3rd output)  
 
CteFEE (with underwriting activities 
as the 3rd output) 
 
CteFID (with fiduciary activities as 
the 3rd output) 
 
lnc Coef. Std. lnc Coef. Std. lnc Coef. Std. lnc Coef. Std. 
lnz1 0.02 0.12 lnz1 0.22* 0.13 lnz1 0.07 0.13 lnz1 0.87*** 0.15 
lnz2 0.55*** 0.09 lnz2 0.24** 0.11 lnz2 0.38*** 0.10 lnz2 0.45*** 0.12 
sqlnz1 0.13*** 0.02 sqlnz1 0.18*** 0.02 sqlnz1 0.13*** 0.02 sqlnz1 0.18*** 0.03 
sqlnz2 0.07*** 0.02 sqlnz2 0.09*** 0.03 sqlnz2 0.08*** 0.02 sqlnz2 0.06** 0.03 
lnp1 -0.68*** 0.06 lnp1 -0.63*** 0.07 lnp1 -0.70*** 0.08 lnp1 -0.92*** 0.09 
lnp2 -0.21** 0.10 lnp2 -0.36*** 0.12 lnp2 -0.32** 0.15 lnp2 -0.36*** 0.14 
sqlnp1 -0.01 0.01 sqlnp1 -0.01* 0.01 sqlnp1 -0.01** 0.01 sqlnp1 -0.07*** 0.01 
sqlnp2 0.11*** 0.03 sqlnp2 0.05 0.04 sqlnp2 0.06* 0.03 sqlnp2 -0.04 0.03 
lny1 0.06 0.09 lny1 -0.04 0.11 lny1 0.30*** 0.10 lny1 -0.21 0.15 
lny2 0.50*** 0.10 lny2 0.74*** 0.12 lny2 0.59*** 0.13 lny2 0.47*** 0.15 
   lny3 0.01 0.04 lny3 -0.18* 0.09 lny3 -0.17*** 0.07 
sqlny1 0.05*** 0.01 sqlny1 0.07*** 0.02 sqlny1 0.03** 0.02 sqlny1 0.08*** 0.02 
sqlny2 0.05*** 0.01 sqlny2 0.05*** 0.02 sqlny2 0.08*** 0.01 sqlny2 0.00 0.02 
   sqlny3 0.00 0.00 sqlny3 0.00 0.01 sqlny3 0.03*** 0.01 
lnp1p2 -0.34*** 0.04 lnp1p2 -0.28*** 0.04 lnp1p2 -0.23*** 0.05 lnp1p2 -0.06 0.04 
lnp1y2 -0.05*** 0.02 lnp1y2 0.02 0.02 lnp1y2 -0.01 0.02 lnp1y2 -0.06*** 0.03 
lnp1z1 -0.03 0.02 lnp1z1 -0.02 0.02 lnp1z1 0.01 0.02 lnp1z1 0.08*** 0.03 
lnp1z2 0.11*** 0.02 lnp1z2 0.08*** 0.02 lnp1z2 0.10*** 0.02 lnp1z2 0.16*** 0.02 
lnp2y1 0.00 0.02 lnp2y1 0.01 0.02 lnp2y1 0.02 0.02 lnp2y1 -0.03 0.02 
lnp2y2 0.04** 0.02 lnp2y2 0.03 0.02 lnp2y2 0.03 0.02 lnp2y2 0.07*** 0.02 
lnp2z1 -0.10*** 0.02 lnp2z1 -0.10*** 0.02 lnp2z1 -0.06*** 0.02 lnp2z1 0.00 0.02 
lnp2z2 0.07*** 0.02 lnp2z2 0.05** 0.02 lnp2z2 0.04** 0.02 lnp2z2 0.02 0.02 
lny1y2 -0.21*** 0.03 lny1y2 -0.19*** 0.04 lny1y2 -0.24*** 0.04 lny1y2 -0.22*** 0.05 
lny1z1 -0.01 0.02 lny1z1 -0.06*** 0.02 lny1z1 0.01 0.02 lny1z1 -0.03 0.02 
lny1z2 0.04*** 0.01 lny1z2 0.07*** 0.02 lny1z2 0.03** 0.01 lny1z2 0.05*** 0.02 
lny2z1 -0.01 0.01 lny2z1 -0.01 0.02 lny2z1 0.03** 0.01 lny2z1 0.00 0.02 
lny2z2 0.03*** 0.01 lny2z2 0.00 0.02 lny2z2 0.01 0.02 lny2z2 0.08*** 0.02 
lnz1z2 -0.19*** 0.03 lnz1z2 -0.21*** 0.04 lnz1z2 -0.21*** 0.03 lnz1z2 -0.31*** 0.05 
   lnp1y3 -0.03*** 0.01 lnp1y3 -0.06*** 0.01 lnp1y3 -0.07*** 0.01 
   lnp2y3 0.03*** 0.01 lnp2y3 -0.01 0.01 lnp2y3 -0.04*** 0.01 
   lny1y3 -0.01 0.01 lny1y3 0.02 0.01 lny1y3 -0.01 0.01 
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   lny2y3 0.01* 0.00 lny2y3 -0.01 0.01 lny2y3 0.01 0.01 
   lnz1y3 0.00 0.00 lnz1y3 -0.05*** 0.01 lnz1y3 -0.02** 0.01 
   lnz2y3 0.00 0.01 lnz2y3 0.03** 0.01 lnz2y3 -0.01 0.01 
_cons -3.92*** 0.40 _cons -3.36*** 0.42 _cons -3.37*** 0.43 _cons -3.75*** 0.57 
 
 
Asset-equivalent  measure 
 
Cte (taking no consideration of  
securities activities) 
 
CteTRA (with securities trading 
activities as the 3rd output) 
 
CteFEE (with underwriting activities 
as the 3rd output) 
 
CteFID (with fiduciary activities as 
the 3rd output) 
 
Asset 
equivalent  
measure            
            
lnc Coef. Std. lnc Coef. Std. lnc Coef. Std. lnc Coef. Std. 
            
lnz1 0.02 0.12 lnz1 0.22* 0.13 lnz1 0.33** 0.14 lnz1 1.36*** 0.18 
lnz2 0.55*** 0.09 lnz2 0.24** 0.11 lnz2 0.26*** 0.11 lnz2 0.20* 0.12 
sqlnz1 0.13*** 0.02 sqlnz1 0.18*** 0.02 sqlnz1 0.14*** 0.02 sqlnz1 0.23*** 0.03 
sqlnz2 0.07*** 0.02 sqlnz2 0.09*** 0.03 sqlnz2 0.10*** 0.02 sqlnz2 0.08*** 0.03 
lnp1 -0.68*** 0.06 lnp1 -0.63*** 0.07 lnp1 -0.62*** 0.11 lnp1 -0.70*** 0.11 
lnp2 -0.21** 0.10 lnp2 -0.36*** 0.12 lnp2 -0.67*** 0.19 lnp2 -0.39* 0.23 
sqlnp1 -0.01 0.01 sqlnp1 -0.01* 0.01 sqlnp1 -0.02*** 0.01 sqlnp1 -0.09*** 0.01 
sqlnp2 0.11*** 0.03 sqlnp2 0.05 0.04 sqlnp2 -0.01 0.04 sqlnp2 -0.06 0.04 
lny1 0.06 0.09 lny1 -0.04 0.11 lny1 0.22* 0.12 lny1 0.07 0.15 
lny2 0.50*** 0.10 lny2 0.74*** 0.12 lny2 0.28** 0.12 lny2 0.07 0.16 
   lny3 0.01 0.04 lny3 0.09 0.08 lny3 -0.21*** 0.06 
sqlny1 0.05*** 0.01 sqlny1 0.07*** 0.02 sqlny1 0.04** 0.02 sqlny1 0.01 0.03 
sqlny2 0.05*** 0.01 sqlny2 0.05*** 0.02 sqlny2 0.08*** 0.01 sqlny2 -0.03 0.03 
   sqlny3 0.00 0.00 sqlny3 0.00 0.00 sqlny3 0.01** 0.00 
lnp1p2 -0.34*** 0.04 lnp1p2 -0.28*** 0.04 lnp1p2 -0.27*** 0.07 lnp1p2 -0.10 0.06 
lnp1y2 -0.05*** 0.02 lnp1y2 0.02 0.02 lnp1y2 -0.05*** 0.02 lnp1y2 -0.09*** 0.03 
lnp1z1 -0.03 0.02 lnp1z1 -0.02 0.02 lnp1z1 0.02 0.03 lnp1z1 0.17*** 0.03 
lnp1z2 0.11*** 0.02 lnp1z2 0.08*** 0.02 lnp1z2 0.11*** 0.02 lnp1z2 0.11*** 0.02 
lnp2y1 0.00 0.02 lnp2y1 0.01 0.02 lnp2y1 0.04* 0.02 lnp2y1 -0.02 0.03 
lnp2y2 0.04** 0.02 lnp2y2 0.03 0.02 lnp2y2 -0.02 0.02 lnp2y2 0.05** 0.03 
lnp2z1 -0.10*** 0.02 lnp2z1 -0.10*** 0.02 lnp2z1 -0.07*** 0.02 lnp2z1 0.01 0.03 
lnp2z2 0.07*** 0.02 lnp2z2 0.05** 0.02 lnp2z2 0.03 0.02 lnp2z2 0.00 0.03 
lny1y2 -0.21*** 0.03 lny1y2 -0.19*** 0.04 lny1y2 -0.20*** 0.04 lny1y2 -0.09* 0.05 
lny1z1 -0.01 0.02 lny1z1 -0.06*** 0.02 lny1z1 -0.04** 0.02 lny1z1 -0.05*** 0.02 
lny1z2 0.04*** 0.01 lny1z2 0.07*** 0.02 lny1z2 0.06*** 0.01 lny1z2 0.06*** 0.02 
lny2z1 -0.01 0.01 lny2z1 -0.01 0.02 lny2z1 0.00 0.01 lny2z1 -0.02 0.02 
lny2z2 0.03*** 0.01 lny2z2 0.00 0.02 lny2z2 -0.01 0.02 lny2z2 0.08*** 0.02 
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lnz1z2 -0.19*** 0.03 lnz1z2 -0.21*** 0.04 lnz1z2 -0.16*** 0.04 lnz1z2 -0.32*** 0.05 
   lnp1y3 -0.03*** 0.01 lnp1y3 -0.03** 0.01 lnp1y3 -0.07*** 0.01 
   lnp2y3 0.03*** 0.01 lnp2y3 0.03** 0.01 lnp2y3 -0.02** 0.01 
   lny1y3 -0.01 0.01 lny1y3 0.01 0.01 lny1y3 0.00 0.01 
   lny2y3 0.01* 0.00 lny2y3 0.01 0.01 lny2y3 0.01 0.01 
   lnz1y3 0.00 0.00 lnz1y3 0.00 0.01 lnz1y3 -0.01 0.01 
   lnz2y3 0.00 0.01 lnz2y3 -0.02* 0.01 lnz2y3 -0.01 0.01 
_cons -3.92*** 0.40 _cons -3.36*** 0.42 _cons -4.22*** 0.59 _cons -3.80*** 0.68 
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Chapter 7   Concluding Remarks 
 
 
7.1 Main Findings: 
This dissertation presents a study of securities activities undertaken by US bank holding 
companies during the last decade. Securities activities are categorized into three different types, 
namely securities trading, underwriting and fiduciary activities. We empirically analyze how the 
three types of securities activities affect profitability, risk and efficiency of bank holding 
companies. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a close look at the on-going theoretical debates on the advantages and 
disadvantages of commercial banks’ expansion into securities activities.  It also reviews 
empirical literature dealing with historical evidence and contemporary surveys of banks with 
securities activities. Chapter 3 portrays our classification of the three types of securities activities. 
This chapter proves fiduciary activities, besides trading and underwriting activities, to be non-
negligible securities activities of bank holding companies. It also provides a preliminary 
description of the characteristics of different types of securities activities, and serves as a basis 
for our analyses of these activities in later chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 contributes to the discussion about the profitability effects of securities activities on 
bank holding companies. Employing a quadratic function, we find that the relationship between a 
bank’s profitability and its involvement in securities activities is non-linear. Securities 
underwriting and fiduciary activities enhance bank profitability only when underwriting and 
fiduciary incomes lie above certain thresholds, implying a “top-player” rule in the securities 
activities sector.  Securities trading activities, on the contrary, are not affected by an explicit 
threshold.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with the risk effects of banks’ securities activities. A bank’s total risk is 
decomposed into market risk and interest rate risk. We find that these risks respond differently to 
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the various types of securities activities. A bank’s exposure to market risk increases with 
securities trading activities, whereas its interest rate risk falls with trading, keeping the total risk 
unchanged. Underwriting activities reduce the total risk of banks and leave the two specific risks 
untouched, indicating that the underwriting risk is properly hedged. More importantly, against 
the common expectation that fiduciary risk is borne by the trustors and that banks as assets 
managing agents are risk free, we find a bank undertaking fiduciary activities significantly 
increases its total risk, due largely to the increment of the bank’s market risk. 
 
Moreover, in chapter 6, we concentrate on the influence of securities activities on bank 
efficiency. Bank cost efficiency is calibrated by the stochastic frontier analysis based on a 
transcendental logarithm cost function. We compare the mean efficiency scores of banks with 
and without securities activities, and find that all three types of securities activities increase bank 
efficiency scores significantly. Both the Asset-Equivalent-Measure and the Revenue-Based-Measure 
are adopted to define the securities activities outputs - the results, however, turn out to be unaffected 
by different measures. 
 
The policy implication of the study is to cautiously support the current deregulation tide to create 
integrated financial service providers. Economists frequently worry about the potential risk of 
commercial banks’ expanding into securities activities. This study, however, allows us to argue 
that the risk effects are specifically related to a particular type of securities activities and are 
specially related to a particular risk, and should therefore not be feared too much. Moreover, 
since these securities activities affect various kinds of bank risks in different ways, an 
appropriate combination of these activities could serve as a useful tool in bank operations, 
helping bank managers to adjust the bank’s risk exposure. Besides, we find a “broader” bank 
combining both commercial banking activities and securities activities is economically more 
efficient than a specialized commercial bank. Nevertheless, the rule of “top-player” in the 
profitability analysis suggests that only a few top banks which are strong enough to overcome 
various operating barriers in the securities industry are able to make profits from this 
combination. Large numbers of small and middle-sized banks, therefore, have to be very 
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cautious when stepping into the securities market.  Such evidence helps to formulate 
recommendations for both policy makers and bank managers.  
 
7.2. Directions for Further Research:  
 
The research in this dissertation focuses on the deregulation effects of the US banking industry. 
This deregulation tide, however, is not exclusively observed in the US. Starting in the 1980s, 
reforms towards a more integrated financial industry have taken place in numerous developed as 
well as in developing countries. An interesting extension of this topic might be comparing 
profitability, risk and efficiency effects of the US banking industry with those of other 
economies. In detail, such research should be extended into a panel of various countries while 
controlling for differences in the economic growth rate, the structure of the banking market, and 
the relative size of bank financing and stock market financing. Particularly, the comparison with 
China as the world’s biggest developing country would be of great research interest. 
 
During the past twenty years the Chinese banking industry has been hovering between the 
separating banking system and the universal banking system. Banks holding securities 
subsidiaries have once been common until the first half of the 1990s. In 1993, however, the 
collapse of certain stock market bubbles and of the real estate market has greatly impaired the 
banking system by bankrupting some financial institutions and leaving the others with numerous 
non-performing assets. This turmoil has directly contributed to the legal separation of banking 
industry and securities industry in 1995. Yet a few big banks still manage to circumvent this 
restriction by establishing oversea securities branches to participate in the domestic securities 
market.  
 
Years after the separating banking system has been enacted, policy makers are now 
endeavouring to develop a more flexible framework for a limited integrated banking system, in 
order to meet the increasingly diversified financing demand of the growing economy. In addition 
to the legal underwriting of government bonds, the central bank has for some years now 
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gradually extended the banks’ underwriting power into the corporate bonds market. Also, 
starting 2005, Chinese bank have been permitted to undertake a wide range of fiduciary activities 
under the condition that they establish sound internal control procedures and operational risk 
management.119  Among the three types of securities activities, the securities trading activity now 
remains the last and only taboo.    
 
Our current study is of interest in that its categorization of the three types of securities activities 
fits well with the stepwise deregulation in China. This study justifies the order of deregulating 
underwriting activities earlier than other types of securities activities, in that we find the 
underwriting risks to be effectively put under control in the practice of US bank holding 
companies. Nevertheless, our study does not support tabooing securities trading. In fact, 
securities trading activities increase banks’ market risk but reduce their interest rate risk, thus 
providing a useful instrument for banks to manage their risk structure. Moreover, this study 
reminds policy makers and banks to be aware of the risk of fiduciary activities.  
 
For our study to be more applicable to developing countries, we may extend our future research 
by also taking the particular macroeconomic environments of the studied countries into 
consideration. In contrast to the rather stable macroeconomic features in developed countries, 
many developing countries have experienced some kind of economic transition in recent years. 
Moreover, banks in developing countries typically have much higher rates of non-performing 
loans, weaker risk management procedures, and inadequate capital adequacy. These differences 
constitute a distinctive feature of the banking industries in various studied countries, and are to 
be taken into account in future research.  
                                                 
119 See “Mandate of Commercial Banks Establishing Fund Management Companies”, the People’s Bank of China, 
Feb 20th, 2005.  
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